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11 Introduction
1.1 Members of the committee
A Review Committee, chaired by His Honour David Jones AM, conducted the Review. 
The committee members have a broad range of relevant experience. The members are:
His Honour David Jones AM
Mr David Jones was a Judge of the Victorian County Court from 1986 to 2002 and 
a Reserve Judge from 2002 to 2004. He is a lawyer with over forty years experience. 
He contributed to the establishment of the Victorian Office of Special Investigations 
Monitor (SIM) and served as Victoria’s SIM from 2004 to 2009. Mr Jones has 
also served as Chairman of both the Accident Compensation and the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunals. Mr Jones was President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
in 1998-1999. He was a member of the Adult Parole Board for 12 years and is a part 
time Commissioner of the Victorian Law Reform Commission.
Lieutenant General (Retd) Mark Evans AO DSC 
Lieutenant General Mark Evans retired from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in 
2011. Most of General Evans’s career in the Australian Army has been spent primarily 
in command, operational and joint deployment. His last appointment in the ADF was 
as Chief of Joint Operations during which he commanded all operationally deployed 
ADF forces. Since retirement, General Evans continues to mentor senior military 
officers in their preparation for operational commands. He is the current chair of the 
Australian Defence College Advisory Board, and was until recently the Chair of the 
Advisory Committee to the Queensland Premier regarding the Commemoration of the 
ANZAC Centenary. In addition, he has conducted a number of reviews for Federal and 
State Government Departments.
Kieran Walshe APM
Kieran Walshe is a retired Deputy Commissioner with Victoria Police, retiring in 2012 
after 44 years of service. His service was primarily focused around command and 
control of operational and emergency management activities. Prior to retirement, he 
was active in counter-terrorism activities representing Victoria Police at both State 
and National level. Additionally he attended international counter-terrorism training 
programs run by the Australian Federal Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Since his retirement he has been appointed to the Adult Parole Board, and a number 
of other boards of not for profit organisations. 
21.2 Terms of reference
The terms of reference are set out in Appendix A of this report. 
1.3 Conduct of the Review
The Review commenced at the end of January 2014. A website for the Review was 
established. The Review Committee publicly advertised the Review and sought 
comments or submissions from interested persons or organisations and asked them to 
indicate whether they would like to attend a public hearing.
Consultations were held with a number of organisations relevant to the Review, 
namely, Victoria Police, Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO), Public Interest Monitor (PIM), Victorian Inspectorate (VI), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), WorkSafe Victoria (WorkSafe) and Department of Premier 
and Cabinet (DPC). Some of the information provided was private and some public. 
Some agencies were provided with a list of relevant issues which the Review Committee 
considered arose from the Review and asked for their views. These were provided. 
The information provided by the agencies has been of critical importance to the 
conduct of the Review. The Committee is appreciative of the co-operation and 
assistance provided by these agencies.
The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the Charter) has been 
enacted since the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 (TCPA) was passed. 
Consequently, the compatibility of the TCPA with the Charter was not considered 
when the legislation was enacted. It has been necessary for this to be done as part 
of the Review. The Committee engaged Counsel, Joanna Davidson, to assist in the 
consideration of the Charter issues which are an important part of the Review. Her 
advice and assistance on these issues has been invaluable and much appreciated. 
In the light of constitutional issues that arose in the Review the advice of the Solicitor-
General was obtained by the Review Committee. Further reference is made to this 
advice later in the Report. The Review Committee are appreciative of the advice and 
assistance provided by the Solicitor-General. 
In conducting the Review and preparing this Report the Review Committee have been 
assisted by Lisa Farrell, Senior Strategic Adviser, Criminal Justice Division, Department 
of Justice and Stephen Brockway, Legislative Adviser. Their assistance has been of 
great value to the Review Committee and is very much appreciated. 
1.3.1 COAG Review
A review of Commonwealth and State and Territory counter-terrorism legislation was 
carried out by a Council of Australian Governments (COAG) appointed Committee 
in 2012 and 2013. The report COAG Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Report 2013 (COAG Report) was tabled in the Federal Parliament on 14 May 2013. 
David Jones, who is the Chair of this Review Committee, was also a member of the 
COAG Committee.
The COAG Report has been important to the Review Committee’s conduct of 
this review of the Victorian legislation as it covers areas the subject of this Review. 
Reference is made to it when reviewing the various Victorian legislative provisions. In 
addition, the Review Committee have had access to the submissions to the COAG 
Review and the transcript of the public hearings. This has been of assistance to the 
3Review Committee and the preparedness of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s 
Office to provide the material is appreciated.
1.3.2 INSLM Reports
In the conduct of the Review, the Review Committee have been conscious of the 
important role played by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor 
(INSLM).
The INSLM is appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister under the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth) 
(INSLM Act). 
The duty of the INLSM is to assist Commonwealth ministers to review Australia’s 
counter-terrorism and national security legislation so as to ensure that it:
• Is effective in deterring and preventing terrorist activity and responsive in dealing 
with it;
•	 Is	consistent	with	Australia’s	international	counter-terrorism	and	security	
obligations; and
•	 Contains	appropriate	safeguards	for	protecting	the	rights	of	individuals.
The INSLM’s functions, set out at section 6 of the INSLM Act, can be summarised as 
considering whether the legislation remains appropriate, proportionate and necessary. 
He or she must report annually to the Prime Minister. 
The INSLM’s reviews are not only of Commonwealth legislation:
“ … but also with regard to arrangements between the Commonwealth,  
the States and Territories for a national approach to countering terrorism.”1
Consideration has been given to the INSLM’s reports where they are relevant to 
issues arising in this Review and, where appropriate, reference is made to them when 
reviewing the legislative provisions.
1.3.3 Submissions 
Written submissions were received from Victoria Police, the Human Rights Law Centre 
(the Centre) and His Honour Judge Maidment, a Judge of the County Court. The AFP 
referred the Review Committee to sections of their written submission to the COAG 
Committee. Further reference is made to the Victoria Police and AFP submissions later 
in this Report. The Human Rights Law Centre submission addresses human rights 
issues including the application of the Charter to the legislation under review. The views 
expressed by the Centre have been taken into account by the Review Committee 
when considering the impact of the Charter on the legislation. General matters relating 
to counter-terrorism powers have also been raised by the Centre and have been taken 
into account by the Review Committee where relevant to the review. The Centre made 
a submission to the COAG Review. His Honour Judge Maidment in his submission 
adapted the submission he provided to the COAG Committee. His views have been 
taken into account. The Review Committee appreciates the assistance provided by the 
Centre and Judge Maidment to the review.
1 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Annual Report, 16 December 2011 at page 4. (INSLM Report, 
2011).
41.3.4 Hearing
A public hearing was advertised. However, as only a few submissions were received 
and those who provided submissions did not wish to present at a public hearing, the 
Review Committee decided not to proceed. 
1.3.5 List of acronyms
Acronym Definition
ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
COAG Council of Australian Governments
DHS Department of Human Services 
DOJ Department of Justice
HCDG High Consequence Dangerous Goods
IBAC Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission
INSLM Independent National Security Legislation Monitor
PACIA Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association
PDO Preventative Detention Order
PIM Public Interest Monitor
RIS Regulatory Impact Statement
SARC Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee 
SSAN Security Sensitive Ammonium Nitrate
52.1 The legislative imperative
The tightened security environment around the world following, in particular, the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 2001 led 
Australian governments to review their own counter-terrorism measures. Those events 
had clearly demonstrated that previous assumptions regarding the potential nature, 
form and immediacy of terrorist threats against Australia were no longer valid. 
In April 2002, the Prime Minister, State Premiers and Chief Ministers met at the 
National Summit on Terrorism and Multi-jurisdictional Crime, where a stronger 
framework to meet the emerging challenge of combating terrorism was discussed.  
Six key elements with regard to counter-terrorism were agreed upon:
“1. The Commonwealth to have responsibility for “national terrorist situations”, 
to include attacks on Commonwealth targets, multi-jurisdictional attacks, 
threats against civil aviation and those including chemical, biological 
radiological and nuclear material;
2. The Commonwealth will consult and seek the agreement of affected 
States and Territories before a national terrorist situation is declared, 
and States and Territories agree not to withhold unreasonably such 
agreement;
3. To take whatever action is necessary to ensure that terrorists can be 
prosecuted under the criminal law, including a reference of power of 
specific, jointly agreed legislation;
4. All jurisdictions will review their legislation and counter-terrorism 
arrangements to make sure they are sufficiently strong;
5. The Commonwealth and States and Territories will continue to:
 a.   improve Australia’s anti-terrorist intelligence capacity and to develop 
effective means for sharing intelligence; and
 b.  respond rapidly and effectively;  
6. The existing Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/
State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) will be 
reconstituted as the National Counter-Terrorism Committee with a broader 
mandate to cover protection and consequence management issues with 
Ministerial oversight arrangements.” 2
This new national framework, and the establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, took effect in the Intergovernmental Agreement on Australia’s National 
Counter-Terrorism Arrangements, signed by all the Heads of Government on 
24 October 2002. Whilst this agreement reflected the Commonwealth’s enhanced  
2 The Commonwealth and States and Territories Agreement on Terrorism and Multi-jurisdictional Crime, 5 April 2002.
2 Background to the Terrorism  
(Community Protection) Act 2003
6role in a “national terrorist situation”, it also made clear the role that State agencies 
would continue to have, reinforcing the need to enhance Victoria Police’s counter-
terrorism capabilities.
As part of its side of the agreement of April 2002, the Commonwealth Parliament 
enacted a series of statutes3 creating new terrorism offences and making amendments 
to Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code)4 which relates to 
terrorism. In 2003, the Commonwealth Parliament re-enacted Part 5.35 of the Criminal 
Code, so as to put its constitutional validity beyond doubt, based on powers referred 
to it by States under section 51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution.6 In Victoria, that referral of 
powers was effected by the Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2003. 
The fourth head of agreement mentioned earlier, however, said that States and 
Territories would review their legislation and counter-terrorism arrangements to ensure 
they were sufficiently strong. Moreover, it had been agreed that each would enact 
their own legislation in order to fill any gaps in the overall counter-terrorism framework 
caused by Commonwealth inability to legislate for constitutional reasons. In Victoria, 
the result was the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 (TCPA) now under 
review. A document setting out the equivalent Commonwealth, State and Territory 
provisions for covert search warrants, preventative detention and special police powers 
can be found at Appendix B to this Report. 
2.2 Policy development in Victoria
The Standing Advisory Committee for Protection Against Violence, of which the 
Victorian Government was a part, was formed to consider national counter-terrorism 
arrangements in the aftermath of the bombing of the Sydney Hilton Hotel in February 
1978. Victorian arrangements were incrementally developed further over time, as part 
of a common set of emergency management provisions, influenced by a number of 
incidents, including the:
1. Ash Wednesday bushfires of February 1983;
2. Russell Street Police Headquarters bombing in March 1986;
3. Bombing of the Turkish Consulate in South Yarra in November 1986;
4. Port Arthur massacre in April 1996;
5. Explosion at the Esso gas processing plant at Longford in September 1998; and
6. Large scale anti-globalisation protests at the World Economic Forum Asia Pacific 
Economic Summit in Melbourne in September 2000.
Victoria’s arrangements were based on the “all hazards, all agencies” principle, to 
deal with all emergencies, natural as well as potentially criminal. The Major Incidents 
Committee of Cabinet had been established in 1999, to ensure close co-operation 
between all relevant State agencies.
3 The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth); the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 
2002 (Cth); the Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002 (Cth). 
4 The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code).
5 The Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth).
6 Section 51 states “The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have powers to make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to… (xxxvii) matters referred to the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, so that the law shall extend only 
to States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred, or which afterwards adopt the law”. Effectively, the States 
by referral lend power to the Commonwealth (in the sense that a referral can be withdrawn by a State) so that its 
ability to legislate on matters covered by the referral is beyond constitutional challenge.
7In November 2002, following the National Summit in April of that year and the signing 
of the Intergovernmental Agreement in October, the Victorian Government released 
its counter-terrorism policy statement “Enhancing Victoria’s Domestic Security: New 
measures for the fight against terrorism”. In it, the Government acknowledged that 
co-operation between Commonwealth and State agencies could and should be 
increased. Prevention of terrorist acts could be improved, and there was a need to 
strengthen the law to ensure that any person engaging in terrorist activities could be 
appropriately prosecuted.
This policy statement described a range of major reviews that had been undertaken in 
Victoria, including the establishment of strengthened relationships with private-sector 
utility providers and enhanced agency-wide risk management procedures. The Premier 
continued to stress, however, that Victoria’s approach to the threat of terrorism as 
being a part of the wider “all hazards, all agencies” approach, would continue. He said:
“Victoria has deliberately avoided establishing dedicated counter-terrorist 
structures. The framework and protocols for responding to all State and 
national emergency situations should be broadly consistent to avoid 
operational confusion during an emergency. Victorians rely on the same 
people to protect them through natural disasters and civil catastrophes.” 7
Nevertheless, a package of new measures and funding commitments was announced 
in that policy statement, amongst them the creation of a Risk Assessment and 
Counter-Terrorism Co-ordination Group within Victoria Police and a new high level 
Security Policy Unit within the Department of Premier and Cabinet, together with 
the establishment of a new State Crisis Centre and the funding of new surveillance, 
communications and forensic equipment.
2.3 The Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 
The Terrorism (Community Protection) Bill (the Bill) was introduced into Parliament by 
the Premier in February 2003. The Premier explained that the intent of the legislation 
was not to comprehensively cover all terrorist activities in Victoria, but to complement 
existing Commonwealth counter-terrorism measures, plugging the gaps in areas over 
which Victoria would retain responsibility.
In the course of the second reading speech, the Premier stated:
“The bill proposes important new powers and obligations to ensure that there 
is in Victoria an adequate framework to prevent, and in a worst-case scenario 
respond to, a terrorist act. While the new measures are robust, they are also 
finely balanced to ensure that important civil liberties are not unduly infringed.” 8
With bipartisan support, the Bill moved swiftly through both Houses of the Parliament, 
passing without amendment, and was granted Royal Assent on 15 April 2003.
7 “Enhancing Victoria’s Domestic Security: New measures for the fight against terrorism” at page 7.
8 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Thursday 27 February 2003) at page 164.
8The key aspects of the Bill as originally passed and assented to, which will be outlined 
more comprehensively later in this report, are as follows:
1. Covert Search Warrants – providing for a Supreme Court judge to issue a covert 
search warrant to the police where he or she is satisfied that an act of terrorism 
has occurred or is likely to occur, and that the covert entry and search would 
substantially assist the police in their investigations;
2. Powers to Detain and Decontaminate – granting special powers to the police to 
deal with actual or suspected chemical, biological or radiological attack in order to 
contain or prevent contamination; 
3. Mandatory reporting of the theft or loss of prescribed chemicals or other 
substances – occupiers of premises from which chemicals that could be used to 
make bombs had gone missing were now compelled to report the loss to police;
4. Protection of Information – allowing courts and tribunals to protect information 
about sensitive counter-terrorism activities from disclosure.
The Parts of the TCPA dealing with Powers to Detain and Decontaminate and 
Protection of Information came into force on the day after Royal Assent, 16 April 2003. 
Part 2, dealing with covert search warrants, came into force on 16 October 2003, but 
that relating to the loss of chemicals, etc. (Part 4) was not proclaimed to come into 
force until 1 July 2004.
The TCPA contains, at Part 6, measures dealing with the risk management of essential 
services infrastructure. This Part is outside the scope of this Review, and was reviewed 
in a separate report9 by Lieutenant General Mark Evans, AO DSC, who is also a 
member of this Review Committee. 
The TCPA also made provision (at Part 8) for amending the Freedom of Information Act 
1982 (FOI Act) and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (VCAT Act), 
reflecting provisions in Commonwealth legislation of even date. 
As a result of the amendments made, section 29A of the FOI Act exempts 
from disclosure documents that, if disclosed, would or could reasonably be 
expected to cause damage to national or State/Territory security, the defence of 
the Commonwealth or international relations. A Department Head or the Chief 
Commissioner of Police may certify that such a document is exempt from disclosure. 
The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) is able to investigate whether 
there are reasonable grounds for the claimed exemption and, if it finds in the negative, 
can notify the responsible minister. The minister is entitled to ignore that finding, 
however, and refuse to revoke the certificate, providing that he or she tables the 
reasons for the refusal and the VCAT finding in Parliament. 
The provisions added to Part 8 of Schedule 1 to the VCAT Act provide, amongst other 
things, for hearings to be held in private when considering challenges to the validity of 
a certificate exempting such security sensitive documents.
The TCPA was significantly amended in 2006,as discussed below.
9 Review of the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet in supporting the Premier in the administration of 
“Part 6 – Essential Services Infrastructure Risk Management” of the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003, 
July 2012.
92.4 A changing legislative landscape
A special meeting of COAG was held on 27 September 2005. The meeting had been 
called to consider the evolving terrorism threat and security environment in Australia 
following the attacks on the London public transport system in July 2005, in which 
52 people had died. A range of legislative measures were discussed including the 
strengthening of existing powers and the creation of new ones, such as preventative 
detention orders, control orders, special stop and search powers at transport hubs or 
mass gatherings and access to airline information.
COAG was briefed on the security situation both domestically and overseas by the 
Office of National Assessments and ASIO. Whilst the national counter-terrorism alert 
remained at medium, as it had since its introduction in 2003, an attack on Australia 
continued to be feasible and could occur.
It was agreed at the meeting that there was a clear case for counter-terrorism laws to 
be strengthened. It was further agreed between the leaders, however, that any new 
laws should be based on a set of fundamental principles that had been expounded by 
the Victorian Government.10
Just prior to that special COAG meeting, the Victorian Government had released, on 
21 September 2005, a further policy paper, “Protecting Our Community: Attacking the 
Causes of Terrorism.” The Government reaffirmed its commitment to the ‘all hazards, 
all agencies’ approach to emergency management as the foundation of its security 
arrangements. However, with a view to addressing continuing security concerns, 
and with an eye to the Commonwealth Games scheduled for 2006 in Melbourne, the 
Government signalled its intention to bring to COAG proposals for new legislation to 
enhance Australia’s security capability, whilst ensuring at the same time that any new 
laws should: 
•	 Be	necessary;
•	 Be	effective;
•	 Contain	appropriate	safeguards	against	abuse,	such	as	parliamentary	 
and judicial review;
•	 Be	exercised	in	a	way	that	was	evidence-based,	intelligence-led	 
and proportionate; and
•	 Be	subject	to	a	legislative	sunset.
The policy paper stated: 
“All proposals to change our national legislative approach to terrorism must be 
considered carefully, as they raise complex legal and constitutional issues, as 
well as civil liberty and human rights issues. Australian Governments will need 
to work cooperatively and purposefully through these issues, with advice from 
their respective Solicitors-General and other agencies, before reaching any 
agreed outcomes. There should also be provision for a joint Commonwealth-
State review mechanism to ensure regular assessment of the necessity and 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism legislative measures.” 11
10 Council of Australian Governments’ Communiqué, Special Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, 27 September 2005  
at page 3.
11 Protecting Our Community: Attacking the Causes of Terrorism; Victorian Policy Paper 2005 at page 9.
10
Following the special COAG meeting, additions and amendments were made to the 
Criminal Code, including provision for control orders, restricting the movements and 
ability to communicate of people who were thought to pose a terrorism threat, and 
preventative detention orders (PDOs), to enable the preventative detention of persons 
for up to 48 hours to prevent a terrorist act or to preserve evidence of an act that had 
occurred.12
As well as agreeing to these amendments to the Criminal Code,13 State and Territory 
leaders agreed to enact legislation which, because of constitutional constraints, the 
Commonwealth was unable to make. This included preventative detention for up to 
14 days (rather than the 48 hours provided for above) and stop and search powers 
in areas such as transport hubs and places of mass gathering. Victoria’s contribution 
to this national statutory framework of counter-terrorism laws was the Terrorism 
(Community Protection) Amendment Act 2006 (TCPA Amendment Act).
2.5 The Terrorism (Community Protection) Amendment Act 2006
The TCPA Amendment Act, which made substantial and important amendments to the 
TCPA, was introduced into Parliament in November 2005. Its objects were to:
•	 Prevent	a	terrorist	act	from	occurring;
•	 Preserve	the	evidence	related	to	a	terrorist	act;	and
•	 Assist	the	community	to	recover	from	an	attack.
It gave Victoria Police a number of substantial new powers with which to meet these 
objectives. 
During his second reading speech on 16 November 2005, the Premier justified the new 
provisions as follows:
“The consequences of terrorist acts place police under great pressure to 
intervene earlier to prevent a terrorist act with less knowledge than they would 
have had using traditional policing methods. In our society, individual liberties 
must always be balanced against the needs of the community, in particular 
community safety. We already have laws that restrict individual liberty for the 
benefit of the community. This bill strikes that balance between empowering 
police to undertake their functions for the benefit of the community without 
unnecessarily interfering with personal freedoms.” 14
He confirmed that, in his view, the proposals met the criteria set out in the Protecting 
Our Community: Attacking the Causes of Terrorism policy paper. 
12 The Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth) amended existing offences in the Criminal Code regarding the giving or 
receiving of training connected to a terrorist act, possessing things connected to a terrorist act, collecting or 
making documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts, other acts done in preparation for a terrorist act and the 
financing of terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism (No.2) Act 2005 (Cth) contained new provisions relating to the definition 
and proscription of terrorist organisations and the funding of terrorists or terrorist organisations, as well as the 
control order and preventative detention order provisions. 
13 The amendments made by the Anti-Terrorism (No. 2) Act 2005 (Cth) required the agreement of a majority of 
States and Territories, because they were express amendments to Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code, which relied on 
constitutionally referred legislative powers.
14 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Wednesday 16 November 2005) at page 2177. 
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The Premier also indicated that the Bill would not be brought back to the Assembly 
for debate until February 2006, to allow for further consultation and discussion of 
the proposals, and also to await the Senate’s public inquiry into the provisions of the 
draft Commonwealth legislation (the Anti-Terrorism (No.2) Bill) and the final form of 
that legislation.
During that period, an inquiry into the provisions of the Bill was held by the Scrutiny of 
Acts and Regulations Committee of Parliament (SARC). It received written submissions 
from 10 organisations or individuals, and held a public hearing on 31 January 2006. 
Their report was tabled on 7 February 2006,15 and they wrote to the Premier the same 
day, seeking advice or clarification. The Premier replied two days later.16
When the Bill returned to the Assembly on 9 February 2006, some 206 house 
amendments had been tabled (though many were merely consequential). Many of the 
amendments dealt with issues debated and raised by the SARC. 
Due to the Government’s pre-briefing of the shadow Attorney-General and the Leader 
of the National Party, support for the Bill and the tabled amendments had been 
obtained.
The most significant effect of the TCPA Amendment Act was to add to the police’s 
armoury:
•	 PDOs	and	prohibited	contact	orders	(contact	orders)	(Part	2A	of	the	TCPA,	
inserted by section 4); both pro-active and re-active powers allowing the police 
to detain in custody persons where an imminent terrorist act is suspected, or 
following an act for the purposes of preserving evidence; and
•	 Special	Police	Powers	(Part	3A,	inserted	by	section	5);	particularly	stop,	search	
and seizure powers to protect mass gatherings, or prevent a suspected imminent 
terrorist act, or to recover from an act that has occurred and apprehend those 
responsible or to protect essential services infrastructure.
These provisions will be considered in depth later in this Report.
The TCPA Amendment Act also provided some refinement of the covert search 
warrant powers in Part 2 of the TCPA, enhancing the grounds on which a warrant 
may be sought by the police.17 In this regard, during his second reading speech, the 
Premier said:
“The current power of police to obtain covert search warrants does not allow 
a warrant unless the target is known and the terrorist attack is imminent. This 
power is too limited. The bill extends the power to obtain a warrant to prevent 
the planning of a terrorist act at some time in the future or the prevention of an 
imminent terrorist act where the target is unknown.” 18
15 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee Alert Digest No 1 of 2006 (“SARC Alert Digest No 1 of 2006”).
16 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee Alert Digest No 2 of 2006 (“SARC Alert Digest No 2 of 2006”).
17 TCPA Amendment Act at section 8(1).
18 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Wednesday 16 November 2005) at page 2178.
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During the course of the second reading debate, a number of contributors commented 
on the potentially oppressive nature of some of the measures proposed. The shadow 
Attorney-General described the Bill as “very serious and draconian”19 and continued:
“My own view is that it may be the most draconian bill I will ever have to deal 
with as shadow Attorney-General – hopefully in Government I would not have 
to deal with such a bill”.20
In fact, most of the house amendments tabled that day had provided additional 
safeguards against the abuse of the new proposed powers, or were to make it more 
difficult to obtain authorisation to use those powers at all. For example:
•	 Clause	13C	had	originally	provided	for	PDOs	to	be	issued	by	a	senior	police	officer	
(ie. of or above the rank of Assistant Commissioner) in circumstances where the 
application was urgent and it was impracticable to go to the Supreme Court for an 
order. This proposal was abandoned by February 2006;
•	 A	significant	number	of	amendments	were	made	to	the	proposals	as	they	related	
to minors, making special provision for persons aged between 16 and 18 years of 
age held under a PDO, such as detention in a youth justice facility, etc. These will 
be outlined in detail in Chapter 8;
•	 Clause	13F(4)(f)(iii)	of	the	Bill	provided	that	the	Court	may,	as	part	of	an	order,	ban	
a detainee from informing a person with whom he or she was having contact to 
tell that other person the length of detention ordered. This was now expressly 
permitted in all cases (section 13ZD(3)(c));
•	 Clause	13F(6)	was	added	in	the	interim	period,	whereby	the	Court	may	order	that	
a detainee’s contact with his or her lawyer may not be monitored;
•	 The	possibility	of	more	and	earlier	involvement	of	the	Victorian	Ombudsman	and	
the Director, Police Integrity was now in the Bill;
•	 Provisions	for	special	assistance	to	be	given	to	people	with	an	inadequate	
knowledge of the English language or a disability were added (for example, what 
are now sections 13JA and 13ZF(4) – (6)); and
•	 What	is	now	section	13KA(4)	was	added,	setting	more	onerous	grounds	to	be	
satisfied before the granting of a contact order. 
The Bill again passed through both Houses with bipartisan support, and was assented 
to on 7 March 2006. The relevant provisions came into force on 9 March 2006. It also 
extended, by 10 years, the operation of the TCPA, which had been due to sunset on 
1 December 2006.21
19 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Thursday 9 February 2006) at page 185.
20 Ibid also at page 185.
21 TCPA at section 41.
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2.6 The Terrorism (Community Protection) Further Amendment 
Act 2006
One month after the TCPA Amendment Act was made, the Terrorism (Community 
Protection) Further Amendment Act 2006 (TCPA Further Amendment Act) was said 
by the Attorney-General, to “reflect further consideration” of the TCPA.22 He was quick 
to point out however that no additions were being made to the powers so recently 
introduced and enacted.
Of interest for the purposes of this report, the TCPA Further Amendment Act included 
some enhancements to the powers regarding detention and decontamination in Part 3, 
and to the provisions which impose reporting duties in respect of missing chemicals in 
Part 4. These amendments are described further in Chapters 9 and 11 below. 
The TCPA Further Amendment Act also made amendments to the definition of 
“terrorist act” in section 4 of the TCPA, so that it now includes the serious interference 
with, serious disruption to or the destruction of an electronic system for the delivery of 
essential government services by any entity (public or private) or a system used for, or 
by, an essential public utility, whether or not that utility is publicly or privately owned. 
This amendment was for clarificatory purposes, there having been some debate about 
whether the terrorism provisions generally applied to attacks against such essential 
public services infrastructure.
Again, the parts of this Bill with which this Review is concerned achieved cross-party 
support, and came into force on 7 June 2006.
2.7 Legislative developments since 2006
Recent years have seen the enactment of the Charter and the Public Interest Monitor 
Act 2011 (PIM Act) in Victoria which have had, or will have, a significant impact on 
the exercise of police powers under the counter-terrorism legislation, adding to the 
statutory safeguards available to prevent any abuse of those powers. These will be 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this Report.
22 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Thursday 6 April 2006) at page 1030.
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3.1 Introduction
As outlined at Chapter 2 of this Report, terrorist incidents around the world, including 
the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the United States in 
September 2001, led Australian governments to review counter-terrorism measures.
It was against this background and the perceived terrorist risk to Australia that 
Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation was enacted in 2003, including the 
Victorian legislation under review.
Following the London bombings in 2005, governments decided to strengthen the 
existing counter-terrorism legislation and consequently further legislation was enacted 
by the Commonwealth, States and Territories in 2005 and 2006, including the Victorian 
legislation under review. Again this further legislation was enacted having regard to the 
perceived terrorist risk at the time.
Some review of the perceived terrorist risk in 2002-2003 and 2006, when the 
legislation was enacted, is contained in Chapter 2 of this Report. Parliaments, in 
enacting the Australian counter-terrorism legislation, considered that the risk posed 
to the Australian community by terrorist acts warranted such legislation. There was 
a need for it notwithstanding that the rights of citizens might be affected by it. The 
protection of the community from terrorist acts was the overriding consideration.
The Review Committee in conducting this Review have to assess, inter alia, the 
continuing need for the legislation and whether there is a need for the legislation 
to be amended or additional powers provided to mitigate and prevent the risk 
of terrorist acts.
Thus, the Review Committee in conducting the Review must make some assessment 
of the current risk and likely future risk of terrorist acts to the Australian community. 
It is that risk that provides the background and context to the Review, including an 
assessment of the TCPA in light of the Charter provisions 
3.2 COAG Report
The terrorist risk was evaluated by the COAG Committee in its Report.23 It was made 
against an unclassified submission by ASIO which stated, inter alia:
•	 The	threat	to	Australia,	domestically	and	offshore,	from	those	committed	to	
terrorist activity endures. 
23 Council of Australian Government Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation 2013 (“COAG Report”) at  
paragraphs 19-21. 
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•	 Terrorist	planning	and	activities	have	occurred	in	Australia,	and	terrorists	have	
attacked Australians and Australian interests overseas. Over 100 Australians have 
been killed in terrorist attacks in Bali, Jakarta, Mumbai, Istanbul, London and 
New York.
•	 Threats	of	terrorism	can	come	from	extremist	groups	or	from	an	individual.	In	
particular, individuals committed to a violent jihad ideology continue to regard 
Australia and Australian interests abroad as legitimate targets. The threat posed  
by this form of extremism is ongoing, pervasive and persistent.
The COAG Committee was informed that, at that time, ASIO was conducting over 
200 counter-terrorism investigations and was, on an ongoing basis, responding to a 
large number of counter-terrorism leads. Concern was expressed as to the rise in the 
numbers of Australians wishing to support acts in Australia or travel overseas to obtain 
training to undertake their own form of jihad, ASIO stating:
“This is not an abstract or offshore threat; it is real and it is amongst  
the community.” 24
The COAG Committee in its Report also referred to the following:
•	 AFP	and	ASIO	had	pointed	out	since	2001,	four	potentially	serious	attacks	
intended to produce mass casualties had been prevented.
•	 Following	trial	and	conviction	of	terrorism	offences,	a	number	of	persons	are	
serving lengthy prison sentences.
•	 Other	investigations	had	disrupted	the	activities	of	individuals	who	had	been	intent	
on committing terrorist acts.
The COAG Committee concluded:
“The AFP and ASIO submissions leave us in no doubt that Australia remains 
a target for a small range of individuals and groups who would promote their 
belief systems and seek to destroy our democratic way of life in a violent and 
irreversible way.” 25
They added:
“Of course, we accept, at the same time, that the threat of terrorist attack in 
Australia should not be overstated or exaggerated ... The fact that there has 
not as yet been an attack on Australian soil should not … give its citizens 
any great comfort. Nor should it allow complacency and inertia to dilute the 
nation’s vigilance”.26
The COAG Committee acknowledged that they needed to take into account 
submissions challenging the need for counter-terrorism laws when examining the 
legislation under review, but concluded with the following strong statement: 
24 ASIO Submission to the COAG Review at paragraph 7.
25 COAG Report at page19.
26 Ibid at page 20.
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“The Committee wishes to stress, however, that a factor of the utmost 
importance in our considerations is our acceptance of the assurance we have 
received that terrorism remains at the present time a genuine threat to the 
safety and well-being of the Australian community.” 27
There have been a number of other reports in recent years that have considered the 
terrorist risk to the Australian community. A brief summary follows in the sections below. 
3.3 The Independent National Security Legislation 
Monitor Reports
In his first report to the Prime Minister, written just after the tenth anniversary of the 
“9/11” attacks on the USA, the INSLM stated:
“Nothing in the material available to the INSLM suggests that the risk of 
terrorist attacks internationally including in Australia has diminished so as to 
render the CT [counter-terrorism] laws mere relics of an unhappy past.” 28
In light of that he continued:
“No legislation can be regarded as permanent, but the CT laws in substance if 
not in form ought to be seen as a regime of intended indefinite duration. Their 
effectiveness and appropriateness should be assessed on the basis that they 
or any improvements of them will be in force for a long time to come.” 29
The INSLM’s second report, of 20 December 2012, made no reference to or analysis 
of the prevalent terrorist threat. 
His report of 7 November 2013, however, made reference to the “continued level 
of terrorist threat” by reference to the ASIO Report to Parliament 2012/2013 and 
in particular the relatively new terrorist phenomenon emerging from the crisis in 
Syria, given the reported number of Australians travelling there to take part. In their 
submission to the INSLM, the AFP stated:
“There has never been an international civil conflict that has prompted as 
many Australians to travel to a warzone as the Syria crisis has, other than 
perhaps the Balkans war.
Of significant security threat to Australia is the growing trend of Australians 
travelling offshore to engage in, or support, terrorist activities or conflict. These 
individuals not only potentially commit criminal offences, but upon their return 
to Australia they potentially pose a significant national security risk in terms of 
their ability to conduct an attack on Australian soil, radicalise others and impart 
knowledge and skills gained offshore.” 30 
The INSLM also made reference to the Government’s official assessment of the threat 
in order to draw attention to the recommendations he had made for improving counter-
terrorism legislation in his second report, and the lack of official response to those 
recommendations.
27 Ibid at page 21.
28 INSLM Report 2011 at page 5.
29 Ibid also at page 5.
30 AFP Submission to the INSLM, 14 October 2013.
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3.4 Government White Paper
In 2010, the Federal Government published a Counter-Terrorism White Paper 
“Securing Australia – Protecting Our Community”. 
In Chapter 2, headed “The Threat”, the paper states:
“The threat of terrorism to Australia and our interests is real. Terrorism 
has become a persistent and permanent feature of Australia’s security 
environment. It threatens Australians and Australian interests both at home 
and overseas. The Government’s intelligence agencies assess that further 
terrorist attacks could occur at any time.
Over the past century, the world has seen a succession of terrorist campaigns 
supporting various ideological or nationalist causes. Methods of attack 
have evolved and terrorists have proved innovative, adaptive and ruthless in 
pursuing their goals.
Terrorism affected Australia before the 11 September attacks against the 
United States. Various overseas terrorist groups have long had a presence 
in Australia – focussed largely on fundraising and procurement, occasionally 
escalating to violence. But prior to the rise of self-styled jihadist terrorism 
fostered by al-Qa’ida, Australia itself was not a specific target. We now are.” 31
The paper goes on to assess the continued threat from:
“ …people who follow a distorted and militant interpretation of Islam that calls 
for violence as the answer to perceived grievances”32
consisting of al-Qa’ida, groups associated with it and others inspired by a similar 
worldview. It goes on to explore the threats arising in South-East Asia, the Arabian  
Gulf and parts of Africa.
It continues:
“Australia is a terrorist target. Public statements by prominent terrorist leaders 
and other extremist propagandists have singled Australia out for criticism and 
encouraged attacks against us both before and after 11 September 2001. 
Although al-Qa’ida has not itself launched a direct attack on Australia, it has 
shown an operational interest in doing so.
We continue to see terrorist planning within Australia by terrorists inspired by 
al-Qa’ida.” 33
The paper further states:
“So far, terrorist attempts in Australia have been disrupted by the coordinated 
and highly professional efforts of Australia’s security agencies and police 
services, with support from international partners. But this success should 
not give us any false confidence that all plots here can be discovered 
and disrupted.” 34
31 Federal Government White Paper “Securing Australia – Protecting our Community” 2010 at page 7.
32 Ibid at page 8. 
33 Ibid at page 13.
34 Ibid at page 14.
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It concludes:
“Terrorism will continue to pose a serious challenge to Australia and to 
international security. Terrorist networks will continue to aspire to conduct 
further attacks, and to alter their methods to defeat counter-terrorism 
measures. We must remain ready to meet this challenge and work productively 
with the international community and the governments of Australia to thwart 
terrorist groups and lessen the appeal of their extreme views.”35
3.5 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Report to 
Parliament 2012-2013
A more recent assessment of the risk comes from the 2012-2013 ASIO Report to 
Parliament. The Director-General’s foreword states:
“Terrorism remains the most immediate threat to the security of Australians 
and Australian interests.” 36
In Part 1, The Security Environment 2012-2013 and Outlook-Terrorism the Report 
continues:
“The threat to Australia from terrorism remains real, ongoing and evolving.” 37
The domestic threat as described in the ASIO Report is threefold:
1. Self-radicalising lone actors, motivated by an extreme ideology which advocates 
“stand-alone, stay at home” attacks as well as participation in extreme violence 
overseas. As illustrated by the bombing of the Boston Marathon in April 2013 
and the murder of a British soldier in London in May 2013, these attacks may be 
carried out by disenfranchised individuals using everyday items without any training 
being necessary. The difficulty of identifying such individuals quickly enough to 
disrupt an attack is a significant challenge.
2. The threat still posed by more organised and directed extremist groups, which 
aspire to conduct large-scale, mass-casualty attacks against the West, and 
are easily able to spread their ideology online. References to such published 
material reveal that groups such as al-Qa’ida continue to regard Australia as a 
legitimate target.
3. The ongoing situation in Syria.
On the third point, the Director-General of ASIO states:
“There has been an increase in Australians travelling overseas to participate 
in terrorist training or engage in foreign disputes—Syria is the primary 
destination. The concern is not only for Australians who risk their lives 
overseas, but also the likelihood of radicalised Australians returning home 
with an increased commitment and capability to pursue violent acts on 
our shores.” 38 
35 Ibid at page 15. 
36 2012-2013 ASIO Report to Parliament at Director-General’s foreword.
37 Ibid at page 2.
38 Ibid at page viii.
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The report continues in the same vein: 
“Ongoing conflicts overseas present a range of security challenges for 
Australia. The Syrian conflict has resonated strongly in Australia, partly 
because of deep familial ties to Lebanon that exist here. Many Australians—a 
significantly greater number than we have seen for any comparable conflict—
have travelled to the region, including several to participate directly in combat 
or to provide support to those involved. As at 30 June 2013, four Australians 
were known to have been killed in Syria.
ASIO is concerned about the potential for Australians in Syria to be exposed 
further to extremist groups and their ideology. Such groups include the 
recently proscribed terrorist organisation Jabhat al-Nusra. An individual who 
becomes involved in the conflict and who holds, or develops, an extremist 
ideology could return to Australia not only with the intent to facilitate attacks 
onshore but also with experience and skills in facilitating attacks. In addition, 
the individual’s social connections with international fighters could make such 
attacks easier to carry out. Alternatively, such an individual could become 
involved in terrorist activity elsewhere, exploiting the relative travel advantages 
Australian citizenship brings.
We expect these challenges to play out over several years and have a 
medium-to long-term influence on the extremist environment in Australia, 
beyond any immediate resolution to the Syrian civil war.” 39
The report also warns of significant threats to Australians abroad, such as kidnap-for-
ransom in parts of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. 
Finally, the report points out, “the terrorism threat in Indonesia is enduring.” 40 A spike 
of releases of terrorist detainees in 2014, many of whom have undergone terrorist 
training and/or have participated in bombings against Western or local targets, is likely 
to increase this threat.41
3.6 The Lowy Institute
One of the most recent analyses of the international situation, and how it may impact 
upon Australia, is to be found in the Lowy Institute for International Policy report  
“Next-gen jihad in the Middle East”, published in March 2014. In its executive 
summary, it states: 
“The current turmoil in the Middle East is incubating a new generation of 
jihadists. Syria has become a magnet for foreign fighters, including Australians. 
The political crisis in Egypt is being exploited by extremists and could result 
in a lengthy period of political conflict. New spaces are opening up across 
the region that can be used by jihadists for training. Power struggles between 
regional powers are exacerbating the instability.
39 Ibid at page 3.
40 Ibid at page 4.
41 The Herald Sun reported on 2 May 2014 that 36 of the people convicted of involvement in the Bali bombings had 
already been released, with up to 100 more involved in other attacks on local and western interests in Indonesia 
scheduled for release in the forthcoming 12 months. This report was taken up by numerous websites. 
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In many respects the conditions for the creation of extremist movements and 
ideas in the Middle East are worse today than they were before 9/11. And 
while the current focus of jihadist groups is on the Middle East, this can, and 
probably will, change. For Australia the immediate focus is, and should be, 
on individuals returning from Syria. But the government should be keeping a 
weather eye on other parts of the Middle East as well.” 42
Significantly for the purposes of this Review, the report states: 
“The Australian Government will need to sustain counter-terrorism efforts in 
the years to come. And it must not lose sight of developments in the broader 
Middle East even as it focuses more intensely on strategic developments in 
East Asia and the Indo-Pacific.” 43
3.7 Official assessment of terrorist threat
The Government’s official current assessment of the terrorism threat at any given time 
can be found on the Australian National Security website at www.nationalsecurity.gov.
au. The assessment level is continuously monitored and evaluated by Government. 
There are four tiers of threat, being: 
Low – terrorist attack is not expected.
Medium – terrorist attack could occur.
High – terrorist attack is likely.
Extreme – terrorist attack is imminent or has happened.
At the time of writing, the assessed threat for Australia is “medium”.
3.8 Briefings on the current risk
In addition to the official assessment of terrorism risk described, the Review Committee 
have been provided with briefings (both classified and unclassified) on the current risk 
by ASIO, AFP and Victoria Police. Those briefings have been very helpful to the Review 
Committee in assessing the current risk.
It is not necessary or appropriate to set out the details of those briefings. The Review 
Committee accept the assurances that have been given to them in the briefings that 
the concerns that have previously been expressed and are reflected in the reports 
referred to remain. A genuine risk to the safety of the Australian community continues. 
Although the nature of the risk has changed in recent years, it remains a real one.
The risk continues to be linked to global events, particularly in the Middle East, and 
most particularly to the ongoing conflict in Syria. That conflict has been in progress for 
a number of years with no sign of resolution. It continues to attract young Muslim men 
who are travelling from Australia in increasing numbers. Many wishing to travel have 
had their passports cancelled because of security concerns.
42 Lowy Institute for International Policy Report “Next-gen jihad in the Middle East”, March 2014 at page 1.
43 Ibid at page 3.
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Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are concerned about the training, 
experience and radicalisation that can result from involvement in armed conflicts such 
as in Syria. On return to Australia these young men could have the capability and 
motivation to be involved in terrorist activities and constitute a real risk to the Australian 
community through, for example, the creation of terrorist cells or the launching of 
domestic attacks. Skills acquired, inter alia, could be in the making of improvised 
explosive devices or performing the role of a sniper. The Review Committee were given, 
on a classified basis, an overview of some actual case studies to illustrate the risk.
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are concerned at the challenge they face 
managing this risk and protecting the Australian community, particularly as on current 
trends, over the next five years, there will be a substantial resulting increase in the 
domestic terrorist capability. It is felt that there may have to be a much greater use of 
the control order process under the Commonwealth legislation, as has occurred in the 
United Kingdom, in order to manage this risk.
3.9 Discussion and conclusion
As already stated, the Review Committee accept the assurances they have been given 
by law enforcement and intelligence agencies as to the current and likely continuing 
terrorist risk. The Review Committee accept that Australia continues to be a terrorist 
target notwithstanding that there has not been a terrorist attack in this country. We 
cannot afford to be complacent and there is a continuing need for all to be vigilant.
The Review Committee accept that the risk should not be overstated but do not 
believe law enforcement and intelligence agencies are doing so. They have an 
unenviable and heavy responsibility to protect the Australian community.
In conducting the review of the legislation, the Review Committee do so against the 
background of the material and assessments that have already been referred to. It is 
done on the basis that the risk of a terrorist attack remains a real one and such risk 
is likely to continue indefinitely. It is apparent that the nature of the risk has changed 
over the years and is likely to continue to do so, which represents a challenge for law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. Although different, the Review Committee 
accept the assessment of law enforcement and intelligence agencies that the risk is 
probably higher now than when the legislation was enacted.
To sum up, the Review Committee, as did the COAG Committee, accept that terrorist 
acts remain and will continue indefinitely to remain a genuine risk to the safety and way 
of life of the Australian community. 
At the time of finalising this Report there have been recent developments in Iraq. 
These developments and their implications add to the terrorist risk to the Australian 
community. 
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4.1 Statutory definition
The concept of a “terrorist act” is fundamental to Commonwealth, State and Territory 
counter-terrorism legislation. The definition inserted in the Commonwealth legislation 
in 2002 reflected agreement between the various Australian Governments to achieve 
a consistency across all jurisdictions and take account of definitions in other countries 
such as the United Kingdom and Canada.
The definition of a “terrorist act” in Victoria is as follows. The definition is the same (with 
a few exceptions) in other Australian legislation:
“(1)  In this Act, terrorist act means an action or threat of action where—
(a) the action falls within subsection (2) and does not fall within subsection 
(3); and
(b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing  
a political, religious or ideological cause; and
(c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of—
(i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the 
Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of part  
of a State, Territory or foreign country; or
(ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
(a) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or
(b) causes serious damage to property; or
(c) causes a person’s death; or
(d) endangers a person’s life, other than the life of the person taking the 
action; or
(e) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of 
the public; or 
(f) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic 
system including, but not limited to—
(i) an information system; or
(ii) a telecommunications system; or
(iii) a financial system; or
(iv) a system used for the delivery of essential government services by 
any entity (whether publicly or privately owned); or
(v) a system used for, or by, an essential public utility (whether publicly or 
privately owned); or
(vi) a system used for, or by, a transport system.
4 Definition of a Terrorist Act
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(3) Action falls within this subsection if it—
(a) is advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action; and
(b) is not intended—
(i) to cause serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or
(ii) to cause a person’s death; or
(iii) to endanger the life of a person, other than the person taking action; 
or
(iv) to create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section 
of the public.” 44
4.2 COAG Review
The definition was comprehensively considered by the COAG Committee in their 
review,45 including its history. A number of submissions were made to the review 
recommending changes to the definition. 
The COAG Committee identified two principal arguments by submitters. First, that the 
Australian definition of a “terrorist act” should coincide with, or at least not substantially 
extend beyond, international definitions. Second, where there was division among 
submitters, should the “cause” mentioned in section 100.1(b) of the Commonwealth 
Act (section 4(1)(b) of the TCPA) be retained?
With respect to the first matter, the COAG Committee noted that the Australian 
definition was “among the most tightly drafted and human rights respecting definitions 
in the domestic laws of any country”.46 The COAG Committee saw no justification 
for limiting the range of actions and harm likely to be caused by such actions as they 
are set out in the definition. In particular, the COAG Committee saw no justification to 
restrict the notion of harm to death or serious physical harm to a person or persons as 
urged by some submitters.
With respect to the second, the COAG Committee was firmly of the view that “intention 
of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause”47 should be retained. It was 
influenced by a number of considerations.
1. The definition, as part of Australian legislation, has been considered by appellate 
courts in its current form on a number of occasions. Its meaning and application 
are relatively clear.
2. The presence of this motivation distinguishes terrorism offences from other criminal 
offences.
3. It is part of the United Kingdom legislation and has been extensively scrutinized by 
courts in that jurisdiction.
4. The three forms of motivation will commonly run together and evidence of one will 
illuminate a state of mind that reflects the presence of the others.
5. No acceptable justification in the tenets of any religion can exist that warrants the 
unjustified killing of innocent civilians.
44 TCPA at section 4.
45 COAG Report at paragraphs 22-45.
46 COAG Report at paragraph 31.
47 COAG Report at paragraph 32. 
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6. The need to prove this motivation appropriately makes the task of the prosecution 
more difficult and reflects the special nature of a terrorism offence, distinguishing it 
from other crime.
However, the COAG Committee considered some changes to the definition were 
warranted and made the following recommendations: 
“RECOMMENDATION 1: Criminal Code - Section 100.1 – Definition of a 
terrorist act – ‘threat of action’
The Committee recommends that ‘threat of action’ be removed from the definition 
and a separate offence of ‘threatening to commit a terrorist act’ be created.”
Also, the COAG Committee noted that NSW and SA (in “police powers” legislation) 
have also removed “threat of action” from their definitions.
“RECOMMENDATION 2: Criminal Code - Section 100.1 – Definition of a 
terrorist act – ‘hoax threat’
The Committee recommends that an additional offence be inserted into Part 5.3 of 
the Criminal Code to provide for a ‘hoax threat’ to commit an act of terrorism.”
“RECOMMENDATION 3: Criminal Code - Section 100.1 – Definition of a 
terrorist act – meaning of ‘harm’
The Committee recommends that ‘harm’ in subsection 100.1(2) be amended to 
allow the harm contemplated by the Act to extend to psychological harm, together 
with any consequential amendment, for example, to subsection 100.1(3)(b)(i).”
The COAG Committee’s intention was to extend “harm” to “psychological harm”, 
which is well recognised medically.
“RECOMMENDATION 4: Criminal Code - Section 100.1 – Definition of a 
terrorist act – ‘hostage taking’
The Committee recommends that ‘hostage-taking’ be included in subsection 
100.1(2).”
The COAG Committee was concerned that “hostage taking” might not fit precisely 
into the current definition and that it should be included as a specific example of a 
terrorist act.
“RECOMMENDATION 5: Criminal Code - Section 100.1 – Definition of a 
terrorist act – United Nations and its agencies
The Committee recommends that subsection 100.1(1)(c)(i) extend to include 
reference to the United Nations, a body of the United Nations, or a specialised 
agency of the United Nations.”
The COAG Committee accepted that this was a desirable change, reflecting Australia’s 
broader role in international efforts to control terrorism.
“RECOMMENDATION 6: Criminal Code - Section 100.1 – Definition of a 
terrorist act – Interaction with the law of armed conflict
The Committee recommends that consideration be given to incorporating in the 
legislation an amendment to the effect that Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code will not 
apply to acts committed by parties regulated by the law of armed conflict.”
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The COAG Committee noted that following a 2006 review the government had not 
supported this change but nevertheless felt it should be made.
“RECOMMENDATION 7: Criminal Code - Section 100.1 – Definition of  
a terrorist act – Exemption for Australian forces
The Committee recommends that consideration be given to excluding from the 
definition an act done by a person in the course of, and as part of, his or her 
service in any capacity with the Australian armed forces.”
To ensure certainty the COAG Committee considered this change should be made.
4.3 INSLM Reports
The INSLM’s most detailed analysis of the Commonwealth definition (and consequently 
of the Victorian definition) was undertaken in the 2012 Report.48 
Three recommendations are relevant:
1. Motivation should be removed as an element of the definition of a terrorist act. 
In essence this was because (i) it is too difficult to prove by the prosecution and (ii) it 
would remove an accused’s ability to glamourise the ‘cause’. Intimidation should be 
enough in the definition without the need for motivation.
On this issue the INSLM took the opposite position to the COAG Committee.
2. Hostage taking should be included in the definition.
The INSLM took a similar position to that taken by the COAG Committee.
3. Acts committed in an armed conflict (as recognised by international law) should  
be excluded from the definition of terrorist act.
Again, the INSLM took a similar position to the COAG Committee.
The 2013 Annual Report of the INSLM does not take his position any further except to 
note that the views expressed in recommendation 3 were supported by his counterpart 
in the United Kingdom and had been noted as an issue for serious consideration by 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court.
4.4 Discussion and conclusion
The Human Rights Law Centre raised issues concerning the breadth of the definition. 
These and other issues relating to the definition were raised with the COAG 
Committee. However, they in essence related to the Commonwealth legislation and 
the offences created under that legislation which are based on the definition. The role 
of the definition in the TCPA relates to when the various powers may be exercised, a 
terrorist act being a key ingredient.
Having regard to the role the definition plays in counter-terrorism legislation in Australia, 
it is clearly desirable that as far as possible the definition be uniform in all legislation 
and particularly consistent with the Commonwealth legislation.
48 INSLM Report 2012 at Chapter VI. 
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As far as the Review Committee are aware, the recommendations of the COAG 
Review are still under consideration by the various Australian Governments. They also 
have the reports of the INSLM.
The Review Committee are of the view that the definition does not give rise to any 
issue under the Charter. Like the COAG Committee, the Review Committee agree 
with the view of Professor Ben Saul in his submission to the COAG Review that the 
Australian definition is:
“ … amongst the most tightly-drafted and human rights-respecting definitions 
in the domestic laws of any country….” 49 
Reference has been made to the views expressed in the COAG Report and the INSLM 
Report 2012 about the retention of the “cause” mentioned in the definition. The COAG 
Committee was firmly of the view that it should be retained. The INSLM was of the 
view that it should be abolished. The reasons for their respective views have been 
summarised earlier.
Essentially for the reasons expressed by the COAG Committee50 and which have 
already been referred to, the Review Committee are of the view that the reference to 
“cause” should be retained in the definition of terrorist act in the Victorian legislation. 
As Professor Saul stated, its retention is necessary to distinguish terrorism from other 
kinds of political or common crime.51
With respect to the COAG Committee’s Recommendation 3 “meaning of harm”, 
Recommendation 4 “hostage taking” and Recommendation 5 “United Nations and 
its agencies”, the Review Committee agree that the changes recommended should 
be made to the definition of “terrorist act” for the reasons expressed by the COAG 
Committee.
The COAG Committee’s Recommendations 1, 2, 6 and 7 although, in the Review 
Committee’s view, of merit, essentially relate to the offences in the Commonwealth 
legislation and do not bear upon the definition in the TCPA. This legislation has 
a different purpose, relating to the exercise of particular powers, not the creation 
of offences. Consequently, it does not appear to the Review Committee that 
implementation of those recommendations would require amendment to the definition 
in the Victorian legislation.
4.5 Recommendation
49 Submission of Professor Ben Saul to COAG Review dated 4 December 2012, at page 2.
50 COAG Report at paragraphs 32 - 34.
51 Submission of Professor Ben Saul to the COAG Review dated 4 December 2012.
Recommendation 1
That the definition of “terrorist act” in the Terrorism (Community 
Protection) Act 2003 be amended as recommended in 
Recommendations 3, 4 and 5 of the COAG Report.
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5.1 Overview of the legislation 
5.1.1 Origin
The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Bill 2006 was introduced into 
the legislative assembly by the Attorney-General on 4 May 2006. This followed an 
extensive consultation process in the previous year, and because:
“…Australia is the last major common-law based country that does not have a 
comprehensive human rights instrument that ensures that fundamental human 
rights are observed and that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities 
are recognised.”52
He reminded members that other common-law countries such as the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand had recently enacted charters, and informed them that the Victorian 
laws had been developed using guidance obtained from those countries. 
The Charter commenced on 1 January 2007. Part 2 of the Charter lists the human 
rights to be respected and protected by the legislation, based on those civil and 
political rights recognised in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
ratified by Australia in 1980. However, this Part (in section 7) does go on to reflect that 
these rights are not absolute: 
“… but must be balanced against each other and against other competing 
public interests.” 53
The Attorney-General said of what is now section 7:
“The general limitations clause embodies what is known as the ‘proportionality 
test’. The weight to be attached to each of the factors in clause 7 will 
vary depending on the particular rights and circumstances that are being 
considered. Laws which are necessary in order to protect security, public 
order, public safety or public health which limit human rights are examples of 
laws which can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 54
He continued: 
“This bill will not stop the government from taking strong action to protect the 
community from terrorist threats or criminal activity.” 55
52 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Thursday 4 May 2006) at page 1290.
53 Ibid at page 1291.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
5 The Charter of Human Rights  
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5.1.2 Application to the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 
As the Charter came into force on 1 January 2007, after the enactment of the TCPA, 
the TCPA Amendment Act and TCPA Further Amendment Act, it had no relevance to 
the terrorism provisions as they were made. However, the Charter is in force now, and 
its provisions have had a considerable effect on the way laws are made in Victoria. It 
was therefore necessary for the Review Committee to consider the provisions currently 
in force as if they were being made at the present time and within the statutory 
framework as now provided by the Charter.
Moreover, the TCPA is due to expire on 1 December 2016. If the provisions of the 
TCPA are to be re-enacted or remade with amendments before that date, the Charter 
considerations will need to be taken into account. The Review Committee understand 
that a statutory amendment having the effect of repealing or extending that expiry date 
would also have the legislative effect of re-enacting these provisions, so the Charter 
considerations again apply. They are set out briefly below, and the Review Committee 
consider each set of provisions currently contained in the TCPA, taking into account 
the appropriate human rights considerations, in the chapters that follow.
The Charter may require a court in a particular case to perform a delicate balancing 
task when considering legislation. As Lord Hope of Craighead said, in a United 
Kingdom decision on its laws relating to executive detention orders and their 
compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights, given domestic effect in 
the United Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998; 
“It is the first responsibility of government in a democratic society to protect 
and safeguard the lives of its citizens. That is where the public interest lies. It is 
essential to the preservation of democracy, and it is the duty of the court to do 
all it can to respect and uphold that principle. But the court has another duty 
too. It is to protect and safeguard the rights of the individual. Among these 
rights is the individual’s right to liberty.” 56
5.1.3 Provisions of the Charter Act
The main purpose of the Charter is to protect and promote human rights by:
•	 Setting	out	the	human	rights	that	Parliament	specifically	seeks	to	protect	and	
promote; 
•	 Ensuring	that	all	statutory	provisions,	whenever	enacted,	are	interpreted	so	far	as	
is possible in a way that is compatible with human rights; 
•	 Imposing	an	obligation	on	all	public	authorities	to	act	in	a	way	that	is	compatible	
with human rights; 
•	 Requiring	statements	of	compatibility	with	human	rights	to	be	prepared	in	respect	
of all bills introduced into Parliament and enabling the SARC to report on such 
compatibility; 
•	 Conferring	jurisdiction	on	the	Supreme	Court	to	declare	that	a	statutory	provision	
cannot be interpreted consistently with a human right and requiring the relevant 
minister to respond to that declaration; and
•	 Enabling	Parliament,	in	exceptional	circumstances,	to	override	the	application	of	
the Charter to a statutory provision.57 
56 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] AC 68, at page 132.
57 The Charter at sections 1(2) and (3)(a).
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Expanding on this, Part 3 of the Charter makes provision for this preferred Parliamentary 
model for giving effect to these human rights. It operates in the following way:
•	 Every	bill	introduced	into	Parliament	must	be	accompanied	by	a	“statement	of	
compatibility,” 58 describing how the legislation is compatible with the Charter, and 
if there are limitations on any human rights in the proposed legislation, how those 
limitations are justified, balancing the factors in section 7(2);
•	 The	SARC	is	given	a	role	in	scrutinising	each	bill	introduced	into	Parliament,	and	
reporting back to Parliament as to whether the bill is consistent with the Charter  
or not;59
•	 Courts	are	not	entitled	to	strike	down	legislation,	but	the	Charter	does	provide	for	
the courts to interpret laws in such a way as to make them compatible so far as is 
possible. Statutory provisions remain valid notwithstanding any inconsistency with 
the Charter;60
•	 The	Attorney-General	and	the	Victorian	Equal	Opportunity	and	Human	Rights	
Commission (the Commission) must be notified by a party to proceedings in which 
a Charter point arises, or where there is a referral to the Supreme Court (courts 
and tribunals may refer any issue arising under the Charter to the Supreme Court), 
and have a right to intervene in those proceedings;61
•	 If	the	Supreme	Court	decides	that	a	statutory	provision	cannot	be	interpreted	
consistently with the Charter, as described above, it may make a “declaration of 
inconsistent interpretation.” 62 Before making such a declaration, the Court must 
notify the Attorney-General and the Commission and give them the opportunity to 
intervene or make submissions;
•	 Within	six	months	of	receiving	a	declaration	of	inconsistent	interpretation,	the	
minister responsible for the legislation must prepare a response, which is then 
tabled in Parliament and gazetted, along with the declaration, so that Parliament 
may consider the provision anew in the light of the Court’s opinion.63
So that human rights are observed by the administration, and in the development of 
policy, the Charter makes it unlawful for any public authority to act in a way that is 
inconsistent with the human rights protected by the Charter. “Public authority” is given 
a wide interpretation by section 4, so that it includes entities whose functions “include 
functions of a public nature” whilst they are exercising those functions. It provides for 
the seeking of a remedy, and by whom, but does not make provision for new causes 
of action. A claim for a remedy or relief under the Charter may only be “piggy-backed” 
onto a legal proceeding for relief or remedy already extant. Moreover, there is no 
provision for a claim that results in an award of damages for a breach of a human 
right.64 The Attorney General stated: 
“This reflects the government’s intention that any available remedies should 
focus on practical outcomes rather than monetary compensation.”65
58  Ibid at section 28.
59  Ibid at section 30.
60  Ibid at section 32.
61  Ibid at sections 34 and 35.
62  Ibid at section 36.
63  Ibid at section 37.
64  Ibid at section 39.
65 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Thursday 4 May 2006) at page 1294. 
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The following human rights are protected and promoted:66
•	 Right	to	recognition	and	equality	before	the	law;	
•	 Right	to	life;		
•	 Right	to	protection	from	torture	and	cruel,	inhuman	or	degrading	treatment;
•	 Right	to	freedom	from	forced	work;
•	 Right	to	freedom	of	movement;	
•	 Right	to	privacy	and	reputation;	
•	 Right	to	freedom	of	thought,	conscience,	religion	and	belief;
•	 Right	to	freedom	of	expression;	
•	 Right	of	peaceful	assembly	and	freedom	of	association;
•	 Right	to	protection	of	families	and	children;
•	 Right	to	take	part	in	public	life;
•	 Cultural	rights;
•	 Property	rights;
•	 Right	to	liberty	and	security	of	the	person;	
•	 Right	to	humane	treatment	when	deprived	of	liberty;
•	 Rights	of	children	in	the	criminal	process;	
•	 Right	to	a	fair	hearing;	and	
•	 Rights	in	criminal	proceedings.
However, it is possible to lawfully limit a person’s human rights under the Charter  
in certain circumstances. Those rights may be limited under law, but subject only  
to “such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”,67 and taking into account  
all relevant factors including:
•	 The	nature	of	the	right;	
•	 The	importance	of	the	purpose	of	the	limitation;	
•	 The	nature	and	extent	of	the	limitation;	
•	 The	relationship	between	the	limitation	and	its	purpose;	and
•	 Any	less	restrictive	means	reasonably	available	to	achieve	the	purpose	that	the	
limitation seeks to achieve.
Finally, and in a deliberate statement of intent in terms of protecting the sovereignty of 
Parliament, section 31 provides that, in “exceptional circumstances”, Parliament may 
make an express declaration in a statute, or in a provision within it, that the statute or 
provision will operate notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with the rights set out in 
the Charter. In the words of the Attorney-General, “exceptional circumstances” may 
include:
“threats to national security or a state of emergency which threatens the 
safety, security and welfare of people in Victoria.”68
66  The Charter at sections 8 – 25.
67  Ibid at section 7(2).
68  Victorian Parliament Hansard (Thursday 4 May 2006) at page 1291.
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The effect of such an override declaration is that for five years thereafter, the Supreme 
Court may not make a declaration that it is unable to interpret an act consistently with 
the Charter, in other words the Charter has no effect on the legislation in question. 
That override may be extended by Parliament wherever the exceptional circumstances 
continue to exist.
5.1.4 Review of the Charter
Part 5 of the Charter provides for it to be reviewed after four and eight years of 
operation. The first part of this duty was comprehensively carried out by the SARC, 
which tabled its report in September 2011. On many issues, such as weakening or 
strengthening the Charter, the SARC was divided.
The Government responded in March 2012. Amongst other things, it agreed to repeal 
the override provision mentioned above, as it had never been used and was regarded 
as unnecessary. Parliament has always had the ability to overrule or override its own 
previous legislation. This repeal has yet to be carried out.
It also reinforced its earlier conviction that the Charter should not provide for monetary 
compensation for its breach. It should retain its emphasis on engagement with issues 
relating to rights. 
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6.1 Overview of the Public Interest Monitor Act 2011
6.1.1 Origin
The second statutory safeguard to take effect after the revision of the TCPA and after 
the enactment of the Charter, was the creation of the Public Interest Monitor (PIM) and 
the insertion of Part 1A into the TCPA, with effect from 10 February 2013, by section 
44 of the Public Interest Monitor Act 2011 (PIM Act). 
The main purposes of the PIM Act are to establish the offices of Principal Public 
Interest Monitor and Deputy Public Interest Monitors and to confer functions on 
them in respect of ex parte applications made under four statutes, being the Major 
Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004, the Surveillance Devices Act 1999, the 
Telecommunications (Interception) (State Provisions) Act 1988 and the TCPA. 
During debate on the TCPA Amendment Act, various members of Parliament raised 
the existence of a PIM in Queensland, asking why such an office could not be created 
in Victoria. That office had been established by section 157 of the Police Powers and 
Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) to oversee applications for covert search warrants or 
permission to use surveillance devices. His or her functions are now found at section 
742 of that Act, though they have been supplemented to cover applications for 
preventative detention orders by the Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005 (Qld). 
In November 2006, the Australian Capital Territory legislated for the creation of a panel 
of public interest monitors to be appointed, for the purpose of application hearings 
for preventative detention orders, under section 62 of the Terrorism (Extraordinary 
Temporary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT).
The establishment of a PIM for Victoria was an issue that had also been debated by 
the SARC, in 2003 and again in 2006, and the issue was referred by its members to 
the Premier.69
In his response to the SARC, the Premier stated:
“As all applications must be made before a Supreme Court justice, all of 
whom are highly experienced in considering ex parte applications, creating a 
new statutory position such as a PIM is not necessary under the preventative 
detention order scheme. The PIM could only review the process at the interim 
hearing without the benefit of obtaining the affected person’s response to the 
evidence. In any case, the person has a right to contest the application at 
the resumed hearing to confirm, vary or revoke the order and the conditions 
attaching to it.”70
69 SARC Alert Digest No 1 of 2006.
70 SARC Alert Digest No 2 of 2006.
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By 2011, however, concerns had been raised by the Victorian Ombudsman in a report 
concerning the Office of Police Integrity,71 and in particular, the oversight of telephone 
intercept powers. The introduction of the PIM formed part of the Government’s reform 
of Victoria’s integrity regime generally. The first parts of the PIM Act came into force on 
18 September 2012, and Mr Brendan Murphy QC was appointed as the first Principal 
PIM by the Governor in Council. An accompanying media release stated:
“The Principal Public Interest Monitor will be responsible for independently 
testing the evidence used by crime fighting and integrity bodies to apply for 
covert and coercive investigative powers, in the public interest.”72
6.1.2 Purpose
As the media release indicated, the purpose of the PIM is to provide checks and 
balances on the use of significant covert and coercive investigative powers in 
Victoria. The PIM has a role in applications for the use of covert and coercive powers, 
representing the public interest by testing the content and sufficiency of material 
supplied in support of such applications and the circumstances of those applications. 
The provisions of Part 1A of the TCPA apply whenever an application is made for:
•	 A	covert	search	warrant;
•	 A	PDO,	or	an	extension,	variation	or	revocation	of	such	an	order;	or
•	 A	contact	order,	or	a	variation	or	revocation	of	such	an	order.73
All information that is supplied to the Supreme Court in support of an application for 
any of the above, whether it be contained in a written application, an affidavit or is 
conveyed during a telephone application, must also be supplied to the PIM by the 
applicant. Importantly, as the applications are often made ex parte (always so in the 
case of covert warrants, by definition) the applicant is also under a duty to supply the 
PIM with any information of which he or she is aware which may be adverse to the 
application. 
Following receipt of this information, the PIM is entitled to:
•	 Appear	at	the	hearing;
•	 Ask	questions	of	any	person	giving	the	information;	and
•	 Make	submissions	to	the	Court	about	the	appropriateness	of	granting	the	
application. The submissions may be in person, or by telephone, fax, email or in 
any other way that is reasonable.74
Except in the case of an application for a covert search warrant, if it has not been 
reasonably possible to contact the PIM, the hearing may proceed without him or her 
being notified, so long as he or she is contacted as soon as possible thereafter and 
supplied with the information that would have otherwise been supplied before or during 
the hearing. 
71 Investigation into the Office of Police Integrity’s handling of a complaint, October 2011.
72 Media Release by the Hon. Andrew McIntosh MP, Minister for Corrections, Minister for Crime Prevention and 
Minister responsible for the establishment of an anti-corruption commission, dated 18 September 2012.
73 TCPA at section 4C.
74 Ibid at section 4F.
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All documentary evidence supplied to the PIM before, during or after the application 
must be returned to the police as soon as practicable afterwards.
Detailed provisions regarding the notifications that must be given to the PIM, the 
documents and other information to be submitted to the PIM and the circumstances 
in which the PIM may be regarded as not reasonably contactable are contained in 
regulations made under section 21.75
6.2 Public Interest Monitor operations
The PIM and two Deputy PIMs met with the Review Committee and explained their 
modus operandi.
They pointed out that they had yet to be involved with any applications under the 
TCPA, though they had gained a good deal of experience in dealing with applications 
under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004, the Surveillance Devices Act 
1999 and the Telecommunications (Interception) (State Provisions) Act 1988. 
To accommodate urgent applications, the PIM works on a 24-hour, 7 days a week 
roster, and is contactable at all times should an urgent application arise. 
The PIM advised that he is well aware of the need to keep information secure and 
confidential and adequate arrangements are in place at all times. 
6.3 Discussion and conclusions
Whilst the PIM has yet to be involved in matters under the TCPA, the Review Committee 
are satisfied that his existence and operations provide an important safeguard in respect 
to similar applications under other crime fighting and integrity legislation.
Victoria Police, in its written submission, raised an issue of concern with the provisions 
of Part 1A. Generally, applications may be made in the absence of the PIM where the 
PIM is not reasonably able to be contacted, providing that the PIM is notified as soon 
as possible thereafter and supplied with all of the evidence and information. This does 
not apply, however, in the case of an application for a covert search warrant under 
Part 2.76 
The Review Committee discussed this with the PIM. In response, the PIM advised  
that this had never been an issue with regard to applications under other legislation  
(of which there were some 67 between 10 February and 30 June 2013), because the 
24-hour roster operates.
On that basis, the Review Committee does not consider Victoria Police’s concern 
regarding the availability of the PIM is justified. 
75 The Public Interest Monitor Regulations 2013, S.R. No. 8/2013.
76 TCPA at section 4F(3).
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The COAG Committee reviewed the use of a PIM in the context of Commonwealth 
control orders, and took submissions from the Queensland PIM in Brisbane. In seeking 
to find a balance between fairness to the subject of a control order and the security 
implications attaching to some evidence, the COAG Committee gave consideration to 
a nationwide system of PIMs. It was felt that such a system would be a more difficult, 
expensive and less effective system to implement on a practical level than the use of 
a Special Advocate system, along the lines of that utilised in the United Kingdom.77 
Such a Special Advocate system would allow each State and Territory to have a panel 
of security-cleared barristers and solicitors who may participate in closed material 
procedures whenever necessary.78 
In terms of the Victorian legislation, the Review Committee find the provisions of Part 
1A of the TCPA to be adequate, effective and necessary. The Review Committee do 
not consider that any issue arises under the Charter with respect to Part 1A and do not 
consider there is any need for amendment to these provisions. 
77 COAG Report at paragraph 238. 
78 Ibid at Recommendation 30.
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7.1 Summary of the legislation
7.1.1 Origin
Part 2 of the TCPA remains largely unchanged since 2003, save for an important 
extension to the circumstances in which the police may apply for covert search 
warrants, made by an amendment to the Act in 2006.79 As discussed in Chapter 6 of 
this Report, provision for the involvement of the PIM in the application process was 
added in 2013.80 
7.1.2 Purpose of the provisions
A judge of the Supreme Court may issue a covert search warrant to a police officer 
where that judge believes that a terrorist act has happened or is likely to happen, 
and the issue of the warrant will assist the police in responding to it or preventing 
it. In urgent circumstances, the warrant may be issued on the basis of a telephone 
application. The warrant is covert in the sense that the occupier of the premises in 
question knows nothing about its issue, or the subsequent entry and search carried 
out under its authority. For the purposes of the TCPA, “premises” includes a vehicle or 
part of a vehicle.81 
7.1.3 Applications for a covert search warrant
A police officer may apply to the Court for a covert search warrant at any time if he or 
she reasonably suspects or believes: 
•	 That	an	act	of	terrorism	has	been	committed,	is	being	committed	or	is	likely	to	be	
committed in the future; or
•	 That	a	person	who	resides	at	the	premises	which	are	the	subject	of	the	
application, or who visits those premises, has done something indicating that he  
or she is preparing for or planning an act of terrorism, or has participated in training 
provided by a terrorist organisation82 connected with involvement in an act of 
terrorism; or
•	 There	has	been	in	the	past,	or	there	is	ongoing,	some	activity	on	those	premises	
connected with an involvement in an act of terrorism.83
79 TCPA Amendment Act at section 8.
80 PIM Act at sections 45 and 46.
81 TCPA at section 3.
82 As defined by Division 102 of the Criminal Code.
83 TCPA at section 6(1)(a).
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The officer seeking a warrant under this Part must also reasonably believe that the 
entry and search of the premises will substantially assist in preventing or responding 
to an act or suspected act of terrorism, and that it is necessary for the success of the 
warrant’s execution that it be carried out without the knowledge of the occupier. Before 
applying for a warrant, the police officer must seek the authorisation of the Chief 
Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner.
An important addition to the police powers in this regard, provided by virtue of the 
TCPA Amendment Act, is that an application can be made for a warrant of this kind 
where the police officer’s suspicions relate to terrorist activity generally, and not to a 
particular and specific act. In other words, the warrant may be used to prevent the 
planning of a terrorist act at some unknown time or place, or where the actual target  
of the attack is unknown.84
Generally, an application for a warrant must be made in Court, be in writing and be 
supported by an affidavit.85 Provision for such applications is made by Order 11 of the 
Supreme Court (Criminal Procedure) Rules 2008, and a standard form with which an 
application may be made is attached to those Rules.86 The applicant must inform the 
PIM of the application.87
The judge hearing an application under this Part must first be satisfied that:
•	 The	written	application	sets	out	the	grounds	for	seeking	the	warrant;
•	 The	police	officer	making	the	application	has	provided	such	additional	information	
as the judge requires in support of those grounds (this information may be 
provided orally); 
•	 The	information	provided	by	the	officer	is	verified	by	affidavit	or	on	oath	before	 
the judge; and
•	 There	are	reasonable	grounds	for	the	police	officer’s	suspicion	or	belief.88
Once satisfied with the above matters, the judge must take into account the following:
•	 The	gravity	and	nature	of	the	act	of	terrorism	(or	suspected	act);
•	 Whether,	and	to	what	extent,	the	powers	sought	under	the	warrant	would	assist	
in the prevention of an act or suspected act, or in the response to an act or 
suspected act that had already occurred;
•	 The	effect	that	the	grant	of	the	warrant	sought	might	have	on	the	privacy	of	the	
occupier of the relevant premises;
•	 Any	conditions	(or	restrictions)	that	might	be	placed	on	the	warrant	if	granted;	and
•	 Any	submissions	made	by	the	PIM.89
84 Ibid at section 6(1A).
85 Ibid at section 7(1).
86 Supreme Court (Criminal Procedure) Rules 2008 Rule No 12/2008 – Order11, Rule 11.03, Form 6-11A.
87 TCPA at section 7A.
88 Ibid at sections 7(2) and 8(1).
89 Ibid at section 8(2).
41
Applications for covert search warrants are heard in camera. Ordinarily, members of 
the public are entitled to attend court hearings, and the media may report on them. 
However, in this instance, the Court remains closed to ensure that any information that 
could jeopardise the successful execution of the warrant is not made public. It is an 
offence to publish a report of an application hearing or of any information derived from 
it, unless the Court allows it.90
However, applications for a warrant may be made by telephone in circumstances 
where, in the police officer’s view, urgency requires it.91 An affidavit in support of the 
application must still be prepared. In these circumstances it can be faxed to the Court, 
sworn or unsworn. The final sworn affidavit must be provided to the Court no later than 
the day after the telephone application. 
The preconditions set out above, and the matters to be taken into account by the 
judge, apply equally to telephone applications as they do to those made in person.
If a telephone application is granted and a warrant issued, it is faxed to the applicant, 
where the means to do so are available. In any event, the applicant must be informed 
of the terms of the warrant and the reasons for its issue, as well as the date and time 
of its issue. If a copy has not been faxed to the applicant, then he or she must prepare 
the warrant in the terms described over the telephone, and send it to the Court no later 
than the day after its execution or expiry, whichever is the sooner. 
7.1.4 Grant of a covert search warrant
More than one warrant may be issued in respect of any particular premises. In any 
event, each warrant must contain the following information:
•	 Clear	confirmation	that	its	purpose	is	to	assist	in	the	prevention	of	an	act	or	
suspected act of terrorism, or to assist in the investigation of such an act or 
suspected act;
•	 The	address	or	location	of	the	relevant	premises;	as	mentioned	above,	“premises”	
in this context includes a vehicle or a part of a vehicle that will not, generally 
speaking, have an address;
•	 The	name	of	the	applicant,	and	the	name	(or	a	description)	of	anyone	else	who	 
will take part in enforcing the warrant;
•	 The	date	of	issue	of	the	warrant,	and	the	period	for	which	it	will	remain	in	force	 
(not being more than 30 days);
•	 The	name(s)	of	the	occupier(s)	of	the	relevant	land,	place,	building	or	vehicle,	 
if known;
•	 Whether	the	warrant	authorises	more	than	one	search	and	entry;
•	 The	name	of,	or	a	description	of,	the	sort	of	thing	that	is	being	searched	for,	 
or that may be seized, or photographed, etc; and
•	 Any	conditions	placed	on	the	warrant	by	the	issuing	judge.92
A standard form of warrant is also attached to the above-mentioned Supreme 
Court Rules.93
90 Ibid at section 12.
91 Ibid at section 10.
92 Ibid at section 8(3).
93 Supreme Court Rules Order 11, Rule 11.05, Form 6-11B.
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In terms of the conditions which the Court may impose on a warrant, the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Bill envisaged, as one example, that if the purpose of a warrant 
was short-lived, a condition might require the owner of premises to be informed that a 
search had occurred, after a suitable period of time. This, it was argued, would provide 
an additional safeguard on the issuing of a covert search warrant, intended to ensure 
that the power to obtain such a warrant is not abused. This intention was reiterated 
by the Premier in his response to the consideration of the Bill by the SARC, and its 
subsequent comments.94 
7.1.5 What is authorised by a covert search warrant?
Under section 9(1)(a) of the TCPA, a warrant authorises the applicant police officer, 
together with any other person that is named or described in the warrant, and with any 
necessary equipment, to enter the land, place, building or vehicle named or described 
in the warrant. Entry to any specified adjoining premises, or to specified premises 
which provide an access route to those which are the subject of the warrant, is also 
permitted. Entry by force, or by the impersonation of someone else, is permitted where 
necessary. It should be noted that a warrant can only authorise entry by impersonation 
and not, for example, questioning whilst continuing the impersonation. 
Once inside, where authorised by the warrant, the officer(s) may:
•	 Search	for	whatever	items	were	named	or	described	in	the	warrant;
•	 Seize	those	items;
•	 Replace	any	item	so	seized,	so	as	to	outwardly	cover-up	its	seizure;
•	 Copy,	photograph	or	describe	in	writing	or	sketches	the	thing	named	or	described;
•	 Use	any	electronic	equipment	that	happens	to	be	on	the	premises	for	the	
purposes of such copying, etc; and
•	 Test	or	keep	a	sample	of	anything	found	as	named	or	described.95
If the Court believes that an item seized in the execution of a warrant may be returned 
to its owner “consistently with the interests of justice”, or in other words because the 
Court feels it would be right to do so, it may order the return of that item.
7.1.6 Reporting requirements to the Court
No later than seven days after the expiration of the warrant, the officer to whom the 
warrant was granted must report back to the Court. Failure to do so may result in the 
commission of an offence under the TCPA.96 That report must state:
•	 Which	powers	were	exercised;
•	 Which	conditions	on	the	warrant	were	complied	with,	and	how;
•	 The	period	during	which	the	entry	and	search	were	conducted;
•	 The	name	of,	or	a	description	of,	any	person	who	entered	the	premises	in	
accordance with the warrant;
•	 The	name(s)	of	the	occupier(s)	of	the	premises	entered,	if	known;	and
94 SARC Alert Digest No 1 of 2003.
95 TCPA at section 9(1)(b)-(g).
96 Ibid at section 11.
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•	 Details	of	any	activity	undertaken	in	the	execution	of,	and	as	authorised	by,	the	
warrant (such as any seizure, item replacement, photographing, etc).
Additionally, the applicant police officer must provide, as part of the above-mentioned 
report to the issuing Court, an analysis of any benefit that was derived from the 
issue and exercise of the warrant, in terms of any act or suspected act of terrorism 
prevented or investigated. 
7.1.7 Reporting requirements to the Attorney-General and Parliament
As soon as is practicable, but in any event within 3 months of the end of each 
financial year,97 the Chief Commissioner must submit a report to the Attorney-General 
describing the exercise (if any) by Victoria Police of the powers contained in Part 2 
during that year.98 The report must record:
•	 The	number	of	applications	made	to	the	Court	and	the	number	of	warrants	
granted;
•	 The	number	of	telephone	applications	made;
•	 The	number	of	applications	refused;
•	 The	number	of	premises	covertly	entered,	and	an	itemised	list	of	the	occasions	
when any powers were exercised in accordance with those warrants; and
•	 Any	other	information	that	the	Attorney-General	considers	appropriate.
The Attorney-General must lay that report before both Houses of Parliament within 
12 sitting days of its receipt, to enable public scrutiny and debate about the use of 
warrants granted under this Part of the TCPA.
7.1.8 Further safeguards
Reporting requirements apply to the use of these powers to allow for judicial, 
ministerial, parliamentary and ultimately public oversight of how the powers are 
exercised and how regularly. Additionally, a number of other safeguards have been built 
into this Part of the TCPA to ensure as far as possible that the powers are exercised 
correctly and accountably. For example:
•	 Warrants	may	only	be	issued	by	the	Supreme	Court;	this	contrasts	with	the	use	of	
the AFP warrantless search powers contained in section 3UEA of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth); 
•	 Applications	for	a	warrant,	whether	in	person	or	by	telephone,	cannot	be	made	
until the applicant has obtained the internal approval of a senior police officer; 
•	 The	Supreme	Court	judge	hearing	the	application	may	seek	such	additional	
information as he or she sees fit, and must be satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds for the belief or suspicion held by the officer; 
•	 The	judge	is	specifically	directed	in	section	8(2)(c)	of	the	TCPA	to	consider	the	effect	
of the issue of a warrant on the privacy of the occupier of the premises in question, 
expressly providing for the type of balancing exercise required by the Charter;
•	 The	judge,	in	granting	the	application,	may	place	such	conditions	on	the	warrant	
as he or she sees fit;
97 3 months limit added by section 53, Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2009.
98 TCPA at section 13.
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•	 The	PIM	will	always	be	involved,	unlike	other	applications	to	the	Court	that	may	be	
made under the TCPA; 
•	 The	Court	has	the	power	to	order	the	return	of	seized	items;
•	 The	fact	that,	in	any	subsequent	court	proceedings	of	any	kind,	if	the	police	are	
unable to produce the warrant authorising any entry, search or seizure, then that 
entry, search or seizure must be deemed by that court to have been conducted 
unlawfully, with the legal and evidential consequences that may flow from that;99 
•	 The	fact	that	the	Part	is	the	subject	of	further	and	regular	Parliamentary	scrutiny	
through the use of a sunset provision (originally December 2006 under section 41, 
now December 2016) and provision for reviews, such as this Review (section 38).
7.2 Operation of the legislation
To date the powers granted under this Part have had limited use in Victoria. 
The annual reports submitted to the Attorney-General and tabled in Parliament reveal 
that the covert search warrant powers under this Part of the TCPA have been used on 
just one occasion, during the financial year 2004-2005. Six applications for warrants 
were made, and all were granted by the Supreme Court on appearance. Under those 
warrants, six premises were entered and searched, and under the terms of five of 
them, items were seized from those premises and electronic equipment was operated.
Those warrants were issued in the course of an investigation known as “Operation 
Pendennis”. This was a lengthy cross-border multi-agency operation which led to the 
conviction of a number of men in Victoria and New South Wales for various terrorist 
offences under the Criminal Code, based partially on a substantial amount of “extremist 
and jihadi” literature and violent videos seized from computers under the search 
warrants. This material was said in court to have been used to energise, motivate 
and simultaneously desensitise members of the group. In Melbourne, 13 men were 
charged. One pleaded guilty, seven were found guilty of knowingly being a member of 
a terrorist organisation (one of those also being concerned with directing or managing 
a terrorist organisation), four were acquitted and no verdict was reached on one 
person.100 In NSW, nine men were charged with conspiracy to do acts in preparation 
for a terrorist act. Following a lengthy trial, five were convicted. Four had pleaded guilty 
to lesser offences.101 
For the years 2003-2004 through to 2011-2012, the appropriate annual reports were 
tabled. 
With regard to the 2012-2013 period, Victoria Police informed the Review Committee 
that six covert search warrants were applied for and issued, but not executed. They 
provided information relating to the six warrants and the reasons they were not 
executed. There was no annual report tabled for the year 2012-2013. 
99 Ibid at section 10(8).
100 Benbrika & Ors. v The Queen [2010] VSCA 281.
101 R (Commonwealth) v Elomar & Ors [2010] NSWSC 10.
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7.3 COAG Report
The COAG Report did not review, or comment upon, Part 2 of the TCPA.
The COAG Committee did however inquire into federal police powers in relation to 
terrorist acts and terrorist offences. In particular, for the purposes of this chapter, that 
Committee discussed section 3UEA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth),102 which reads:
“(1)  A police officer may enter premises in accordance with this section if the 
police officer suspects, on reasonable grounds, that –
(a) it is necessary to exercise a power under subsection (2) in order to 
prevent a thing that is on the premises from being used in connection with 
a terrorist offence; and
(b) it is necessary to exercise the power without the authority of a search 
warrant because there is a serious and imminent threat to a person’s life, 
health or safety.
(2) The police officer may –
(a) search the premises for the thing; and
(b) seize the thing if he or she finds it there.”
Predictably, such provision for warrantless searches came under considerable criticism 
before the COAG Committee. However, in its response, the COAG Committee placed 
particular emphasis on the fact that these powers are intended for use in only genuine 
emergency situations. Its report stated:
“In the context of terrorism, we do not consider that there is a need for 
evidence to justify the conclusion that emergency situations may arise where 
it is simply impossible or impracticable to obtain a warrant before seizing 
material that is to be used in connection with a terrorist offence. One only has 
to contemplate intelligence suggesting the presence of explosives in a house 
to realise that this is so.”103
It is notable, as mentioned, that this is a power to enter premises without a warrant 
which requires no prior judicial authorisation, in contrast to the Victorian power under 
Part 2. Moreover, as terrorism operations are more often than not joint operations 
with federal investigation agencies, this is a power that would be available in urgent 
circumstances, where Victoria Police have concerns about time factors. 
7.4 Submissions
7.4.1 Victoria Police
In its first written submission to the Review Committee, expanded upon in meetings 
with officers, Victoria Police stated that the availability of covert search warrants 
remains a critical investigative power. However, they raised three issues for the Review 
Committee to consider :
102 Inserted by section 3 and schedule 4 to the National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth).
103 COAG Report at paragraph 335.
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7.4.1.1 Obtaining a warrant in circumstances where the PIM cannot be contacted
This issue is dealt with at Section 6.3 of this Report. The requirement to notify the PIM 
in this instance does not reduce the effectiveness of the provisions As already stated, 
the Review Committee do not consider the concern of Victoria Police is justified.
7.4.1.2 Telephone applications in urgent circumstances
As set out above, section 10 of the TCPA allows the police to apply to the Supreme 
Court for a covert search warrant by telephone in urgent circumstances. Section 
10(2) requires the applicant to prepare an affidavit setting out the grounds on which 
the warrant is sought, though the application can proceed without it being sworn in 
advance of the telephone hearing in order to provide for the urgency. Victoria Police’s 
written submission made the point that this is a time consuming exercise, and given 
the purpose of the provision is to allow for action to be taken quickly, requiring an 
affidavit in urgent circumstances is an unnecessary risk to the public.
An alternative approach suggested by Victoria Police is the one provided for in respect 
of the installation of covert surveillance devices under the Surveillance Devices Act 
1999, where there is a suspected risk of serious personal violence or substantial 
property damage. Section 26 of that Act reads:
“(1)  A law enforcement officer of a law enforcement agency may apply to a 
senior officer of the agency for an emergency authorisation for the use of 
a surveillance device if the law enforcement officer on reasonable grounds 
suspects or believes that—
(a) an imminent threat of serious violence to a person or substantial damage 
to property exists; and
(b) the use of a surveillance device is immediately necessary for the purpose 
of dealing with that threat; and
(c) the circumstances are so serious and the matter is of such urgency that 
the use of a surveillance device is warranted; and
(d) it is not practicable in the circumstances to apply for a surveillance device 
warrant.
(2) An application may be made orally, in writing or by telephone, fax, e-mail or 
any other means of communication.
(3) A senior officer may give an emergency authorisation for the use of a 
surveillance device on an application under subsection (1) if satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds for the suspicion or belief founding the application.
(4) An emergency authorisation given under this section may authorise the law 
enforcement officer to whom it is given to do anything that a surveillance 
device warrant may authorise them to do.”
Within two business days of the emergency approval being given, approval must be 
sought from the Supreme Court. The Court may then confirm the approval, allowing 
for continued surveillance, or may refuse to confirm it, ordering the cessation of the 
surveillance and/or the retrieval of the device.104
Stressing the urgency of the situation that Victoria Police said would or ought to have 
been a concern of Parliament when enacting the TCPA, officers expressed the view 
104 Surveillance Devices Act 1999 at section 30.
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that provision should be made for interim authorisations for covert search warrants to 
be given by a senior police officer.
7.4.1.3 Remote entry 
Victoria Police expanded upon their first written submission and explained that given 
the developments in technology since the TCPA came into force, “remote entry” to a 
person’s computer was now possible without the need to be physically present in the 
premises which are the subject of the covert search warrant. 
The benefits of obtaining access to a computer in this way, without achieving physical 
entry, were explained:
•	 It	is	a	much	safer	option	for	officers,	avoiding	the	possibly	of	a	high-risk	encounter	
with the occupier(s) of the premises; it may also mitigate any risks of compromising 
the investigation though such an encounter;
•	 It	is	a	less	intrusive	process	in	terms	of	the	occupier(s)	right	to	privacy	under	the	
Charter provisions than a physical “break-in”; 
•	 It	is	also	a	less	intrusive	process	in	terms	of	the	occupier(s)’	Charter	rights	in	that	
physical evidence does not come into the police’s possession by chance that may 
be used against the person derivatively, as may be the case in a physical entry and 
search of premises; and
•	 A	search	of	a	person’s	computer	through	such	a	remote	entry	may	negate	the	
need for a physical search under the terms of the warrant, if that search reveals 
nothing of concern.
However, there are currently doubts about the legality of such access, as discussed 
below. 
7.4.2 Australian Federal Police 
Members of the AFP, who also met with the Review Committee, re-iterated the 
evidence that they had put before the COAG Review. They stressed their belief that 
covert search warrant powers are an integral part of the “toolkit” available to law 
enforcement agencies investigating terrorism offences. They also pointed out that the 
execution of an “ordinary” search warrant requires that the occupier of the premises 
be given a copy, allowing for possible interference with evidence or notification of 
accomplices who, at that stage, may not be aware of the police interest in them. The 
use of the section 3UEA warrantless search power is only available in emergency 
situations, not for use in an investigative sense. The ability to gather evidence, whilst 
keeping the existence of the investigation confidential in terrorism matters is, in the 
view of AFP, essential. “Operation Pendennis” was cited as a prime example of this. 
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7.5 Impact of the Charter of Human Rights
Given their very nature, the use of covert search warrants would engage the occupier’s 
right to privacy under section 13(a) of the Charter.105 Their use is lawful, as it is provided 
for by this Part of the TCPA. However, the Review Committee also needs to consider 
whether their use may be arbitrary, and whether the limitation on the right to privacy 
brought about by their use is reasonable and proportionate taking into account the 
factors set out at section 7(2) of the Charter. 
The Review Committee considered that three issues should be taken into account in 
this regard:
•	 Whether	the	test	for	issuing	search	warrants	is	sufficiently	constrained	to	
circumstances in which the purpose is sufficiently important to justify interference 
with privacy;
•	 Whether	there	is	a	way	of	achieving	the	purpose	of	the	covert	search	warrant	that	
provides less interference with privacy, particularly by reference to delayed notice 
warrants available in other jurisdictions; and 
•	 Whether	the	procedure	provides	sufficient	safeguards	against	abuse	of	the	power	
or improper execution of a warrant.
7.6 Discussion and conclusions
The Review Committee were informed by Victoria Police and the AFP that the 
use of covert search warrants had been invaluable in investigations into possible 
terrorist offences in the past, and were regarded generally as an essential part of the 
investigation agencies’ toolkit. They regard the covert search warrant provisions as 
being necessary and effective. There were no submissions to the Review Committee to 
the effect that the provisions of Part 2 were unnecessary. 
With regard to the following matters raised by Victoria Police in their submissions, 
written and oral the Review Committee’s views are as follows.
7.6.1 Telephone applications in urgent circumstances
The Review Committee are of the view that the suggested abolition of the requirement 
for affidavit evidence as part of the application for a warrant is not justified. Victoria 
Police officers are trained to provide such evidence in writing, and the fact that the 
evidence may be provided unsworn at the time of the telephone application means 
that the process should not be unduly burdensome or time consuming. In the Review 
Committee’s opinion, the requirements of the legislation in this regard should not 
impact on the effectiveness of the powers. In urgent circumstances, during joint 
operations, the AFP power to search premises without a warrant or any prior judicial 
authority, as discussed above, may be used. 
However, for the purposes of the TCPA, the Review Committee are of the view that the 
need to obtain prior authorisation from the Supreme Court for the use of a power as 
intrusive as the covert search warrant power is a necessary and justifiable safeguard. 
Authorisation of a senior police officer would not be sufficient or appropriate. 
105 Section 13(a) states that a person has the right not to have his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence 
unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with.
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7.6.2 Remote entry
In respect of the submissions regarding remote entry, the utility of using this method 
of gaining intelligence is clear. The Review Committee have been provided with advice 
obtained by Victoria Police from the Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (VGSO) 
which inclines to the view that the provisions are aimed at authorising a physical entry 
to premises. This view is supported by the list of things that a warrant may authorise 
under section 9 of the TCPA, all of which are predicated upon there being a physical 
presence on the premises. The advice compares the provisions of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act), which more clearly 
authorise the use of a computer or other device for accessing data held in a target 
computer under a “Computer Access Warrant”.
The Review Committee are in agreement with the VGSO’s advice. The Review 
Committee also agree with police that the legislation ought to be modified in order to 
keep up with technological developments that may not have been foreseen when the 
TCPA was last substantively amended in 2006. 
In order to clarify this legal issue, it would be possible for Victoria Police to apply for 
a warrant under this Part for the purposes of a remote search, and thereby enable a 
Court to take into account all of the circumstances. If the Court ruled that there was 
no power to issue a warrant on that basis, a statutory amendment could then be 
considered.
However, the Review Committee are of the view that it is unlikely a warrant would be 
issued in these circumstances. Having regard to the nature of the powers, a judge is 
likely to be cautious and to construe the legislation narrowly. Considering the provisions 
as a whole, the Review Committee do not believe that a search of this kind was 
contemplated at the time they were made.
Consequently, the Review Committee are of the view that this opportunity should be 
taken to put the matter beyond doubt. A clear power, along the lines of that available 
to ASIO, but suitably adapted so that the authority of the Supreme Court would again 
be required, should be included in the TCPA. The relevant ASIO provision reads:
“Issue of Computer access warrant
(1) If the Director-General requests the Minister to do so, and the Minister is 
satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2), the Minister may issue a warrant in 
accordance with this section.
Test for issue of warrant
(2) The Minister is only to issue the warrant if he or she is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that access by the Organisation to data held 
in a particular computer (the target computer) will substantially assist the 
collection of intelligence in accordance with this Act in respect of a matter  
(the security matter) that is important in relation to security.
Authorisation in warrant
(3) The warrant must be signed by the Minister and must authorise the 
Organisation to do specified things, subject to any restrictions or conditions 
specified in the warrant, in relation to the target computer, which must also  
be specified in the warrant.
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Things that may be authorised in warrant
(4) The things that may be specified are any of the following that the Minister 
considers appropriate in the circumstances:
(aa)  entering specified premises for the purposes of doing the things 
mentioned in this subsection;
(a) using:
(i) a computer; or
(ii) a telecommunications facility operated or provided by the 
Commonwealth or a carrier; or
(iii) any other electronic equipment; or
(iv) a data storage device;
 for the purpose of obtaining access to data that is relevant to the 
security matter and is held in the target computer at any time while 
the warrant is in force and, if necessary to achieve that purpose, 
adding, deleting or altering other data in the target computer;
(b) copying any data to which access has been obtained, that appears to be 
relevant to the collection of intelligence by the Organisation in accordance 
with this Act;
(c) any thing reasonably necessary to conceal the fact that any thing has 
been done under the warrant;
(d) any other thing reasonably incidental to any of the above.
Note: As a result of the warrant, an ASIO officer who, by means of a 
telecommunications facility, obtains access to data stored in the target 
computer etc. will not commit an offence under Part 10-7 of the Criminal Code 
or equivalent State or Territory laws (provided that the ASIO officer acts within 
the authority of the warrant).
Certain acts not authorised
(5) Subsection (4) does not authorise the addition, deletion or alteration of data, 
or the doing of any thing, that interferes with, interrupts or obstructs the 
lawful use of the target computer by other persons, or that causes any loss or 
damage to other persons lawfully using the target computer.
Authorisation of entry measures
(5A) The warrant must:
(a) authorise the use of any force that is necessary and reasonable to do  
the things specified in the warrant; and
(b) state whether entry is authorised to be made at any time of the day  
or night or during stated hours of the day or night.
Duration of warrant
(6) The warrant must specify the period during which it is to remain in force.  
The period must not be more than 6 months, although the Minister may 
revoke the warrant before the period has expired.
Issue of further warrants not prevented
(7) Subsection (6) does not prevent the issue of any further warrant.106
106 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) at section 25A. 
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7.6.3 Right to privacy
As already stated, the Charter contains a right to privacy. In the Review Committee’s 
opinion, the power to issue a covert search warrant is sufficiently constrained to 
circumstances where the search would be a reasonable and justifiable interference 
with the right to privacy. A warrant may only be issued by the Supreme Court where it 
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion or belief of the applicant 
that a terrorist act has been, is being or is likely to be committed, or there has been 
other terrorist activity,107 that the entry and search would assist in preventing the terrorist 
act or responding to it108 and that it is necessary for the achievement of the operation 
that the entry and search be carried out without the knowledge of the occupier.109
Moreover, the tests to be applied by the Court in considering the application in 
section 8(2) provide a guide as to the balancing act to be undertaken as between the 
breach of privacy of the person affected and the nature and gravity (and thus possible 
consequences) of the offences, and the effectiveness of the intended exercise of 
the power. 
Taking all of the above into account, in so far as the exercise of the power would 
engage the person’s right to privacy, the Review Committee are of the view that the 
entry and search authorised by the warrant would be a reasonable and proportionate 
interference with that right. It would be neither unlawful nor arbitrary.
The Review Committee considered whether there may be a means to reduce the 
interference with a person’s right to privacy under the Charter but still achieve the 
object of the warrant. Advice received from Counsel drew attention to the use of 
delayed notice warrants in the United States.
Search warrants under this Part are carried out without the knowledge of any 
occupier(s). Specific provision is made for removing items and replacing them to 
conceal their removal.110 Unlike similar provisions that operate in the United States, 
there is no need to notify the subject of the warrant of the entry and search at some 
point in time after the event. Section 3103 of the United States Code for Crime and 
Criminal Procedure provides that notification of the existence of the warrant and its 
execution may be delayed for up to 30 days after the event (or longer where the Court 
believes that giving immediate notification could result in an “adverse result”). 
In NSW, under section 27U of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW),111 the 
officer who executed a covert search warrant must provide to the issuing Court, within 
6 months, an “occupier’s notice”, containing information relating to the warrant and its 
execution.112 After the approval of the judge has been granted, notice must be given 
to the person who occupied the premises at the time of the execution of the warrant 
who was suspected in connection with the terrorist offences. If there was no such 
suspected person, then any person over 18 years of age who occupied the premises 
at the time of execution must be given the notice. The giving of the notice may be 
107 TCPA at section 8(1) together with section 6(1)(a). 
108 Ibid at section 8(1) together with section 6(1)(b).
109 Ibid at section 8(1) together with Section 6(1)(c).
110 Ibid at section 9(1)(d).
111 These provisions, along with all of the other provisions relating to covert search warrants, were added to the Act 
by the Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Warrants) Act 2005 (NSW).
112 The occupier’s notice must contain the names of the applicant and judge, the date of application and execution, 
the address, the number of personnel involved in the execution, the powers contained in the warrant and anything 
seized, placed, retrieved, etc. If the occupier was not, at the time of the execution, believed to be knowingly 
concerned in the commission of the terrorist act, the notice must say so.
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postponed by the judge if there are reasonable grounds, but only up to a total period 
of 18 months, unless the judge is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances 
justifying the further postponement. Moreover, if adjoining premises are entered in the 
execution of the warrant in order to gain access to the subject premises, a notice in the 
same terms must be given to the occupier of those adjoining premises.113
In 2005, the NSW Police applied for, and were issued with, five warrants under these 
provisions. Three were executed (one could not be executed covertly; the other 
contained the wrong address). No arrests resulted from the use of these warrants, 
although some people were charged as a result of ongoing related investigations. 
Occupier’s notices were served in relation to all three executed warrants, although 
the service of two notices was postponed for some 30 months. There was no 
need to postpone service of the third, because the subject of the warrant had been 
charged with an offence, and the warrant was included in the brief of evidence. The 
“exceptional circumstances” justifying postponement beyond 18 months in the other 
two instances were that no charges had then been brought against the suspects. The 
disclosure of the fact that police had conducted covert searches would be likely to 
result in the suspects modifying their behaviour, to act in a more clandestine manner 
that would adversely affect ongoing operations.114 
During a meeting with Victoria Police and the AFP, the Review Committee raised the 
possibility of introducing delayed notice provisions. Officers were strongly opposed to 
the introduction of such a measure in Victoria for the following reasons: 
•	 Revealing	the	fact	that	a	person	has	been	of	interest	to	police	may	place	in	
jeopardy ongoing investigations, whereby the person of interest may “tip-off” an 
accomplice at that time unknown to the investigation or intelligence agencies. 
Some operations are years in the gestation;
•	 Revealing	the	same	may	also	have	the	effect	of	revealing	the	police	methodology.	
The AFP said that minor terrorist investigations have been abandoned in the past 
rather than expose those methodologies;
•	 Revelation	may	lead	to	retribution,	with	the	subject	of	the	warrant	seeking	out	
whoever may have informed on them to the police;
•	 There	are	no	such	delayed	notice	provisions	in	legislation	governing	covert	
intercepts and the like;
•	 There	are	already	sufficient	built-in	safeguards.
In weighing the various arguments in the balance, the Review Committee consider 
there is merit in the introduction of delayed notice provisions into Part 2 of the Act. This 
requirement was in the mind of the Premier when he introduced the legislation in 2003,  
as mentioned in Section 7.1.4 of this Report. However, it was considered at the time 
that a delayed notice requirement imposed by the Court as a condition on the warrant 
under section 8(2)(d) would suffice, rather than making specific provision for it. Whilst 
delayed notice warrant provisions would not provide a complete answer to concerns 
about breaches of privacy rights, they would have the effect of reducing the impact 
of covert warrants, and be viewed as more reconcilable with Charter rights. Such 
provisions would also provide an additional safeguard. 
113 Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW) at section 27V.
114 NSW Ombudsman Review of Parts 2A and 3 of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002, September 2008.
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Taking into account the concerns of Victoria Police, the Review Committee consider 
that an in-built ability for the Court to delay the giving of such a notice indefinitely could 
be desirable, where it is satisfied that revealing the existence of the warrant or its 
execution might have the consequences feared. Additionally, the Review Committee 
see no need to include the name of the person applying for the warrant or the judge 
who issued it, or the people who executed the warrant. To do so could potentially 
invite retribution against those persons.
In the “Review of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002” carried out in 2007, the 
NSW Attorney-General’s Department considered calls for the repeal of the delayed 
notice provisions. The review concluded: 
“In a democratic society, it is vitally important that the exercising of law 
enforcement powers is transparent and accountable. While there is a public 
interest in permitting covert search powers in exceptional circumstances, the 
exercise of those powers should remain covert for only so long as is required for 
legitimate law enforcement purposes.” 115
The Review Committee consider that the introduction of such provisions would lessen 
the interference with a person’s right to privacy. The existence of an ability to delay 
the giving of the notice indefinitely would ensure that the effectiveness of the existing 
provisions was not reduced. 
7.6.4 Further safeguards
Set out above are the reporting requirements and the numerous safeguards built into 
the provisions relating to covert search warrants. 
Section 11 of the TCPA provides for reporting back to the issuing Court, within 
seven days of the expiry of the warrant, on its execution. Whilst the need for this may 
concentrate the minds of those officers carrying out the execution, the requirement 
appears to the Review Committee to serve little purpose. It is not within the remit of 
the Supreme Court to carry out routine oversight of the exercise of police powers. It is 
difficult to envisage what action the Court could take after receipt of the information. 
The Victorian Inspectorate (VI) has been formed under the Victorian Inspectorate 
Act 2011 (VI Act) to be the key oversight body within Victoria’s integrity system. Its 
remit generally is to enhance and monitor compliance by, and provide oversight of 
the activities of, other integrity, accountability or investigatory bodies, particularly the 
Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Agency (IBAC), the PIM, the Victorian 
Auditor-General’s Office (VAGO), the Chief Examiner and the Ombudsman.
The Review Committee consider the option of creating an oversight role for the VI in 
respect of Victoria Police use of covert search warrants should be explored, in lieu of  
or in addition to the obligation to report to the Court. 
The creation of such a role would require appropriate amendments to the Victorian 
Inspectorate Act 2011 and the TCPA. 
115 NSW Attorney-General’s Department “Review of Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002” at page 46.
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In their second written submission, Victoria Police stated that the current requirement 
to report to the Court is appropriate. The Review Committee have not viewed the 
report to the Court following the execution of the warrants in the Pendennis matter. 
If, however, the Review Committee were to recommend the creation of an oversight 
role, Victoria Police is of the view that the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 provides an 
appropriate model. 
The Review Committee do not share that view. The role of the VI in relation to those 
surveillance powers concentrates on the keeping of the records required by that 
legislation from a compliance perspective. The Review Committee do not consider this 
to be adequate if section 11 of the TCPA is to be replaced. A more extensive role for 
the VI would be necessary.
In addition, the requirement for an annual report to the Attorney-General under section 
13 of the TCPA would not be necessary in its current form if there was a requirement 
to report to the VI in lieu of a report to the Court. Such a report would be referred to in 
the VI report to Parliament. However, in these circumstances, it may still be desirable 
that some form of reporting to the Attorney-General continue. 
7.6.5 Meaning of the word “vehicle” 
The meaning of the word “vehicle” was raised by Victoria Police in connection with the 
mandatory reporting of prescribed chemicals and other substances (at Chapter 11 of 
this Report). However, the Review Committee consider that an issue also arises with 
respect to this meaning for the purposes of Part 2 of the TCPA.
A warrant granted under section 9 provides for the entry and search of “premises”.  
The definition of “premises” for the purposes of the TCPA includes:
(a) land; and 
(b) a building or vehicle; and
(c) a part of a building or vehicle; and
(d) any place, whether built on or not.116
“Vehicle” is not specifically defined for the purposes of the TCPA generally, only in 
respect of special police powers under Part 3A of the Act,117 where “a vessel and an 
aircraft” are included. The inclusion of these modes of transport in the definition for one 
part of the legislation only would tend to exclude them from the definition in respect 
of other parts. However, as has been seen from the terrorist actions in the USA in 
September 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, attacks may just as easily be effected by 
air or sea as by any form of land-based transportation, and the full range of powers 
should be available to Victoria Police in those circumstances. 
116 TCPA at section 4.
117 Ibid at section 21A.
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For the purposes of the use of Commonwealth police powers generally, “vehicle” is 
defined as including:
“…any means of transport (and, without limitation, includes a vessel and an 
aircraft).”118
Every other State in Australia has a specific definition of “vehicle” in its respective 
legislation which applies for the purposes of all of the terrorism powers. Without setting 
out the terms of each of them in full, they all include aircraft or vessels, or modes of 
transport over water or in the air.119
For the purposes of the TCPA, the Review Committee are of the view that the definition 
of “vehicle” in section 21A should be included in section 3, so that:
•	 Aircraft	and	vessels	may	be	searched	under	a	covert	search	warrant	granted	 
under this Part; and
•	 Aircraft	and	vessels	may	be	entered	for	the	purpose	of	executing	a	PDO	under	
section 13S; and
•	 The	duty	to	report	the	theft,	attempted	theft	or	unexplained	loss	of	prescribed	
chemicals or other substances applies to incidents where such materials have 
become lost during some form of transportation by air or water.
In sum, the Review Committee are satisfied that the covert search warrant power as 
provided for in Part 2 is adequate, effective and necessary. In the Review Committee’s 
view, however, the effectiveness of the power would be enhanced by the adoption and 
implementation of Recommendations 2 and 3. 
As already stated, the Review Committee consider that the power to issue a covert 
search warrant is sufficiently constrained so that the search would be a reasonable and 
justifiable interference with the right to privacy. 
However, the Review Committee are also of the view that additional safeguards should 
be included in Part 2 as already discussed and as set out in Recommendations 4 and 
5. Such additional safeguards would bring the TCPA more in line with the requirements 
of the Charter whilst, in the Review Committee’s view, not reducing the effectiveness or 
adequacy of the covert search warrant power. Consequently, the Review Committee 
consider the introduction of these additional safeguards to be justified and appropriate. 
118 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) at section 3UA.
119 Section 4, Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW); section 3 and schedule 6, Police Powers and 
Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld); section 63, Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT); section 2, 
Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2005 (SA); section 3, Police Powers (Public Safety) Act 2002 (Tas); section 3, 
Terrorism (Extraordinary Powers) Act 2005 (WA); section 4, Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 2006 (NT).
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7.7 Recommendations
Comment: This provision should allow the Supreme Court to issue 
a search warrant where it is satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting or believing that access to data held on a 
particular computer, or on a computer within a particular address, 
would substantially assist in the collection of evidence or intelligence 
necessary to prevent a terrorist act or suspected terrorist act from 
occurring, or would assist in the response to or the investigation of 
such an act or suspected act. Section 25A of the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) could be considered as a 
possible precedent with appropriate modifications.
Recommendation 3 
That the definition of “vehicle” in section 21A of the Terrorism 
(Community Protection) Act 2003 be included in section 3, so 
that it applies to all police powers and other provisions in respect 
of premise(s).
Recommendation 2
That amendment be made to Part 2 of the Terrorism (Community 
Protection) Act 2003 to clearly provide for “remote entry” or 
“remote access” to data held on a “target” computer.
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Recommendation 4 
That provision be made for the giving of a delayed notice to an 
occupier of premise(s) and any adjoining premise(s) which are the 
subject of an executed covert search warrant.
Comment: The notice should provide the date and time of execution 
and the grounds for the issue of the warrant. It should be given to the 
occupier, after its contents have been agreed with the Court, within 
6 months. However, the Court, on the application of an authorised 
member of the police force, should be empowered to delay the giving 
of the notice, for a defined period of time or indefinitely, where the 
Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
giving of the notice to the occupier may:
•	 jeopardise	any	ongoing	terrorist	investigations	by	any	State	or	
Commonwealth agency;
•	 have	the	effect	of	revealing	any	counter-terrorism	information	as	
defined in section 3 of the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 
2003; or
•	 lead	to	retribution	by	persons	targeted	under	a	warrant	against	 
any person. 
Section 27U and 27V of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 
(NSW) could be considered as a possible precedent with appropriate 
modifications.
Recommendation 5
That consideration be given to the creation of an oversight role 
for the Victorian Inspectorate with respect to the use of the covert 
search warrant power under Part 2 of the Terrorism (Community 
Protection) Act 2003. 
Comment: Such a role could be in lieu of or additional to the 
obligation to report to the Court or to the Attorney-General. The nature 
and scope of the role to be performed by the Victorian Inspectorate 
would need to be determined in consultation with the Victorian 
Inspectorate. The role may be analogous to that undertaken with 
regard to IBAC, the Auditor-General, the Chief Examiner and the 
Ombudsman with appropriate reporting requirements to Parliament. 
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8.1 Summary of the legislation
8.1.1 Origin
This Part of the Act, comprising sections 13A to 13ZV, was inserted by section 4  
of the TCPA Amendment Act, and came into force on 9 March 2006. 
These provisions were designed to provide a mechanism whereby an authorised 
police officer could apply to the Supreme Court for a PDO, allowing for someone to 
be taken into custody and detained for up to 14 days, as opposed to the 48 hours 
permitted under the equivalent Commonwealth provisions. A key feature of a PDO is 
its preventative, not investigative nature, and thus no interrogation is permitted during 
that detention.
In its submission to the INSLM of July 2012, the AFP described the objects of these 
provisions as:
“Preventative measures, aimed at protecting the public from potentially 
catastrophic harm by removing a person (or persons) from the prospect of 
supporting or participating in a terrorist attack. Preventative detention orders 
can also prevent persons from destroying evidence following a terrorist 
incident, evidence which may be crucial to ensuring that the perpetrators are 
brought to justice.” 120
As noted in Chapter 2 of this Report, the original draft of the Bill presented to the 
Assembly provided for a senior police officer, in urgent circumstances, to make an 
initial order. If such an order was made, but the Court later found it to have been 
wrongly made, compensation was payable to the detainee. However, this particular 
provision was removed before the Bill left the Assembly in February 2006. 
As also described in Chapter 2, the result of the scrutiny accorded to the Bill between 
November 2005 and February 2006 was the tabling of 206 amendments. Some 183 
of those amendments related to this Part of the Bill (though many were consequential). 
Amongst the new safeguards thereby provided were:
•	 An	ability	for	the	Court	to	place	a	condition	on	a	PDO	that	the	contact	between	a	
detainee and his or her lawyer should not be monitored;
•	 Provision	for	persons	aged	between	16	and	18	years	of	age	to	be	detained	in	a	
youth justice facility, and not be detained with persons aged 18 years and over;
•	 More	detailed	criteria	that	had	to	be	met	for	the	granting	of	a	contact	order;	and
•	 Provision	for	assistance	for	people	whose	first	language	is	not	English.
120 INSLM Report 2012 at Part III.2.
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Over time, further legislative changes to strengthen the safeguards under this Part of 
the TCPA have been made. Some minor amendments to the youth custody provisions 
were enacted later in 2006,121 and provisions reflecting the involvement in the 
application process of the newly established PIM were inserted in 2013.122 
Minor amendments to Part 2A, relating to access to the Ombudsman and to IBAC, 
were also made in 2008, 2009 and 2012.123 
The standard of proof to be applied to Part 2A matters is the civil standard, that is,  
the balance of probabilities.124 
8.1.2 Purpose of the provisions
The starting point for the PDO scheme was Division 105 of the Criminal Code, which 
came into force in December 2005. In agreeing to the additions to the Criminal Code, 
made by the Anti-Terrorism (No.2) Act 2005 (Cth), the States and Territories also 
agreed to enact complementary legislation so as to extend the permissible detention 
time under an order from 48 hours to 14 days. 
As referred to above, a key characteristic of a PDO is that a person detained can 
be subjected only to very minor, limited questioning during his or her detention.125 
This reflects the general policy position taken that detention under these provisions 
is purely preventative in nature, not investigative. Thus, the police are prohibited 
from questioning a detainee under a PDO, or under an order made under other 
corresponding Australian legislation, unless it is to establish the identity of the person 
or to ensure his or her health and wellbeing. Unless it is impracticable to do so due to 
the seriousness or urgency of the situation, video or audio recording of any questioning 
must occur in order to ensure that this basic rule is complied with. Interrogation may 
only occur if the detainee is released; even if the PDO is still in force, questioning may 
then be undertaken. 
By the same token, restrictions are placed under these provisions on the taking and 
use of identification material.126 Such material may only be taken, or caused to be 
taken, by a police officer of or above the rank of sergeant with the person’s consent 
in writing. Alternatively, it may be taken if the police officer reasonably believes the 
evidence is necessary for the purposes of confirming that the person is the subject of 
the PDO, or it is necessary in connection with documenting an illness or injury suffered 
whilst in detention. 
121 Section 6, Terrorism (Community Protection) Further Amendment Act 2006 and section 42 and Schedule Item 35, 
Children, Youth and Families (Consequential and Other Amendments) Act 2006.
122 Part 8, PIM Act.
123 Section 143 and Schedule 2, item 13, Police Integrity Act 2008; section 54 and Schedule Item 55, Statute Law 
Amendment(Evidence Consequential Provisions) Act 2009; section 167, Integrity and Accountability Legislation 
Amendment Act 2012. 
124 TCPA at section 13ZO.
125 Ibid at section 13ZK.
126 Ibid at sections 13ZL and 13ZM. “Identification material” is defined at length in section 13B, but includes DNA 
profiling samples, handwriting samples or photographs.
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The identification evidence must then only be used to confirm the person’s identity. It 
may be handed to the Department of Human Services (DHS) or the DOJ, depending 
on whether the person is being detained in a youth justice facility or a prison, but only 
for the purpose of assisting in this confirmation of identity. If no court proceedings 
have been commenced in connection with the PDO within 12 months, all identification 
evidence must be destroyed.
8.1.3 Application for a preventative detention order
The use of a PDO may be proactive or reactive. First of all, with respect to a suspected 
future terrorist act, a member of the police force who has been authorised by the Chief 
Commissioner (the applicant)127 may apply to the Supreme Court for a PDO against a 
person if that applicant is satisfied: 
•	 That	there	are	reasonable	grounds	for	suspecting	that	the	person	will	carry	out	an	
imminent act of terrorism (sometime within the next 14 days); or
•	 That	there	are	reasonable	grounds	for	suspecting	that	the	person	is	in	possession	
or control of something connected with the preparation for such an act, or to 
the engagement of someone else to carry out the act, or has done something in 
preparation for the carrying out or the planning of such an act; and
•	 That	the	making	of	the	order	would	substantially	assist	in	preventing	that	act,	
and the detention of the person in question for the period sought is a reasonably 
necessary part of this prevention.128
Alternatively, a PDO may be sought in respect of a terrorist act that has already 
occurred (within the last 28 days). In those circumstances, the applicant needs to be 
satisfied that it is necessary to detain the person for a given, justifiable period of time in 
order to preserve evidence.129
Applications cannot be made speculatively or spuriously. A substantial amount of 
detailed information is required under section 13D of the TCPA and the application 
must be made in writing, be sworn and must set out:
•	 The	facts,	and	the	grounds,	justifying	the	application;
•	 The	period	of	detention	sought,	and	the	justification	for	that	period;
•	 Any	information	available	relating	to	the	person’s	age	and	mental	capacity;
•	 The	details	of	any	previous	applications	for	a	PDO	against	the	person	in	question;
•	 The	details	of	any	applications	for	control	orders	under	the	Commonwealth	law130 
against the person, including any applications for variations to or revocation  
of any such orders that were made;131
127 That is members of the force who, by name or class, have been authorised to make applications for a PDO or a 
prohibited contact order, ibid at section 13B(2).
128 Ibid at section 13C(1)(a).
129 Ibid at section 13C(1)(b).
130 Division 104 of the Criminal Code.
131 TCPA at section 13D.
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•	 The	details	of	any	periods	in	detention	under	any	corresponding	laws	(i.e.	under	
the Commonwealth provisions132 or like provisions in another State or Territory);133 
•	 (Where	the	person	has	already	been	in	detention	for	the	purpose	of	preventing	
a different terrorist attack, either under a different PDO in Victoria or elsewhere 
in Australia) the fact that the evidence in support of this application only became 
available after the earlier PDO was made; a second or subsequent PDO for 
preventing a different terrorist act cannot be granted without this confirmation;134 
and
•	 A	summary	of	the	grounds	for	seeking	the	order.	Certain	information	may	be	left	
out if it is believed to be likely to prejudice national security.135 
The application can be made without notice to the person concerned, unless he or she 
is already in preventative custody under a corresponding law under another Australian 
jurisdiction.136 This is most likely to be the case where a person has been detained 
under the Commonwealth provisions, which provide for just 48 hours detention, and 
then a subsequent application is made by Victoria Police, which allows for up to 14 
days detention, less any time already detained. However, the PIM must be informed of 
the application, as well as, in the case of someone under the age of 18 years, the DHS 
(though a failure to inform the latter does not invalidate the application).
8.1.4 The making of a preventative detention order
A PDO may be granted if the judge is reasonably satisfied that the grounds for the 
application as described above are made out. Any submissions made by the PIM must 
be taken into account. If further information is required by the Court, or if the Court 
wishes to hear from the person concerned (where the application was made ex parte), 
then an interim PDO may be made, allowing for a maximum detention of 48 hours, or 
until the final determination of the application, whichever is the later.137 The person and 
his or her lawyer (if known) must be given notice of the resumption date. The PIM must 
also be notified of the date of any resumed hearing.
At the substantive hearing of the application following the interim order, the person who 
is the subject of the application is entitled to appear to give evidence, call witnesses, 
make submissions, adduce material and cross-examine police witnesses. If the 
person is not represented, then the Court may order Victoria Legal Aid to provide legal 
representation.138 However, whilst the person is entitled to all of this, a failure by him or 
her to appear does not prevent the Court from dealing with the application.
If an interim order was made by the Court, that order may be confirmed, varied or 
revoked. 
132 Division 105 of the Criminal Code. 
133 For the sake of certainty, regulations may be made listing the laws of other States and territories to which these 
provisions apply. No such regulations have been made a the time of writing this report.
134 TCPA at section 13K. Note that whilst another PDO cannot be granted for the purposes of preventing another 
terrorist attack unless the information came to light after the application for the first, this does not prevent the 
granting of a further PDO for the purposes of preserving evidence, if the attack takes place.
135 That is information that relates to national security, or the disclosure of which is likely to prejudice national security 
– section 7, National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth).
136 TCPA at section 13D(6).
137 Ibid at section 13E(4) and (6).
138 Ibid at section 13E(10) and (11). 
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8.1.5 The nature of a preventative detention order
The scope and limitations of a PDO are set out in section 13F of the TCPA.
A substantive PDO (rather than an interim one) allows the subject of the order to be 
taken into custody, or further custody, for a specified period not exceeding 14 days. As 
well as the person’s name, and a summary of the grounds on which the order is made 
(again excluding anything likely to prejudice national security), the order must contain:
•	 The	period	of	detention;
•	 The	place(s)	where	the	person	may	or	may	not	be	detained;
•	 The	date	and	time	of	the	order;
•	 The	date	and	time	after	which	the	PDO	cannot	be	enforced	–	if	the	person	has	 
not been taken into custody within 48 hours, the order lapses;139 and
•	 Any	provisions	regarding	the	person’s	permissible	contact	or	otherwise	with	the	
outside world under a contact order.140 
A PDO may contain a provision directing that contact between a person subject to the 
order and his or her lawyer must not be monitored, if the court is satisfied that such an 
order is appropriate.
Under section 13F(10), added in December 2008 and amended in February 2013, the 
Victorian Ombudsman and IBAC must be informed of the making of any PDO, given 
a copy of it and informed when the subject is taken into custody under it. If the police 
have reason to believe that a person detained is unable to communicate fluently in 
English, the assistance of an interpreter must be obtained, and reasonable assistance 
must be given to choose and engage a lawyer.
If the person to be detained is under the age of 18 years, special rules apply. The order 
will be for the person to be detained in a youth justice facility unless, in the opinion 
of the Court, and having taken into account submissions made by the DHS, it is 
reasonably necessary to detain the person elsewhere, having regard to:
•	 The	age	and	vulnerability	of	the	person,	and	the	likely	impact	that	detention	
elsewhere would have;
•	 The	grounds	for	the	PDO;
•	 The	availability	of	a	place	in	a	youth	justice	facility;	and
•	 The	risk	posed	by	the	person	to	the	security	of	the	country,	to	other	inmates	and	
to the maintenance of good order in the facility.141 
No detention of a person under 16 years of age is permitted.142 If a detainee is 
subsequently found to be under 16 years of age, he or she must be released as soon 
as is practicable.
139 Ibid at section 13H(2).
140 Ibid at section 13F(4).
141 Ibid at section 13F(8).
142 Ibid at section 13J.
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8.1.6 Executing a preventative detention order
Any police officer may take a person into custody under a PDO, exercising the 
same powers as if apprehending someone suspected of an indictable offence, or of 
attempting to escape police or prison custody.143 Details of the apprehension and 
detention are endorsed on the order.
Officers may use reasonable force at any time to search premises for and take custody 
of the subject of the PDO. However, they must not enter residential premises between 
the hours of 9pm and 6am unless they reasonably believe that:
•	 It	would	not	be	practicable	to	take	the	person	into	custody	at	another	time;	or
•	 It	is	necessary	to	do	so	to	prevent	the	loss,	destruction	or	concealment	of	
evidence.144
An officer may also seek assistance from others in the execution of a PDO and, in 
doing so, may request their names and addresses. Refusal or failure to provide these 
when requested, without a reasonable excuse, is an offence, as is supplying false 
details.145 If requested, the officer must supply his or her name, rank, number and the 
address of his or her place of duty. Failure without reasonable excuse to do so is also 
an offence.146
The police officer detaining a person under a PDO is required to inform the subject of 
the particulars of the order, including the reasons for it, the period of it and details of 
who may or may not be contacted. The person must also be informed at this stage of 
their rights under these provisions, being:
•	 The	right	to	seek	a	variation	or	revocation	of	the	order;
•	 The	right	to	speak	to	the	“nominated	senior	police	officer”	assigned	to	the	case	
(see below), and the name and work telephone number of that officer;
•	 Any	rights	to	complain	to	the	Ombudsman	or	IBAC	about	the	application	for	the	
PDO or contact order, or about his or her treatment in detention, or the right to 
seek relief from the court regarding the same; and
•	 The	right	to	contact	a	lawyer.147
A failure to notify the detainee as to these rights could result in the apprehending officer 
being guilty of an offence, unless the behaviour of the detainee makes it impracticable 
to comply. The detainee must also be informed, as soon as is practicable, of any 
extension to the order.148 However, the obligation to inform the detainee can be 
satisfied by informing him or her of the substance of the above, without the need 
for precise or technical language. If the detainee’s use of English is not fluent, the 
assistance of an interpreter must be provided, in person or by telephone.
A failure by the detaining officer to comply with any of these requirements does not 
affect the lawfulness of the detention.149
143 Ibid at section 13P.
144 Ibid at section 13S.
145 Ibid at section 13R(2). 
146 Ibid at section 13R(4). 
147 Ibid at section 13X.
148 Ibid at section 13Y.
149 Ibid at section 13Z(5).
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On taking a person into custody under a PDO, an officer is expressly empowered 
to carry out a search of the person apprehended.150 This may be done to ascertain 
whether the person is carrying evidence of or relating to a terrorist act, or an item 
that presents a danger to a person, or which could be used to assist them to escape 
custody, to contact another person or which could remotely activate a device 
(collectively referred to as “seizable items”).151
The apprehending police officer must also provide the detainee, as soon as is 
practicable, with a copy of the PDO and any contact order in force, as well as a 
summary of the grounds on which the latter was made (excluding any information likely 
to affect national security). If requested, these documents must also be delivered to the 
detainee’s lawyer.
Section 13W makes provision for the administration of the detention. If a person is 
received into custody under a PDO in a police gaol, then the police officer can seek the 
detainee’s transfer to prison by application to the DOJ. The duty to treat the detainee 
humanely applies to the Governor of the prison and any prison officers involved in the 
detention. It continues to apply to the detaining police officer, though the police officer 
requesting the transfer remains responsible for the general obligations under the TCPA 
as to giving information to the detainee. Where the person is under 18 years of age, 
and the PDO requires the person to be detained in a youth justice facility, the request 
to transfer from police custody must be made to the DHS.
8.1.7 Nominated senior police officer
Section 13P(4) provides that, where a PDO is made, the Chief Commissioner must 
nominate an independent member of the force of or above the rank of Superintendent, 
known as the “nominated senior police officer”, to oversee the exercise of powers 
under the PDO and the performance of the obligations on police officers under it. This 
officer serves as an official, designated “contact point” for the subject of the PDO and 
his or her lawyer and family members, independent from those police officers involved 
in applying for and carrying out the order.
Thus, this officer may be contacted by the subject of a PDO with a view to varying 
or revoking that PDO or a contact order. The nominated officer also has a role in 
receiving representations from a detainee or his or her lawyer, the Ombudsman or 
IBAC or a family member or permitted contact person in connection with the detainee’s 
treatment, the performance of the obligations placed on the police by virtue of the 
order and the obligations placed on the police to seek revocation or variation of an 
order when appropriate.152
150 Ibid at section 13T.
151 Ibid at section 13B.
152 Ibid at section 13P(7).
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8.1.8 Prohibited contact orders
If the Supreme Court makes a PDO, and is satisfied as to the criteria set out in the 
paragraph below, it may also make a contact order, which means that the person who 
is the subject of the PDO must not, whilst being detained under the PDO, contact a 
person specified in that order. 
An application for a contact order may be made by an authorised officer, sworn and 
in writing. The Supreme Court may grant such an order if both the applicant and the 
Court are satisfied that such an order is reasonably necessary to:
•	 Avoid	any	risk	to	any	preventative	actions	that	are	being	taken;
•	 Prevent	serious	harm	to	anyone;
•	 Preserve	evidence	or	to	prevent	interference	with	evidence	gathering;	or
•	 Avoid	any	risk	to	any	imminent	arrest	under	the	terrorism	provisions	of	the	Criminal	
Code, the detention of someone under a PDO or the service on someone of a 
Commonwealth control order.153
The person against whom the application is made must be notified, and is entitled 
to appear before the Court. The PIM is notified of the application and may appear or 
make submissions. The Ombudsman and IBAC are notified and provided with a copy 
of the contact order.
Section 13M allows for a contact order to be applied for and made where a person 
is already detained under a PDO, as well as when the PDO is in force but yet to be 
executed. The same requirements as to the application, the service of notice and the 
notification to the PIM, the Ombudsman and IBAC apply.
8.1.9 Restrictions on contact generally
The PDO may allow for some contact with the outside world.154 However, generally 
speaking, and subject to some exceptions, a person in detention has no entitlement 
to contact another person, and may be prevented from so doing.155 Any letter that 
the detainee wishes to send to anyone except the Victorian Ombudsman, IBAC or 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman must be given first to a member of the police force. 
Any correspondence with a person detained in a prison or a youth justice facility must 
also be handed to the police by the prison staff. This provision applies to documents 
passed between the detainee and his or her lawyer. The exceptions to this general rule, 
unless the person to be contacted is mentioned in a contact order, are as follows:
•	 A	family	member,	co-habitee	or	work	colleague	may	be	contacted	once	by	the	
detainee solely for the purpose of letting them know that that he or she is safe and 
is being detained. The detainee may only disclose the fact that the PDO has been 
made, the fact that he or she is in detention and the length of the detention.156 
Further contact with these people may be permitted, as detailed in the order itself;
153 Ibid at section 13KA.
154 Ibid at section 13F(4)(e).
155 Ibid at section 13ZC.
156 Ibid at section 13ZD(3). The draft Bill first submitted to the legislative assembly specifically prevented a detainee 
from informing the contacted person that they were being detained under a PDO or the duration of the detention 
during the initial permitted contact – this had been only permitted during any further contact provided for by the 
order: clause 13ZD(3)-(5).
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•	 A	lawyer	may	be	contacted,	but	solely	to	obtain	advice	or	to	instruct	in	any	
proceedings connected to the PDO or contact order or in any other proceedings 
unrelated to the PDO in which a hearing is due to take place during the detention, 
or in connection with any contact with the Ombudsman or IBAC.157 If the chosen 
lawyer is the subject of a contact order, or cannot be contacted, then assistance 
must be given (including the assistance of an interpreter where necessary) in 
choosing another;
•	 Contact	with	the	Victorian	Ombudsman	or	IBAC	is	permitted.158
Any contact that the detainee has with a family member, etc, or a lawyer is only 
permitted where it can be effectively monitored by the police officer responsible for 
the detention, with the assistance of an interpreter if necessary, unless (in the case 
of a lawyer) the PDO made by the Court provides otherwise under section 13F(6). 
Legal professional privilege is preserved in the case of communications with a lawyer 
by section 13KG(5), which provides that evidence of such communications is not 
admissible in any proceedings against the detainee.
There is a prohibition on the disclosure of facts and information other than as outlined 
above, or as permitted in the case of a minor or a person incapable of managing their 
own affairs. Section 13ZJ makes it an offence for:
•	 Subject	to	the	above,	the	detainee,	during	the	detention,	to	intentionally	 
disclose the fact that he or she is the subject of a PDO or a contact order  
or has been detained;
•	 The	detainee’s	lawyer	to	disclose	any	of	the	above	during	the	detention,	unless	
that disclosure is for the purposes of any proceedings connected to the PDO 
or any contact with the Ombudsman, IBAC or the above-mentioned nominated 
senior police officer;
•	 A	parent	or	guardian	contacted	under	the	special	arrangements	for	minors	or	
persons with limited mental capacity (see below) to disclose any of that information 
unless, again, the disclosure is for the purposes of dealing with the Ombudsman, 
IBAC or the nominated senior police officer; or
•	 An	officer	or	interpreter	who	assists	with	the	monitoring	of	a	detainee’s	contact	
with his or her lawyer, or an interpreter who monitors the detainee’s contact 
generally, to intentionally disclose any of the above information.
A lawyer, parent or guardian may simply inform another person that the detainee is 
safe but cannot be contacted for a specified period. A breach of any of the prohibitions 
on disclosure set out above is an offence. Similarly, it is also an offence for a police 
officer or interpreter who monitors contact between a detainee and another person to 
disclose any information derived from that monitoring.
A secondary non-disclosure offence is created by section 13ZJ(9). That is, anyone 
who receives prohibited information about the PDO must not pass on that information 
except to a person in authority under the order, or to someone with responsibility for 
the well-being of the detainee.
157 Ibid at section 13ZF.
158 Ibid at section 13ZE.
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Some special rules on contact and disclosure apply in the case of minors, or persons 
incapable of managing their own affairs. (See Section 8.1.11 of this Report). 
8.1.10 Treatment of person detained
Division 5 of Part 2A begins with the overriding consideration that a person taken into 
detention must be treated with humanity and dignity, and must not be subjected to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.159 A breach of this provision is an offence .160
8.1.11 Treatment of minors and persons incapable of managing their 
own affairs
A PDO may not be applied for or made in respect of a person under the age of 16 years. 
For persons between the age of 16 and 18 years, a number of special rules apply:
1. He or she must not be detained with persons of 18 years and above unless 
there are exceptional circumstances that dictate otherwise, and that detention is 
authorised in writing by a senior police officer;161
2. The detention shall take place in a juvenile justice facility, unless there are reasons 
why the detention should take place elsewhere;162
3. Provision is made throughout this Part of the TCPA for communication to be held 
with the Secretary of the DHS with regard to the person;163
4. Special contact rules apply so that 2 hours a day (or more if allowed by he 
supervising police officer) of contact with parents or guardians, etc. (or each of 
them) is permitted;164 
5. Special rules apply to the taking and use of identification material.165
The fourth and fifth of these special provisions apply in the case of persons incapable 
of managing their own affairs as they apply to minors.
8.1.12 Revocation or variation of preventative detention order or 
prohibited contact order
A person who is the subject of a PDO may apply at any time for the leave of the 
Supreme Court to make an application to vary or revoke a PDO or a contact order. 
Leave will not be granted, however, unless new facts or circumstances have arisen 
since the making of the order in question.166 If leave is granted, and on the full 
application the Court is satisfied that new facts or circumstances have arisen that 
make it appropriate to vary or revoke the order, the Court must do so. As soon as is 
practicable, the DHS or DOJ must be informed of any variation or revocation of any 
PDO or contact order.
159 Ibid at section 13ZB.
160 Ibid at section 13ZN.
161 Ibid at section 13ZBA.
162 Ibid at section 13F(8).
163 Ibid at sections 13D(7), 13E(8), 13I(8), 13N(6) and (8), 13O(5), 13P(8) and 13WA.
164 Ibid at section 13ZH.
165 Ibid at section 13ZL(4) to (10).
166 Ibid at section 13N(2).
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Alternatively, the police are required to return to the Court to seek a variation or 
revocation of a PDO in respect of a person in detention, or of a contact order in 
respect of that person, on the following bases;
•	 If	the	detaining	officer	is	satisfied	that	the	grounds	on	which	the	PDO	was	sought	
have ceased to exist, a revocation must be sought; or
•	 If	the	detaining	officer	is	satisfied	that	new	facts	or	circumstances	have	arisen	
which make a variation to the PDO appropriate, then a variation must be applied 
for; or
•	 If	the	detaining	officer	is	satisfied	that	new	facts	or	circumstances	have	arisen	
(including that the grounds on which the contact order was made have ceased to 
exist) which make it appropriate for the contact order to be revoked or varied, then 
a revocation or a variation must be applied for.167
If the Court is similarly satisfied as to the above, it must make the requested revocation 
or variation. As with other applications by police, the PIM is notified and may appear 
or make submissions. Any variation or revocation is again reported as soon as is 
practicable to the DHS or DOJ. 
The person who is subject to a PDO may, at any time, make representations to the 
nominated senior police officer (see section 8.1.7 of this Report) with a view to seeking 
a variation to or the revocation of a PDO or contact order. 
8.1.13 Extension of a preventative detention order
A substantive PDO may be extended by the court on the application of an authorised 
police officer, and the application must contain the reasons for seeking the extension 
as well as details of all previous applications and orders. The person can appear and 
contest the application, and the PIM is informed, as is DHS (in the case of a minor in a 
youth justice facility) or DOJ. However, any extension or extensions granted must not 
take the total period of detention beyond 14 days.168
Any extension or further extension must be notified to the detainee as soon as 
practicable thereafter by the police officer responsible for the detention and failure to 
do so could result in the commission of an offence.169 The lawfulness of the continued 
detention is not affected by a failure to do so.170
8.1.14 Release from detention 
Section 13V provides for the release from detention of a person held under a PDO, 
though nothing prevents the person being re-apprehended and detained again as long 
as the PDO remains in force.
Whilst questioning of a detainee is prohibited whilst the person is in detention, a 
detainee may be released from detention under a PDO to be delivered into the hands 
of others for the purpose of such questioning. For example, this may be:
167 Ibid at section 13P(6)(b). The nominated senior police officer referred to previously is charged with ensuring that 
these obligations on the police are complied with. 
168 Ibid at sections 13G and 13I.
169 Ibid at section 13ZN.
170 Ibid at section 13Z(5).
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•	 Into	the	custody	of	Victoria	Police	for	questioning	in	the	usual	way	in	connection	
with a suspected offence; or
•	 In	accordance	with	a	warrant	issued	at	the	request	of	the	Director-General	of	ASIO	
for the investigation of terrorism under section 34D of the ASIO Act. If the detaining 
police officer is handed a copy of such a warrant, he or she must take such steps 
as are necessary to allow the detainee to be dealt with under that warrant;171 or 
•	 Into	the	custody	of	the	Australian	Federal	Police	for	questioning	in	accordance	with	
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
8.1.15 Offences by police
As mentioned in a number of circumstances above, the requirement that the police 
use these powers lawfully and that the detention is in accordance with the legislative 
provisions is reinforced by offence provisions. 
Section 13ZN provides that a breach of any of the following obligations to the subject 
of a PDO by a member or members of the police force may (unless exceptions apply) 
constitute an offence:
•	 The	duty	to	explain	the	details	of	the	PDO	and	the	rights	of	the	detainee	under	it	
on apprehension;172
•	 The	duty	to	inform	a	detainee	that	a	PDO	has	been	extended;173
•	 The	duty	to	provide	a	detainee	with	a	copy	of	the	PDO,	any	contact	order	or	any	
extension order, or to provide on request a copy of the order or a summary of it to 
the detainee’s lawyer;174
•	 The	duty	to	endorse	a	copy	of	the	order	given	to	the	detainee	or	his	or	her	lawyer	
with the date and time of apprehension or detention;175
•	 The	duty	to	treat	a	detainee	with	humanity	and	dignity,	and	not	to	subject	the	
person to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;176
•	 The	duty	to	ensure	that	a	person	under	18	years	of	age	is	not	detained	with	a	
person over 18 years of age;177
•	 The	duty	to	assist	the	detainee	in	finding	another	lawyer	when	the	chosen	one	
cannot be contacted or is the subject of a contact order;178
•	 The	duty	not	to	monitor	contact	between	a	detainee	and	another	person	if	the	
PDO so provides;179
171 Ibid at section 13U.
172 Ibid at section 13X(1).
173 Ibid at section 13Y.
174 Ibid at sections 13ZA(1), (4) and (6).
175 Ibid at section 13ZA(9).
176 Ibid at section 13ZB.
177 Ibid at section 13ZBA(1).
178 Ibid at section 13ZF(3).
179 Ibid at section 13ZG(6).
71
•	 The	duty	to	inform	a	parent	or	guardian	with	whom	a	minor	or	a	person	incapable	
of managing their own affairs has contact not to disclose to another parent or 
guardian who is the subject of a contact order the fact of the PDO, the fact that 
the detainee is in detention or any other information gleaned from the detainee 
during the contact session;180
•	 The	duty	not	to	question	a	detainee	other	than	as	permitted,	or	the	failure	to	
record any questioning;181
•	 The	duty	not	to	take	identification	evidence	except	as	permitted;182 or
•	 The	duty	not	to	use	identification	evidence	other	than	to	establish	the	identity	 
of the detainee.183 
8.1.16 Reporting requirements
By way of public and parliamentary oversight of the use of the police powers under this 
Part of the TCPA, the Attorney-General must cause to be prepared an annual report as 
soon as practicable after the end of each financial year, and must lay that report before 
both Houses of Parliament.184 The report must outline:
•	 The	number	of	PDOs	made	during	the	year	and	the	number	applied	for;
•	 Whether	a	person	was	taken	into	custody	under	each	PDO	and	for	how	long;
•	 The	number	of	persons	subject	to	a	PDO	that	were	later	charged	with	an	offence	
of terrorism under the Criminal Code;
•	 Details	of	complaints	made	to	the	Ombudsman	or	IBAC;
•	 The	number	of	contact	orders	made;	and
•	 The	number	of	PDOs	or	contact	orders	found	by	a	court	to	have	been	invalid.	
Annual Reports have been tabled in Parliament in respect of each financial year since 
2006-2007. Each report has included a nil return in respect of each of the categories 
listed above. At the time of writing, the Review Committee understand that no PDO 
has been applied for in Australia.
8.1.17 Other safeguards
A number of other safeguards have been built in to this Part to prevent abuse of the 
powers or to provide protections for those detained. Some have been referred to 
above, many were added by way of amendments tabled at the end of the second 
reading debate on the TCPA Amendment Bill in the Assembly. 
180 Ibid at section 13ZH(11).
181 Ibid at section 13ZK(1), (2) and (3).
182 Ibid at section 13ZL(1), (4) and (6).
183 Ibid at section 13ZM(2).
184 Ibid at section 13ZR.
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A PDO can only be made by the Supreme Court. It can only be made following an 
application process, generally in the presence of a PIM, and the application must be 
approved by the Chief Commissioner. This is in contrast to the position envisaged in 
the first draft of the Bill, whereby a senior police officer could make an interim PDO. 
Indeed, it contrasts with the position under the Criminal Code,185 whereby an initial 
order lasting up to 24 hours may be made by a senior AFP member, and a substantive 
order may be made by a range of issuing authorities (being judges or retired 
judges). Senior police officers are also entitled to make a PDO, under varying sets of 
circumstances, in Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania.
Moreover, on an ex parte application for a PDO, it is open to the Court to make an 
interim order, allowing for the subject of the application to appear and be represented 
at the substantive hearing. 
Other safeguards already referred to in this Chapter include:
•	 The	fact	that	a	detainee	may	not	be	interrogated	during	the	detention;
•	 The	special	provisions	relating	to	minors	and	persons	with	limited	mental	
capabilities;
•	 The	availability	of	the	nominated	senior	police	officer,	and	the	involvement	of	a	PIM	
in the Court processes and the Ombudsman and/or IBAC thereafter;
•	 The	duty	on	the	detaining	police	officer	to	inform	a	detainee	of	his	or	her	rights	
regarding the Ombudsman, IBAC, lawyers, etc;
•	 The	obligation	on	the	officer	to	seek	a	revocation	of	the	PDO	if	satisfied	that	the	
grounds on which the order was made have ceased to exist, or a variation of the 
order if new facts or circumstances come to light; 
•	 The	list	of	offence	provisions	that	may	apply	to	police	officers	who	fail	to	act	in	
strict accordance with these provisions; 
•	 The	assistance	where	necessary	of	interpreters,	and	assistance	in	identifying	and	
engaging a lawyer;
•	 The	availability	of	legal	aid;	
•	 The	restricted	permitted	use	of	any	identification	materials;	and
•	 The	express	statutory	obligation	on	anyone	involved	in	administering	the	PDO	to	
treat the subject of the order humanely and with dignity when being taken into 
custody and in detention, and not to subject the person to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, under penalty of a criminal sanction for non-compliance. 
Finally, a sunset provision was made to apply to this Part,186 so that it expires on 
9 March 2016 (the remainder of the TCPA expires on 1 December 2016).
185 Sections 105.2 and 105.8.
186 TCPA at section 13ZV.
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8.2 COAG Report
The COAG Committee reviewed the State and Territory legislation introduced as a 
result of the 2005 COAG agreement as part of its terms of reference.187 At paragraphs 
261-276, the COAG Committee commented on the State and Territory provisions 
regarding preventative detention.
The COAG Committee stated that, generally, the schemes shared many common 
features, though there were some differences between the jurisdictions on the extent 
of the safeguards available under those schemes. In that regard, it was recognised 
that the Australian Capital Territory legislation was seen to be the “model” scheme; 
in particular, on an application for a PDO on the grounds of preventing an attack, the 
Court must be satisfied on reasonable grounds:
“that detaining the person under the order is the least restrictive way  
of preventing the terrorist act …” 
before it can grant the order.188 
If the PDO is intended to assist in the protection of evidence, following an attack,  
the Court has to be satisfied on reasonable grounds:
“that detaining the person under the order is the only effective way of 
preserving the evidence…”.189 
However, in respect of the PDO provisions in their entirety, the COAG Committee  
had only one recommendation:
“Recommendation 39: The Committee recommends, by majority, that the 
Commonwealth, State and Territory ‘preventative detention’ legislation be 
repealed. If any form of preventative detention were to be retained, it would 
require a complete restructuring of the legislation at Commonwealth and 
State/Territory level, a process which, in the view of the Committee, may 
further reduce its operational effectiveness.” 190
The COAG Committee recognised the force of the arguments put forward at police 
and government level for retaining as many lawful measures against terrorism as 
possible in the current unstable climate. Where reliable intelligence points to an 
individual preparing to make an attack, for example, but there is not yet enough 
evidence to make an arrest, it is easy to see the value in keeping that person off the 
scene for a limited period of time in an attempt to avert the feared terrorist act. 
The question for the COAG Committee to consider, however, was not whether the 
laws were desirable, but whether they were “necessary and effective”. The majority of 
members concluded they were not.
187 Paragraph 6 of the COAG Report. The purpose and scope of the review had been agreed at the COAG meeting 
of 10 February 2006.
188 Section 18(4)(c), Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT).
189 Ibid at section 18(6)(c). 
190 COAG Report at Recommendation 39. 
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Whilst it was noted as being of interest that the powers had never been exercised at 
Commonwealth or at State or Territory level, this was not a defining factor. Of more 
persuasive value was the evidence given in submissions by a number of police forces 
that they could not see circumstances in which they would actually wish to use 
the powers.
A number of shortfalls in the operational usefulness of a PDO were identified in written 
and oral submissions made to the COAG Committee by enforcement agencies:
•	 The	lack	of	ability	to	interrogate	a	detainee	was	the	most	common	complaint.	
The temporary release of a detainee still subject to a PDO simply to allow for 
questioning may lead to a vital loss of time. Western Australia Police suggested 
that vital evidence could not be accepted during the detention, even if proffered 
voluntarily. The South Australia Police approach in these circumstances would 
be to accept the evidence (and put it to use in protecting the public) even though 
it could not subsequently be used at any trial. The Queensland Police agreed, 
choosing to treat the same as “intelligence” rather than “evidence”; 
•	 The	complexities	involved	in	preparing	an	application	for	a	PDO	impede	its	efficient	
use in an urgent situation;
•	 Some	of	the	thresholds	are	impractical.	For	example,	the	requirement	that	a	
terrorist attack must be threatened “imminently” or within 14 days does not take 
into account suspicions and concerns, based on reliable intelligence, of an attack 
at an unknown time in the future;
•	 The	fact	that	a	suspect	must	be	named	in	the	application	or	in	the	body	of	the	
order rules out applying for the detention of a suspect whose true identity is 
unknown.
The COAG Committee considered that possibly the most persuasive point made 
in submissions by some of the enforcement agencies was that, at a practical, 
operational level, if they had enough evidence to apply for a PDO, they would more 
likely than not have enough evidence to arrest and charge. Not only were police 
forces more comfortable using traditional policing methods, but detention under those 
circumstances also permitted interrogation to occur. Moreover, the preventative and 
protective elements of the PDO scheme would be achieved by the detention of the 
individual in this way in any event, given that there would be a presumption against bail 
being granted in these circumstances.
As indicated in the recommendation, the COAG Committee did give consideration to 
the question of whether worthwhile amendments to the Commonwealth and State 
and Territory schemes could be made to make them “necessary and effective”. The 
conclusion was that any modifications would only result in the introduction of even 
greater safeguards, perhaps based on the Australian Capital Territory “model”, with 
the result that the law enforcement agencies would be even more reluctant to use the 
powers, even in an emergency.
Looking at the four issues identified above as they apply to the TCPA they are:
•	 Questioning	of	a	person	in	detention	under	a	PDO	is	prohibited;191
•	 The	requirements	for	an	application	are	detailed	and	time	consuming;192
191 TCPA at section 13ZK.
192 Ibid at section 13D.
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•	 There	is	a	requirement	that	a	terrorist	act	be	“imminent”,	or	in	any	event	 
“some time in the next 14 days”;193 and
•	 A	preventative	detention	order	must	set	out	“the	name	of	the	person	in	relation	 
to whom it is made.”194
8.3 INSLM comments
In the first report delivered by the INSLM in 2011, an initial unease with the PDO 
provisions was evident, questioning why such draconian laws should be created to 
deal with just one of the threats to the lives of Australians and not others. The INSLM 
also considered whether the laws had effectively been “cabined” ie. so confined by 
the necessity to have human rights safeguards built-in as to render them ineffective, 
through overly strict threshold requirements.
However, the second INSLM Report195 contained a more detailed review of the PDO 
provisions. The forensic analysis of the provisions is in respect of Division 105 of the 
Criminal Code, but most of the observations and recommendations can be directly 
read across to the Victorian statute.
The INSLM commented that:
“…these provisions are fairly ugly legislation, with no real utility and a proven 
lack of users.”196
The INSLM paid fuller regard to the fact that no agency, Commonwealth or State/
Territory, had yet seen fit to use the powers available. This lack of use, he opined, 
questioned their very effectiveness, appropriateness and necessity. Moreover, he 
stressed the complicated nature of the provisions and of the application process, 
saying:
“While it is admirable that the legislation includes such a high threshold for the 
grant of a PDO, the complexity of the provisions dealing with PDOs brings into 
question the efficacy of these laws.” 197
He points out that:
“The significant safeguards and formality surrounding PDOs would engage 
police manpower at the very time of imminent threat. Drafting an application 
for a PDO is a resource intensive activity that may divert police resources 
during a time critical period of investigative activity. It could be impractical for 
police who are intimately involved in an operation to be drafting an application 
for a PDO instead of arresting suspects and gathering evidence for a 
prosecution.” 198
The fact that, in the INSLM’s view, the use of arrest powers would be preferable to the 
use of PDO powers in virtually every circumstance is his main criticism of this particular 
suite of powers:
193 Ibid at section 13C(2).
194 Ibid at section 13F(4)(a).
195 INSLM Report, 2012. 
196 Ibid at Chapter 3, section III.1.
197 Ibid at section III.4.
198 Ibid at section III.7.
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•	 Unlike	a	PDO,	an	arrest	can	be	made	by	a	single	officer	without	the	need	for	formal	
approval or paperwork. There is no reason to suggest that a power of arrest could 
not be used to prevent a terrorism offence in the same way as it is used to prevent 
the commission of other serious offences;
•	 The	criteria	for	an	arrest,	that	an	officer	must	believe	on	reasonable	grounds	that	a	
person has committed or is committing an offence, is so similar to the criteria for 
a PDO (reasonable grounds to suspect) that the PDO provisions are not needed; 
and
•	 Crucially,	detention	following	a	straightforward	arrest	would	allow	interrogation	of	
the suspect. As there is a presumption against bail in terrorist matters, continued 
detention is unlikely to be an issue.
In the view of the INSLM, it is this lack of ability to question a suspect that is the most 
powerful argument against the continued retention of PDO powers. If someone is in 
detention under a PDO, he or she will doubtless hold information of great interest to 
the police and intelligence agencies. In fact, the INSLM concludes, this restriction goes 
further than being of no assistance to the investigation agencies, it actually serves as 
an impediment to the proper investigation of threats and occurrences.
Thus, as a police officer may arrest someone who he or she believes on reasonable 
grounds to have committed a terrorist offence, it is difficult to see a circumstance 
where an officer could meet the threshold for applying for a PDO and yet not meet 
the threshold for arresting the person. As the INSLM points out there is nothing in 
the Explanatory Memorandum for the Anti-Terrorism (No.2) (Cth) Bill or in the ensuing 
parliamentary debates, that explains why existing powers of arrest were insufficient. 
The need for a PDO was not demonstrated at the time, he suggests, and it remains 
unclear now.
The INSLM’s overall conclusion, therefore, and indeed the final recommendation on the 
matter (Recommendation III/4) is that Division 105 of the Criminal Code be repealed. In 
particular, with regard to his statutory duties he said: 
“There is no demonstrated necessity for these extraordinary powers.” 199
If the powers were to be retained, however, the INSLM did go on, in his second annual 
report, to make three recommendations for amendment:
•	 The	threshold	test	for	a	PDO	should	not	be	a	mere	single	objective	requirement	(as	
in “there are reasonable grounds to suspect”) but a dual subjective and objective 
requirement (in that the issuing authority itself should have a reasonable belief as 
well as there being reasonable grounds) – Recommendation III/1. This is in relation 
to the Criminal Code provisions. In the Victorian Act, the Court must “be satisfied 
on reasonable grounds”;200
199 Ibid at Paragraph III.13.
200 TCPA at section 13E(1)(a).
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•	 The	degree	of	precision	required	in	the	“imminence	test”,	ie.	that	something	is	
expected to occur at some time in the next 14 days,201 provides its own problems. 
Practically, it is virtually impossible to predict when an event may occur, and it 
may be that agencies wish to act based on intelligence that something is planned 
that may or will occur outside of that timescale. Thus, in Recommendation III/2, 
this requirement should be replaced with a need for the applicant and the issuing 
authority to be satisfied as to the possibility of a terrorist act occurring sufficiently 
soon as to justify the action being taken;
•	 The	“necessity”	requirement	in	a	PDO	to	preserve	evidence	is	too	strict	ie.	it	has	to	
be proved that it is “necessary” to detain the person to preserve the evidence.202 
This requires the applicant to prove that destruction or loss of the evidence will 
inevitably occur without the detention, which is an extremely difficult threshold 
to meet. Thus, Recommendation III/3 is that, if PDOs are to be retained, the 
requirement should be that it is “reasonably necessary to detain the subject to 
preserve evidence of, or relating to, the terrorist act”.
The INSLM Report 2013, concentrates on other aspects of terrorism legislation, such 
as the financing of terrorist organisations, and provides no further analysis of the PDO 
provisions. In the introductory chapter, however, he does draw the Prime Minister’s 
attention to the fact that his reports are intended to be cumulative in nature, yet he has 
received no official or governmental response to the 21 recommendations made in the 
2012 Annual Report. 
8.4 Operation of the legislation
At the time of writing, no application has been made for a PDO.
8.5 Submissions
8.5.1 Victoria Police
Victoria Police, in its first written submission and during meetings with the Review 
Committee, strongly supported the retention of the PDO provisions. They stated 
that whilst they acknowledged the limitations and practical difficulties inherent in the 
scheme as it currently stands, they would rather see amendments made to improve it 
than see it repealed. With appropriate functional improvements, a PDO would remain a 
useful tool available for use in relevant, urgent circumstances.
The improvements put forward for consideration by the Review Committee are:
8.5.1.1 Meaning of “imminent”
A modification of the pre-condition for an application for, and the grant of, a PDO, that 
the officer (and the Court) must be satisfied that a terrorist attack is imminent, and is 
expected to occur sometime within the next 14 days.203 This should be replaced with 
a different, less rigid, definition of “imminent”. Predicting the precise point in time when 
a terrorist act may occur is difficult. This, of course, echoes one of the concerns of the 
INSLM. Note that the same issue arises in connection with special police powers (see 
Chapter 10 of this Report). 
201 TCPA at section 13C(2) provides the Victorian equivalent.
202 Ibid at section 13E(1)(b)(ii) provides the Victorian equivalent.
203 TCPA at sections 13C(2) and 13E(2).
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8.5.1.2 Object of a preventative detention order
An amendment regarding the requirement that the name of the subject of the PDO 
must be on the order.204 As a result, a PDO cannot be made in respect of a person 
known only to police by one name, or by an alias, or by a description.
8.5.1.3 Urgent applications to be made by electronic means
An amendment allowing urgent applications to be made by electronic means.
8.5.1.4 Prohibition on questioning
Clarification of the prohibition on the questioning of a detainee under a PDO, and the 
potential for police to be subject to prosecution should they use information obtained 
voluntarily which is critical to the prevention of a terrorist act. An exemption should be 
made to the general prohibition where an officer questions a detainee on purely factual 
matters following a voluntary disclosure, where the questioning is carried out in the 
reasonable belief that the information sought is likely to assist in the prevention of an 
imminent terrorist act.
8.5.1.5 Ex parte applications
An amendment providing for all applications for a PDO to be held ex parte, utilising 
the services of the PIM. It is likely that much of the information on which an application 
is based is subject to public interest immunity or national security considerations. 
The revelation of it in the presence of the subject of the application may compromise 
ongoing investigations. Conversely, the withholding of the information from the Court 
on those grounds, because of the presence of the subject, may result in the refusal of 
an application.
8.5.1.6 Responsibility for detainee welfare
Victoria Police also raised an issue regarding their own obligations under the TCPA. 
This centres in particular around section 13W(5)(c), which states that where the officer 
detaining the subject under a PDO requests a transfer of the subject from police 
custody to a prison, the member of the force who made the request is still responsible 
for the detainee whilst in prison. This is notwithstanding the fact that the police officer 
has no control over the prison detention and, therefore, no influence over decisions as 
to how that detention is carried out. 
A failure to observe these duties by the officer may be a criminal offence. Victoria 
Police suggested these provisions should be amended to provide that they do 
not apply to an officer administering a PDO who has taken all reasonable steps to 
discharge his or her legal obligations, particularly with regard to continuing humane 
treatment of the detainee.
8.5.2 Australian Federal Police
AFP officers also present at meetings with the Review Committee, in supporting the 
arguments put forward by their State colleagues, re-emphasised the submission they 
made to the COAG Review, and drew the Committee’s attention to it.
204 Ibid at section 13F(4)(a).
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Of PDOs, the submission stated:
“Despite their lack of application, the AFP considers that preventative 
detention orders remain relevant within the suite of preventative measures to 
counter the terrorist threat. The removal of the preventative detention order 
regime would create a substantial gap in counter terrorism options to thwart 
an impending terrorist attack where disruption by arrest is not viable. The AFP 
considers this void in pre-emptive action would present an unacceptable risk 
to community safety without any alternative offered to replace preventative 
detention measures.” 205
At paragraphs 114 to 116 of the submission, the AFP stated:
“Since the introduction of the preventative detention order regime in 2005, 
neither the AFP nor another Australian police force has applied for a 
preventative detention order. There are a number of reasons for the AFP  
not pursuing detention orders.
Firstly and fortunately, there have been no circumstances necessitating 
the use of this particular preventative power because it is restricted to the 
most extraordinary of circumstances and there has existed comprehensive 
law enforcement and intelligence coverage of planned terrorist operations 
domestically. This should not be an ongoing expectation as the evolving 
terrorist threat and trends may require law enforcement to enact these powers.
Secondly, the AFP has adopted a prudent and cautious approach to 
preventative detention order applications – balancing risk to the community 
against successful preventative action by interdiction, underpinned by the 
strength of evidence to support a prosecution. The fact that, after due 
consideration, preventative detention orders have not been necessary does 
not support the argument that the need for such orders will not arise in the 
future. The trends of terrorism and the challenges for law enforcement, as 
previously described, attach greater relevance to the importance and utility of 
these tools in emergency situations.” 
In respect of perceived weaknesses in the PDO regime, the AFP officers re-iterated  
the points they had made in respect of the Commonwealth PDO provisions in so far  
as they apply to the Victorian model:
1. They agreed that the “14 day” issue was seen as problematical;
2. An interim PDO should be possible for use in urgent circumstances, granted by 
the Chief Commissioner or other senior police officer, consistent with other State 
and Territory provisions; 
3. The issue of questioning in detention should be revisited. Consideration should be 
given to permitting the questioning of detainees on a voluntary basis, principally 
for intelligence purposes, to allow for the use of responses to mitigate risks to the 
public. The questioning would, the AFP stressed, be voluntary, and the right to 
silence preserved.
205 AFP Submission to the COAG Review at paragraph 117. 
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Despite these perceived limitations, the AFP wholly supported the retention of a PDO 
as a tool for the possible disruption of a planned terrorist act. It is not a substitute 
for prosecution, but a preventative measure. All counter-terrorism work, to which the 
majority of these legislative provisions are aimed, is preventative in nature and this 
should be regarded as a separate phase in the 3 stage process, often strategised and 
undertaken between the agencies, being:
•	 Intelligence;	
•	 Prevention;	and	
•	 Investigation.
AFP officers were asked for their views on the different thresholds for taking action,  
ie. an arrest under both Commonwealth and Victorian law requires an officer to have a 
reasonable belief that a person has done, or is about to do something. An application 
for a PDO requires a reasonable suspicion. They explained that the difference was 
corroboration; a PDO could be sought on the basis of intelligence supplied indicating 
that someone is planning to do something, whilst an arrest, based on a belief, would 
require some evidence that corroborated that suspicion. For instance, in the age 
of “global” primary and secondary attacks facilitated by modern communication 
techniques, intelligence from abroad may support the swift detention of a potential 
perpetrator in Australia, thus disrupting a planned secondary attack, whilst the police 
sought evidence to corroborate that suspicion which would justify an arrest. 
The AFP stressed the importance, or potential importance, of the second ground 
for seeking a PDO, that is, to preserve evidence following a terrorist attack. In the 
immediate aftermath of such an incident, sufficient corroborative evidence to justify an 
arrest and detention might be difficult to obtain. There may be enough facts however 
to justify a suspicion that could lead to the seeking of a PDO. 
The AFP and Victoria Police officers were asked by the Review Committee what 
alternative actions they might take in the event that the PDO provisions were repealed. 
The officers provided some examples of such actions. However, in their view, it is the 
element of disruption of a potential act of terrorism that a PDO potentially offers that 
makes the retention desirable. 
8.6 Impact of the Charter of Human Rights 
The Review Committee, with the assistance of advice from Counsel, identified five 
features of the preventative detention regime that raised Charter issues: 
8.6.1 The circumstances in which a PDO can be made
The test for the granting of an order is whether it is reasonably necessary for either 
the prevention of an imminent terrorist act, or to preserve evidence of an act that has 
already occurred. This in itself raises three questions for consideration by the Review 
Committee:
1. Are the purposes for which an order can be made sufficiently important to justify 
detention (and possibly solitary detention)?
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The making of a PDO engages the right to liberty, under section 21(1) of the Charter, 
which protects against arbitrary detention, ie. the detention must be for a proper 
reason. It is likely that detention for the prevention of harm to others would be regarded 
as a proper reason for that detention, and thus be justifiable and reasonable for 
the purpose of limiting the right to liberty. This is recognised in laws relating to the 
detention of mentally-ill persons and sex offenders.
However, the PDO scheme also authorises preventative detention for the purposes of 
the protection of property from a terrorist attack and for the preservation of evidence.
2. Is the test of “reasonable necessity” sufficient to restrict the making of orders to 
circumstances in which preventative detention is compatible with Charter rights?
Arguably, the detention of a person for preventative purposes should only occur if the 
purposes of the order cannot be achieved by other means. Thus, the Court should 
consider whether the purposes could be achieved by a less restrictive means than 
detention. Indeed, in the Australian Capital Territory’s equivalent legislation, in the case 
of a PDO for preventing a terrorist attack, the applicant police officer and the Court are 
required to satisfy themselves on reasonable grounds that the detention is the least 
restrictive way of achieving the purposes of a PDO.206 
3. In light of the preventative purposes of the detention, are there sufficient 
safeguards, including review mechanisms, to ensure that detention occurs  
for no longer than is necessary for those purposes?
Detention for protective or preventative reasons is only justified for so long as the 
protective or preventative purposes continue to exist. If a person is detained beyond 
that time the detention becomes arbitrary, in breach of section 21(2) of the Charter. 
Therefore, the detention should be subject to regular review to ensure that the 
justification for detention continues to exist. 
Section 13N of the TCPA provides that a person in relation to whom a preventative 
detention order has been made may apply for revocation or variation. However, 
the leave of the Court is required to make an application, and the burden is on the 
detainee to satisfy the Court that new facts or circumstances have arisen since the 
making of the order. This burden may be problematic, due to the contact restrictions 
on the detainee. He or she may not be aware of the new facts or circumstances that 
have arisen in the outside world. 
Section 13O of the TCPA requires the detaining officer to apply for the revocation of 
the order where he or she is “satisfied that the grounds on which the order was made 
have ceased to exist.” However, the duty on the detaining officer to bring the matter 
back before the court where the facts and circumstances on which the order has been 
based have changed is only for the purpose of seeking a variation to the order, not the 
revocation of it.207
206 Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT) at Sections 16(3)(b)(ii) and 18(4)(c).
207 TCPA at section 13O(1) and (2).
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8.6.2 The adequacy of existing safeguards to protect against the adverse 
consequences of incommunicado detention
By virtue of section 13ZC of the TCPA, a person who is detained is not entitled to 
contact other persons except as provided in sections 13ZD, 13ZE, 13ZF and 13ZH. 
Therefore, contact is generally restricted to:
•	 Once	with	certain	persons	who,	otherwise,	may	be	concerned	about	the	
whereabouts of the person (family members, persons they live with, employers 
or employees and business partners) solely for the purpose of letting the person 
know they are being detained and are safe;
•	 The	Victorian	Ombudsman	or	IBAC;
•	 Lawyers,	for	legal	representation	purposes;	and
•	 (For	a	person	under	18	years	of	age	or	who	is	incapable	of	managing	his/her	
affairs), a parent or guardian or other person able to represent that person’s 
interests.
Additional contact with a family member or other person may be authorised by a 
member of Victoria Police, once and for the sole purpose of advising that person that 
the detainee is safe. 
However, even the limited contacts in the above provisions can be subject to a contact 
order.
Incommunicado detention is not unlawful per se. Nevertheless, it is clearly one of 
the most oppressive types of detention and should not occur other than in the most 
exceptional circumstances, and with adequate safeguards. The restrictions imposed 
on contact with others, even for those detainees who are not subject to contact 
orders, means that detention is likely to involve solitary confinement. 
8.6.3 Monitoring of communication, including with lawyers
All contact by the detainee is monitored. This includes contact with lawyers, although 
there is an ability for the Court to order that such contact is not monitored.208 The 
content of any communication between a detainee and his/her lawyer is not itself 
admissible in evidence against a person in any proceedings in a court or tribunal. There 
may be an issue about the derivative use of any such content by the police. 
This provision not only affects the right to privacy, but also:
•	 The	right	to	a	fair	hearing	under	section	24	of	the	Charter,	in	that	the	police	are	
privy to all communications between the detainee and his or her lawyer relating to 
the proceedings; and
•	 The	privilege	against	self-incrimination	under	section	25(2)(k)	of	the	Charter	in	
respect of any criminal charges arising out of the investigation and any derivative 
evidence obtained as a result of information gleaned from the monitoring. Section 
13ZG(5) of the TCPA does not specifically provide for a restriction on the use of 
derivative information in respect of monitored communications.
208 Ibid at section 13ZF(6).
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8.6.4 The use of evidence that is not disclosed to the detainee
Section 13D sets out the form and content of a written application for a PDO. Section 
(1)(b) requires:
 “…the facts and other grounds on which the applicant considers that the 
preventative detention order should be made.”
Subsection (1)(g) then requires:
 “…a summary of the grounds on which the applicant considers that the order 
should be made.”
Finally, Section 13D(2) states:
“To avoid doubt, subsection (1)(g) does not require information to be included 
in the summary if the disclosure of the information is likely to prejudice national 
security (within the meaning of the National Security Information (Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 of the Commonwealth).”
The Review Committee found this to be a rather unusual provision, in that it allows 
for the withholding of information on security grounds from the summary required by 
subsection (1)(g), but provides for no similar limitation on the full suite of information 
required by subsection (1)(b). 
On the face of it, the withholding of evidence from the subject of the application 
engages the right to a fair hearing under section 24 of the Charter.
However, as the power to grant a PDO is vested in the Supreme Court under the 
TCPA, the Review Committee were concerned that section 13D(2) also raised 
constitutional issues (see Section 8.7.5.4 of this Report). 
8.6.5 The application of the PDO regime to young people
The application of the PDO regime to young persons (aged 16 and 17 years of age) is 
particularly problematic from a human rights perspective. Such a person is defined as 
a child for the purposes of the Charter:
“Every child has the right, without discrimination, to such protection as is  
in his or her best interests and is needed by him or her by reason of being  
a child.” 209
The current PDO regime, in potentially going so far as to authorise solitary confinement 
and incommunicado detention of a child, clearly engages this human right. There are 
some special safeguards for young people, including the requirement that they not be 
detained with persons 18 years of age or older. However, that particular safeguard can 
be overruled by a senior police officer in exceptional circumstances.210 
209 Charter at section 17.
210 TCPA at section 13ZBA.
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8.7 Discussion and conclusions
8.7.1 Arrest powers as an alternative
This Report sets out the view of the INSLM that the PDO powers are unnecessary in 
the Commonwealth context because the same objective can be achieved through the 
use of more traditional pre-charge, arrest and questioning powers of the police.
The INSLM concludes his 2012 Annual Report with the words:
“It should not be assumed that preventative detention could never be a 
proportionate response to the threat of terrorism, if it were a practical addition 
to powers deficient to prevent terrorism. Rather, in the case of Australia’s PDO 
provisions, on analysis they yield very little if anything that adds to the capacity 
of ordinary arrest powers in this regard.” 211
The Review Committee have questioned the necessity for PDO powers, given their 
perceived inadequacies, and given that general powers of arrest had been used 
successfully in the past in terrorism cases and would allow for questioning during 
detention.
Victoria Police explained that they would prefer to see PDO powers retained as a 
“safety net”. 
AFP officers carefully explained to the Review Committee why the disruptive nature 
of PDO powers and the possible later use of arrest powers should be viewed as 
separate tools for use in separate sets of circumstances. The former, they said, is 
seen as a preventative measure, allowing the detention of a person on the basis of 
credible intelligence that an attack is imminent, and thus disrupting the performance 
of that terrorist act. It is not a substitute for prosecution, which can occur once the 
intelligence has been corroborated in some way. They explained that gathering the 
evidence necessary to support an arrest and charge can be done at a later stage, 
perhaps when the urgency has passed, but should be seen as a separate stage in the 
overall operation.
AFP officers explained that a major issue revolved around the arrest threshold for 
Commonwealth offences as opposed to the threshold for applying for a PDO.  
As discussed above, the INSLM does not consider this to be a reason for retaining 
PDO provisions. The INSLM stated:
“The criteria for arresting a person are so similar to the criteria for a PDO as 
to doubt the usefulness of PDOs at all. While belief and suspicion are different 
states of mind, the difference between suspecting on reasonable grounds 
(PDO threshold) and believing on reasonable grounds (Commonwealth arrest 
threshold) is not very great.” 212
He goes on to quote from the often cited judgement of the High Court in  
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26, which compared the two threshold tests:
“When a statute prescribes that there must be reasonable grounds for a state 
of mind – including suspicion and belief – it requires the existence of facts 
which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.”
211 INSLM 2012 Report at section III.9.
212 Ibid at section III.7.
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There are however other authorities. In R v Rondo [2001],213 for example, Smart AJ 
said:
“A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a 
possibility.”
He had reviewed authorities such as the judgement of the United Kingdom House of 
Lords in O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Ulster Constabulary [1996],214 where Lord 
Steyn said: 
“In order to have a reasonable suspicion, the constable need not have 
evidence amounting to a prima facie case. Ex hypothesi, one is considering a 
preliminary stage of the investigation and information from an informer or a tip-
off from a member of the public may be enough.”
This is the threshold test in the United Kingdom, and also in various States and 
Territories in Australia.215 Such a state of mind could not however lead to a lawful arrest 
in Victoria or under Commonwealth law.
In meetings with the AFP, officers gave the Review Committee examples, which they 
considered real and foreseeable, of where the immediate and disruptive nature of a 
PDO, obtained purely on the grounds of intelligence which leads to a suspicion that a 
terrorist act might occur, could be essential for the safety of the public, where there has 
been no time to corroborate that intelligence. 
Conclusions of the Review Committee concerning the use of arrest powers as an 
alternative to a PDO are set out at Section 8.8 of this Report. 
8.7.2 Use of ASIO powers as an alternative
In terms of joint terrorism operations between ASIO, AFP and Victoria Police, and 
having considered the arrest powers of the police forces, the Review Committee also 
reviewed the powers available to ASIO, in particular the use of “questioning warrants” 
or “questioning and detention warrants”. Those powers are set out in the ASIO Act. 
The statute was amended in 2003 in relation to terrorism offences.216
Division 3 of Part III of that Act grants ASIO the following coercive and compulsory 
questioning powers in a terrorism context:
1. Section 34E provides for the issuing of a “questioning warrant” by an “issuing 
authority” (a judge), on the application of the Director-General, with the consent  
of the Attorney-General. Before giving such consent, the Attorney-General must 
be satisfied that: 
•	 There	are	reasonable	grounds	for	believing	that	the	issue	of	the	warrant	
will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important to the 
investigation; and that 
•	 Reliance	on	other	methods	of	collecting	that	intelligence	would	be	ineffective;	 
and that
213 [2012] NSWCCA 540 at [53].
214 [1996] UKHL 6.
215 See for example, section 99, Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW); section 356, 
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (QLD); section 128, Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA); section 
75, Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA); section 212, Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).
216 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth).
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•	 A	written	statement	of	procedures	to	be	followed	in	the	exercise	of	authority	under	
a warrant issued under this division of the Act is in place, having been prepared 
by the Director-General in consultation with the Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security and the Commissioner of the AFP, and having been approved by the 
Attorney-General as a legislative instrument, and upon which the Director-General 
has briefed the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.
The warrant requires a person to appear before a “prescribed authority” (generally  
a retired judge) for questioning, either immediately or at a specified time and place.
2. Section 34G provides for the issuing of a “questioning and detention warrant”, 
following the same procedure as above. The Attorney-General, in consenting to 
the Director-General making a request for a warrant under this section, must be 
satisfied as to the three criteria set out above, but must also be satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that, if the person is not immediately taken 
into custody and detained, that person:
•	 May	alert	someone	else	involved	in	a	terrorism	offence	that	an	investigation	is	
taking place; or
•	 May	not	appear	before	the	prescribed	authority	for	questioning;	or
•	 May	destroy,	damage	or	alter	a	record	or	thing	that	he	or	she	might	be	requested	
to produce under the warrant.
This warrant authorises the immediate detention of a person, to be brought immediately 
before a prescribed authority for questioning, followed by detention for up to 168 hours 
(seven days). Contact with the outside world is generally prohibited, though it may be 
provided for in a limited and specified way in the warrant, or by order of the prescribed 
authority. The warrant specifically authorises ASIO to question the detainee before the 
prescribed authority, and seek documentary evidence from him or her.
Subdivision D of Division 3 of this Part of the ASIO Act sets out a number of 
safeguards and protections, in addition to the layers of authority required under the 
application process. For example, the information to be given to the subject of a 
warrant by the prescribed authority is set out at length, and there are limits on the 
length of permissible questioning time. Specific provision is made for the humane 
treatment of the person specified in the warrant.
As mentioned above, contact is generally prohibited217 for persons who are 18 years 
of age and over. This does not prevent the subject of the warrant from contacting 
a lawyer of his or her choice. In fact, provision for such contact must be specifically 
permitted in the warrant itself.218 However, if ASIO is satisfied that contact with the 
chosen lawyer might prejudice terrorism investigations against someone else, or lead 
to the destruction of evidence, the prescribed authority may prevent such contact. 
Another lawyer may then be chosen by the person specified in the warrant. On the 
other hand, questioning before the prescribed authority in the absence of a lawyer is 
permissible219 and contact with the lawyer is specifically monitored.220
217 Ibid at section 34K(10).
218 Ibid at sections 34E(3) and 34G(6).
219 Ibid at section 34ZP.
220 Ibid at section 34ZQ.
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Section 34U provides for a police officer to enter a property for the exercise of a 
questioning and detention warrant under these provisions, and to use necessary and 
reasonable force. A person detained may be searched, including a strip search. A 
person against whom a warrant has been issued under either of these provisions must 
immediately surrender his/her passport(s), and must not leave Australia without the 
written permission of the Director-General.
The use of these provisions is not permissible for persons under 16 years of age. 
Special rules apply to persons aged between 16 and 18 years of age.221
All actions taken under this Division of the ASIO Act must be reported to the Attorney-
General and to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. This Division of the 
ASIO Act is due to sunset on 22 July 2016.
The INSLM Report 2012 indicates that up to and including the financial year 2011-
2012, the “questioning and detention warrant” under section 34G has never been used 
by ASIO.222 
It occurred to the Review Committee that, where the powers set out in section 34G 
of the ASIO Act were used by ASIO and the police in the context of a joint operation, 
there could be incommunicado detention for up to 7 days but with questioning 
specifically permitted, and this could be a viable alternative to the use of a PDO. By 
the time an investigation reaches a stage where the use of a PDO is under active 
consideration, it would be expected that the operation would be multi-jurisdictional, 
and the use of the ASIO power available.
However, the Review Committee was informed of a number of perceived limitations to 
the use of these powers as an alternative to a PDO, particularly in the disruptive sense 
of securing someone’s detention:
•	 The	detention	aspect	of	the	“questioning	and	detention”	warrant	requires	a	belief	in	
one of three criteria, which are: 
o that the subject of the warrant may alert someone else involved in a terrorism 
offence that an investigation is taking place; or
o that he or she may not appear before the prescribed authority for questioning; 
or
o that he or she may destroy or alter a record or thing that he or she might be 
requested to produce under the warrant.
It can therefore be said that the intention supporting these powers is not “preventative”, 
and to solely detain someone under them in order to prevent that person from 
undertaking a terrorist act would be beyond power. Those powers were granted to 
ASIO for its use as an intelligence agency. 
•	 In	any	event,	the	duration	of	any	detention	under	such	a	warrant	cannot	be	
confidently predicted or guaranteed. The maximum allowable detention is seven 
days. However, once questioning under the warrant has been completed (even 
where the subject of the warrant has answered each question untruthfully, but the 
veracity of the testimony is yet to be verified), the person must be released from 
custody; and
221 Ibid at section 34ZE. 
222 INSLM Report, 2012 at Appendix G.
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•	 As	the	two	types	of	warrants	described	result	in	coercive	questioning	by	a	
prescribed authority (ie. the subject of the warrant has no right to silence), 
evidence gained as a result of the questioning cannot be used in court.
The COAG Committee were not specifically asked to comment on the ASIO legislation. 
However, they were aware of the availability of the above-mentioned questioning and 
detention warrant provisions, and stated:
“The presence of those extensive powers suggests, should they remain in 
force, a further reason why the preventative detention legislation is, in its 
current format, not presently needed.” 223 
However, the Review Committee consider that while the prevention of an act could 
clearly be a consequence of a person being detained under a questioning and 
detention warrant, possibly for up to 7 days, the preventative aspect of the warrant 
could not be a primary ground for the granting of such a warrant.
Conclusions of the Review Committee concerning the use of ASIO powers as an 
alternative to a PDO are set out at Section 8.8 of this Report. 
8.7.3 Victoria Police submission
The Review Committee conclude as follows: 
8.7.3.1 Meaning of “imminent”
The Review Committee consider that there is merit in making an amendment to the 
TCPA so that, in making an application, or in making an order, the police applicant and 
the Court do not have to satisfy themselves that a terrorist attack is expected to occur 
imminently, and in any event within the next 14 days.
The terrorist legislation in every other State has the same restriction in its application 
provision,224 as does the Criminal Code.225 Whilst the equivalent measure in NSW also 
has the same pre-condition, in the case of applications to use special police powers 
under the same statute, reasonable belief that a terrorist act is suspected to be taking 
place “in the near future” is sufficient.226 
The INSLM stated that (in respect of the Commonwealth equivalent) provision should 
be made for the imposition of a duty on the Court simply to be satisfied as to the 
possibility of a terrorist act occurring sufficiently soon as to justify the action being 
taken rather than retain the requirement that the act is expected to occur within 
14 days.
The Review Committee are of the view that the INSLM’s formulation, in recommendation 
III/2 in the INSLM Report 2012 has merit, and consider that the TCPA should be 
amended accordingly. 
223 COAG Report at paragraph 274.
224 Section 16(4), Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT); section 6(4)(a), Terrorism (Preventative 
Detention) Act 2005 (SA); section 8(4), Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005 (Qld); section 21E(2), Terrorism 
(Emergency Powers) Act (NT); section 5(2)(b), Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005 (Tas); section 9(2)(b), 
Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2006 (WA). 
225 Section 105.4(5)(b) of the Criminal Code. 
226 Sections 5(a) and 26D(1), Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW), amended by section 5 and Schedule 3, 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2004 (NSW).
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8.7.3.2 Object of a preventative detention order
Whilst recognising the difficulty that police face in dealing with a person known only 
by a single name or a mere description, the severity of the consequences of a PDO 
require a degree of certainty in terms of the individual targeted before an order ought 
be made.
However, it is not uncommon for terrorists, as with other criminals, to use false names 
or aliases. Both can be identified with more certainty because such aliases will usually 
appear on official, though false, documents such as passports or drivers licences. 
In such circumstances, a PDO made by the Court should not be invalid merely because 
it subsequently transpires that the wrong name appears on the order. It should be 
possible for an order to be made against “the person going by the name of …” or some 
other such formulation. The Review Committee therefore recommend an amendment to 
the provisions to deal with this situation (See Recommendation 7 of this Report). 
8.7.3.3 Urgent applications by electronic means
In the context of an application for a PDO being made by electronic means, enquiries 
were made with the Supreme Court. It was explained that there are in place special 
procedures and protocols for the handling of applications filed under the TCPA, and 
other such Acts where the utmost security is necessary. Under Practice Note No 4 of 
2007, applications of this type are dealt with or allocated by the Principal Judge of the 
Criminal Division. Early contact with the Judge’s Associate is encouraged, and provision 
is made for the filing of urgent applications outside of office hours. Filing by hand is the 
standard practice in order to preserve security. It was also advised that investigation 
agencies have used this method of filing applications efficiently in the past. 
In the circumstances, the Review Committee do not consider an amendment to the 
TCPA as sought by Victoria Police is necessary. 
8.7.3.4 Prohibition on questioning
Victoria Police maintained a strong position to the Review Committee that there should 
be a power to question a person whilst in preventative detention. Reference has 
already been made to this position. It is a position that Victoria Police and other police 
forces took with the COAG Committee. 
The Review Committee pointed out during its meetings with Victoria Police and AFP 
officers that the provisions provide for a person subject to a PDO to be released from 
detention to allow for interrogation, not just under an ASIO warrant, but by the AFP or 
Victoria Police. The officers explained that whilst this procedure was good in theory, 
there were significant problems for a Superintendent administering a detainee in 
determining whether someone was lawfully in or out of detention at any given time.
It is the clear policy of all preventative detention legislation in Australia that the 
detention is to be solely preventative and not investigative or punitive. Allowing police 
to question a detainee whilst in detention would be contrary to this policy and is not 
supported by the Review Committee. Law enforcement agencies have to accept that 
if a preventative detention power is to remain available to them such power cannot 
permit questioning of the person whilst in detention. Following lengthy consultations 
with law enforcement and intelligence officers, the Review Committee believe that 
they accept that this should remain the position under a PDO, and that to permit 
questioning would inevitably mean that the power was no longer preventative. 
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Further, it can be said that subjecting a detainee to alternate periods in or out of 
detention for the purpose of interrogation goes against the spirit in which the Court 
originally makes an order ie. preventative purposes. Bearing that in mind, the Review 
Committee consider there is merit in requiring that an application be made to the 
issuing Court for its approval to the detainee being removed from detention for the 
purpose of questioning by law enforcement or intelligence officers. Having regard 
to the nature and effect of a PDO and the pivotal position of the issuing Court, the 
Review Committee consider that such an amendment to the TCPA is necessary and 
recommend accordingly. It is not considered that such an amendment would reduce 
the effectiveness of the PDO provisions. 
8.7.3.5 Ex parte applications
The Review Committee do not support the hearing of all PDO applications ex parte 
as submitted by Victoria Police. A person who is at liberty, with insufficient evidence 
against him or her to warrant arrest but facing incommunicado detention for up to 
14 days, should have the right to appear and contest any application to the Court. 
8.7.3.6 Responsibility for detainee welfare
Turning to the issue raised by the Victorian officers regarding continued responsibility 
for the subject of a PDO following detention in a prison, the Review Committee 
understand the concerns expressed about the position of a detaining officer in these 
circumstances, in particular, their concern where, following a request for a transfer 
from a police gaol to a prison, the person is detained in solitary confinement. Such 
confinement may be necessary for a person whose contact with others is to be 
deliberately restricted. Such detention may also need to be in a high security prison. 
In light of these considerations, the Review Committee are of the view that section 
13W(5) and any other related provisions should be amended and clarified, so that the 
responsibility for a detainee’s welfare, in terms of section 13ZB in particular (the duty 
to treat humanely, etc.), transfers with the detainee. The responsibility under section 
13ZB should move from the detaining police officer to the relevant prison authority. 
As part of the Review process this issue was discussed with the DOJ. It is noted 
that a person being detained in a prison under the Serious Sex Offender (Detention 
and Supervision) Act 2009 is managed in accordance with the provisions contained 
in Part 9 and subject to the Part managed under the Corrections Act 1986. Such a 
person is not subject to a charge or sentence the detention, as in the case of a PDO, 
being preventative. 
8.7.4 Australian Federal Police submission
The Review Committee conclude as follows:
1. The requirement in sections 13C(1)(a) and (2) 13E(1)(a) and (2) of the TCPA that the 
Chief Commissioner and the Court need to be satisfied of the threat of a terrorist act 
occurring in the next 14 days should be replaced with a provision requiring the Chief 
Commissioner and the Court to be satisfied as to the possibility of a terrorist act 
occurring sufficiently soon as to justify the application for and the making of a PDO.
2. With respect to the submission that an interim order should be granted by a senior 
police officer and not the Court, the original draft of the Terrorism (Community 
Protection) Amendment Bill 2006 made provision for a senior police officer to make 
an interim PDO in urgent circumstances. In the course of the consultations that 
followed, this particular provision was withdrawn. Parliament required a greater 
degree of judicial oversight in the use of such powers.
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 The Review Committee acknowledge that it is not uncommon in equivalent 
legislation in other jurisdictions to have an interim PDO made by a senior police 
officer. Nor is it uncommon, however, to not have such provision. The Review 
Committee are firmly of the view that it is necessary and appropriate that an 
interim order be made by the Court, as judicial oversight is imperative. Therefore 
the Review Committee do not consider that the TCPA should be amended 
as submitted. 
3. With respect to the questioning of a detainee whilst in detention the Review 
Committee reiterate the views already expressed when considering the  
submission of Victoria Police. 
8.7.5 Charter issues
In considering each of the Charter issues identified above, the Review Committee 
conclude as follows:
8.7.5.1 The circumstances in which a PDO can be made
The Review Committee are in no doubt that, in the circumstances in which a PDO can 
be made, detention for the prevention of harm to other persons is justifiable. In terms 
of harm or potential damage to property, the Review Committee are of the view that 
such preventative detention is reasonable and any distinction between intended harm 
to persons or property in the context of terrorist acts is not justified. As the COAG 
Committee stated, serious damage to property and the destruction or disruption 
of systems that are fundamental to the proper functioning of society can be as 
catastrophic in certain circumstances as the loss of life.227
The Review Committee are of the view, in the context of counter-terrorism, that 
preventative detention of a person for either purpose is a proportionate and justifiable 
limitation on the right to liberty, as is detention to preserve evidence of a terrorist act in 
these circumstances.
The Review Committee acknowledge that the consideration of whether or not the 
purposes of a PDO could be achieved in a different, less restrictive way is a test that 
should be applied in deciding whether or not a PDO should be granted. However, it 
is not necessary in the view of the Review Committee to legislate to make express 
provision for this consideration, as the Australian Capital Territory has done. The 
availability of any less restrictive means to achieve the purposes of the provision is 
already built into the Court’s considerations by virtue of section 7(2) of the Charter. 
The Court, in the view of the Review Committee, would be a public authority acting in 
an administrative capacity for the purpose of section 38 of the Charter, and as such it 
would be required to take into account this consideration. 
The basic objective of this and other parts of the terrorism legislation is the protection 
of the community from the acts or potential acts of others. The same objective 
applies to other legislative provisions whereby a person can be deprived of liberty 
without conviction (or further conviction), such as the ongoing detention of serious 
sex offenders who have served their sentence, but in the view of the Supreme Court, 
continue to pose an unacceptable risk to the community.228 The involuntary detention 
of patients with mental health problems who may be a risk to the public, under 
section 8 of the Mental Health Act 1986, is another example. Such detention, and the 
227 COAG Report at paragraph 31.
228 Part 3, Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009.
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concomitant limitation on the individual’s right to liberty, in circumstances where it is 
reasonably considered by the Supreme Court to be necessary to discharge the State’s 
responsibility to protect the community, is proportionate. 
In general, the Review Committee are satisfied that there are appropriate safeguards 
built into these provisions, as can be seen from sections 8.1.16 and 8.1.17 of this 
Report, with two reservations. 
As explained previously, section 13O of the TCPA requires the police to apply to the 
Court for a revocation of a PDO where satisfied that the grounds on which the order 
was made have ceased to exist. If the Court is also satisfied, revocation must be 
ordered. However:
•	 Whilst	the	detaining	officer	is	under	a	duty	to	apply	to	the	Court	seeking	a	
revocation of the order, the detainee remains in detention. This matter was 
considered by the New South Wales Ombudsman in a report tabled in 2008, and 
again during a statutory review into the NSW legislation carried out in 2010.229 Both 
recommended that the Terrorist (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW) be amended to 
provide that, as soon as is practicable after the officer becomes satisfied that the 
grounds on which the order was made have ceased to exist, the person must 
be released from detention. That amendment was made in 2010.230 The Review 
Committee are of the view that a similar amendment is necessary and should be 
made to the TCPA;
•	 If	the	officer	is	satisfied	that	the	facts	and	circumstances	leading	to	the	making	of	
the order have changed, the application may only be for a variation of the order, 
not the revocation of it. The Court would appear to have no power to order a 
revocation in this situation. However, where the subject of a PDO brings new 
facts and circumstances before the Court, then either revocation or variation 
is permitted.231 The Review Committee see no basis for this distinction. Under 
section 31 of the Terrorism (Extraordinary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT) for example, the 
Supreme Court is able to set aside a PDO on the application of either party on the 
grounds of new facts and circumstances having arisen. The Review Committee 
consider that an amendment along the lines of the Australian Capital Territory 
legislation is necessary and recommend accordingly. 
With respect to the position under the Charter, with these amendments, the Review 
Committee consider the provisions to be reasonable and proportionate, and a 
justifiable limitation on the right to liberty of the detainee in the circumstances.
8.7.5.2 The adequacy of existing safeguards to protect against the adverse 
consequences of incommunicado detention
The Review Committee recognise that incommunicado detention may be detrimental 
to the health and well-being of the subject of the order, particularly where that person is 
under 18 years of age or of limited intellectual capability. However, in the circumstances 
in which a PDO would be made, it is difficult to envisage how the detention could 
be otherwise than solitary with appropriately restricted contact. The purpose of the 
preventative detention would be prejudiced otherwise.
229 Review of Parts 2A and 3 of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002, NSW Ombudsman, September 2008 and 
Review of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002, Department of Justice and Attorney General, 2010. 
230 Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism (Police Powers) Amendment Act 2010 (NSW).
231 TCPA at section 13N.
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In terms of any additional safeguards, however, the Review Committee are not 
of the view that there should be a statutory obligation on a judge to consider the 
potential adverse consequences on the health and wellbeing of the subject before 
making an order. 
In making a PDO, the Court must be satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that the 
detention of the person for the period of time for which he or she is to be detained 
is reasonably necessary for the purposes of the order. The Court must therefore 
consider what period of detention is necessary and make the order in light of all 
relevant considerations.
With that, and other safeguards, and taking into account the seriousness of the 
situation and the permissible purposes of a PDO, the Review Committee consider the 
safeguards provided under the TCPA are adequate.
8.7.5.3 Monitoring of communication, including with lawyers
Having regard to the purposes of the provisions and of the limitations on rights 
resulting, the Review Committee consider the limitations to the right to privacy with 
respect to contact with friends and relatives, etc., to be justifiable and proportionate. 
However, the possible prejudice to the right to a fair hearing and the right not to self-
incriminate arise in respect of the monitoring of contact between the detainee and his 
or her legal representative(s). Section 13ZG(5) provides a restriction on the use that can 
be made of any communication between a detainee and a lawyer in any proceedings 
arising out of the circumstances that led to the detention. 
That section clearly provides for a “direct use immunity”. That is, the contents of the 
communication between the detainee and his or her lawyer cannot be adduced in 
evidence by the prosecution in a subsequent proceeding against the detainee. 
In the case of Re: an application under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 
2004 [2009] VSC 381, the Supreme Court of Victoria considered whether a provision 
similar to section 13ZG(5), this time relating to evidence obtained as a result of coercive 
questioning, could be regarded as also containing a “derivative-use immunity”, that is, 
a restriction on the use of evidence which was obtained as a result of the information 
provided by the person under coercive questioning. 
Warren CJ found that the relevant provision should be read in the light of section 32(1) 
of the Charter, which states:
“So far as is possible to do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory 
provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights”. 
Her Honour provided a comprehensive analysis of the way in which legislation should be 
interpreted in the light of the Charter obligation, and in doing so, found that the immunity 
provided by the statute in that case should be read as extending to a derivative-use 
immunity, thus ensuring that the right to a fair hearing and the right against self-
incrimination was protected. The decision of the Supreme Court was not appealed.
In light of that judgment, the Review Committee are of the view that the provisions of 
the TCPA that provide for the monitoring of communications between a detainee and 
his or her lawyer do not unreasonably limit the detainee’s rights under the Charter. 
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8.7.5.4 The use of evidence that is not disclosed to the detainee
As referred to at Section 8.6.4 of this Report, the procedure for applying for a 
PDO provides for the withholding of information by the applicant from the written 
application. That is, some information, in the interests of national security, is not 
available to the Court through the written application and consequently not available 
to the subject of the application. This potentially raises an issue under the Charter, in 
that such withholding may engage the right to a fair hearing. It also potentially raises 
a constitutional issue, which was drawn to the attention of the Review Committee 
by Counsel. That issue is whether the manner in which an application is to be 
made impugns the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court so as to be invalid for 
inconsistency with Chapter III of the Constitution (pursuant to the principle derived 
from the line of cases commencing with Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[1996] HCA 24).
Turning first to the constitutional issue, the Review Committee sought the advice of  
the Solicitor-General for Victoria. His advice is attached at Appendix C. At paragraph 
25 of his advice, the Solicitor-General concluded as follows: 
“1. Section 13D(1)(g), read with s 13D(2), operates to require an applicant 
for a preventative detention order to set out a summary of the grounds 
on which the order should be made, other than to state information the 
disclosure of which is likely to prejudice national security in the sense 
described. Section 13(D)(2) does not permit or direct the Supreme Court 
to have regard to such information in the absence of evidence. It does 
not purport to interfere in any way in the manner in which the Court 
conducts its proceeding, including the manner in which it applies the rules 
of evidence and evaluates the evidence once admitted, or the manner in 
which it affords procedural fairness after the application has been made. 
 2. In light of the limited operation of s 13(D)(2), that provision is valid and 
does not give rise to constitutional invalidity of Pt 2A of the Act.”
In light of the advice from the Solicitor-General, the Review Committee are of the view 
that no constitutional issue arises from the PDO provisions in the TCPA. 
Further, the Review Committee do not consider that the operation of section 13D(2) 
prevents the subject of the application from receiving a fair hearing as provided for in 
section 24 of the Charter. 
8.7.5.5 The application of the PDO regime to young people
It can be said in terms of the Charter rights of persons between 16 and 18 years 
of age, who are legally classified as children, that it is difficult to justify the use of 
legislative provisions which would lead almost inevitably to solitary confinement and 
limited contact with a parent(s) or a guardian(s), even taking into account the special 
provisions that apply. 
Section 13J of the TCPA provides that a PDO may only be applied for, or made, 
in respect of a person who is 16 years of age or over. By contrast, the equivalent 
Australian Capital Territory legislation provides that a PDO cannot be applied for, 
or made, for a child (defined as an individual under 18 years of age).232 Every other 
jurisdiction in Australia, including the Commonwealth, limits the use of the powers to 
232 Section 10, Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT) and section 2 and Dictionary, Legislation 
Act 2001 (ACT).
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those who are 16 years of age and over. However, the Australian Capital Territory is the 
only other jurisdiction whose laws are subject to specific human rights legislation.
The Review Committee found this to be one of the most difficult issues to address 
in conducting the Review. Victorian law regards persons who are 16 and 17 years of 
age to be children. However, there is evidence internationally that such young persons 
have been involved in acts of terrorism, and that they are more likely to be influenced 
by terrorist propaganda. Arguably, the police need to be in a position to be able to 
respond to such situations.
The Review Committee considered the conditions in which persons under 18 years 
of age might be detained, bearing in mind that such detention might take place in an 
adult prison. Section 13F(8) provides that such a person must be detained in a youth 
justice facility unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that it is reasonably necessary for 
him or her to be detained elsewhere, having regard to:
•	 The	person’s	age	and	vulnerability;
•	 The	likely	impact	that	detention	in	a	place	other	than	a	youth	justice	facility	would	
have on the person;
•	 The	grounds	on	which	the	order	is	made;
•	 The	risk	posed	by	the	person	to	the	security	of	Australia,	to	other	persons	detained	
in the youth justice facility or to the good order and safe operation of that facility;
•	 The	availability	of	a	place	in	the	youth	justice	system	capable	of	holding	the	
detainee in accordance with the terms of the PDO; and
•	 Any	other	factors	that	the	Supreme	Court	considers	relevant.
Moreover, it is not only the Supreme Court that may order a juvenile to be detained in 
an adult prison. Under section 13ZBA, the detaining officer is under a duty to ensure 
that a person under 18 years of age is not detained with persons who are above that 
age. However, a senior police officer (of or above the rank of Assistant Commissioner) 
may approve detention with adults if there are “exceptional circumstances”.
Victoria Police provided the Review Committee with a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between DHS, DOJ and Victoria Police which relates to the operation of a PDO. 
The contents of this MOU are confidential. 
In December 2013, the Victorian Ombudsman published a report entitled “Investigation 
into children transferred from the youth justice system to the adult prison system.”233 
The Ombudsman concluded that, in his view:
“…there are no circumstances that justify the placement of a child in the adult 
prison system.” 234
The Review Committee considered that there were three options for dealing with 
the conflict of provisions, that is the PDO legislation as against the Charter rights of 
children. The options are:
233 TCPA at sections 13F and 13ZBA.
234 Victorian Ombudsman Report “Investigation into children transferred from the youth justice system to the adult 
prison system” 2013 at paragraph 184.
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1. Not change the TCPA provisions. In deciding whether to make a PDO, the Court 
must be satisfied under section 13E(1) that detention is reasonably necessary for 
the achievement of the objective of the PDO, and the Court may thus take the 
subject’s age and experience into account;
2. Remove such persons from the ambit of the provisions. Application to persons 
who are 18 years of age and over would satisfy the Charter consideration; or 
3. By way of compromise, refine the test in section 13E so that the age, experience 
and the extent of the person’s involvement in the terrorist activity is expressly to be 
considered by the Supreme Court in determining an application for a PDO.
This is a difficult issue in the light of the provisions of the Charter. After giving the 
matter careful consideration, the Review Committee, by majority, are not of the view 
that an amendment is necessary to the current provisions relating to young persons. 
Having regard to the importance of the purpose of the TCPA (that is, protection of the 
community), whilst the rights of children are limited through the making of a PDO, on 
balance, the Review Committee, by majority, conclude that the limitation is reasonable, 
proportionate and justified in all the circumstances. 
Put briefly, the view of the minority is that the preventative detention scheme as 
contained in the TCPA, in the event that it continues, should be amended to provide 
that only persons of 18 years of age and over may be detained under a PDO. That is 
the position in the Australian Capital Territory legislation, which Territory has human 
rights legislation. The minority is not persuaded that the limitation on the rights of 
children is proportionate, justified or reasonable in all the circumstances. Under the 
current provisions, in the view of the minority, a person of the age of 16 or 17 years 
in detention under a PDO, where there are exceptional circumstances, might be 
detained in solitary confinement, with very restricted ability to communicate, and in a 
high security adult facility such as the Barwon prison. In the view of the minority, such 
a situation would be unacceptable. It is noted that only a person of 18 years of age 
and over, who is an unacceptable risk of committing a sexual offence, can be detained 
under the Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009. Consequently, 
a person of 16 or 17 years of age who is an unacceptable risk to the community could 
not be preventatively detained under that legislation in order to eliminate the risk. Such 
risk would have to be managed by other means. The minority is not persuaded that 
the need to have the power to preventatively detain a person of 16 or 17 years of age, 
in order to adequately protect the community from the risk of a terrorist act, outweighs 
the need to protect the rights of such a person as a child under the Charter.
8.8 Summing up
It is not necessary to repeat conclusions that have already been expressed in relation 
to the PDO provisions. The various issues that arise have been carefully considered, 
including issues under the Charter. 
The Review Committee have considered whether amendments should be made to 
the provisions and are of the view that some amendments are necessary and would 
be appropriate. The fundamental question is whether the power to detain a person as 
provided for in the TCPA is necessary and effective. 
The submissions and information provided to the Review Committee by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies have been comprehensive, cogent and 
persuasive as to the continuing need for the power, notwithstanding that to date it 
has not been used. They strongly maintained that even though the questioning of a 
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detainee is not permitted there was still a need to have a power to detain. The power 
is preventative and not investigative. The Review Committee explored at length with 
the agencies whether there is a continuing need, having regard to the arrest powers 
of police and the detention and questioning powers of ASIO. The COAG Committee 
considered the existence of these powers to be an important factor in concluding that 
the detention power was not necessary. 
After reflecting on the information before the Review Committee, a majority of the 
Review Committee are persuaded that such powers of arrest and detention and 
questioning do not necessarily protect the community from all potential risks of a 
terrorist act. The Review Committee, by majority, are persuaded that the detention 
power is necessary in order for law enforcement agencies to be able to protect the 
community from a terrorist act to the maximum extent possible. There is a continuing 
need for the power. 
It will be clear from the comprehensive review of these provisions that they are 
complex. There are many and varied steps that have to be taken before a PDO can 
be obtained and a range of requirements that have to be met. These requirements are 
necessary safeguards having regard to the consequences of a PDO for the person the 
subject of the order. Realistically, do they in essence render the power ineffective for 
operational use by police? 
The Review Committee had robust discussions with law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies about this issue of effectiveness. The agencies frankly acknowledged the 
operational difficulties and limitations they faced. They were strong in their view that, 
in effect, as a last resort, the process could be effectively employed in order to protect 
the community from a terrorist act where no other means was available.
After careful consideration the Review Committee, by majority, are persuaded that, 
notwithstanding the operational difficulties the legislation presents to police, the 
preventative detention power as provided for in the TCPA is effective. In other words, 
in protecting the community from a terrorist act, the power could be used effectively, 
even though with some difficulty. 
It follows that the Review Committee, by majority, consider that the preventative 
detention power is necessary, adequate and effective and should continue to be 
available to Victoria Police. Recommendations are made as to amendments that are 
felt appropriate and necessary.
Notwithstanding the force of submissions made to the Review Committee by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, a minority of the Review Committee does 
not consider that the preventative detention power is necessary or effective. It is 
understandable that such agencies would wish to have as extensive a range of 
powers as possible. They carry a heavy and onerous responsibility to protect the 
Australian Community from a terrorist act. However, it has always been a fundamental 
requirement that any counter-terrorism powers be necessary and effective. 
The reasons of the minority are in essence similar to those expressed by the majority of 
the COAG Committee and the INSLM. In the minority’s view, the preventative detention 
power is not necessary to adequately protect the community from a terrorist act having 
regard to the range of other powers available to law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies. Apart from police arrest and ASIO questioning and detention powers, 
these powers include the power to have a person subject to a control order under 
Commonwealth provisions and surveillance and telephone intercept powers.  
98
It is noted that there is no preventative detention power in the United Kingdom. 
However, considerable use is made of control orders to adequately protect the 
community from a terrorist act. Such orders have been used sparingly in Australia,  
but the changing terrorist risk could mean that more extensive use is made of them.
The complexity of the provisions and the operational difficulties they present to police 
have already been referred to. To date, no application has been made in Australia 
for a PDO. The COAG Report referred to the South Australian submission where the 
operational difficulties were stressed. The minority of the Review Committee is of 
the view, as were the majority of the COAG Committee, that from a realistic practical 
perspective the PDO provisions are incapable of operational use by police. In their 
current form they are ineffective. However, the safeguards built into the legislation 
cannot be reduced in order to achieve effectiveness. Those safeguards are necessary 
having regard to the nature and effect of the preventative detention involved under a 
PDO and the requirements of the Charter.
In the event of it being decided that the PDO regime should continue, and be  
re-enacted, the minority supports the following recommendations as to amendment  
of the TCPA. 
8.9 Recommendations
Recommendation 6
That the provisions in the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 
2003, relating to the requirement that a terrorist act be imminent 
and expected to occur, in any event, at some time in the next 
14 days, be amended along the lines recommended by the INSLM.
Recommendation 7
That section 13F(4)(a) of the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 
2003 be amended to provide that the order must contain the name 
of the person in relation to whom it is made, or the name by which 
the person is known to police.
Recommendation 8 
That section 13V of the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 
be amended to provide that, where an investigation or intelligence 
agency seeks to have a person released from detention for the 
purpose of questioning, the authorised officer must return to the 
Supreme Court for a variation of the order, or for permission to 
interrogate, at any time whilst the order is still in force. 
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Recommendation 9 
That the provisions of Part 2A of the Terrorism (Community 
Protection) Act 2003 be amended, as necessary, to provide that 
the responsibility for the welfare of a detainee transfers from the 
police to the prison authorities at the same time as the detainee 
transfers from the custody of one to the other.
Recommendation 10
That the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 be amended 
to provide that, as soon as is practicable after the detaining 
officer becomes satisfied that the grounds on which a PDO 
was made have ceased to exist, the detainee must be released 
from detention.
Recommendation 11
Section 13O of the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 be 
amended so that if the detaining officer is satisfied that either: 
•	 the	grounds	on	which	a	PDO	was	made	have	ceased	to	exist;	or
•	 the	facts	and	circumstances	on	which	the	order	was	based	
have changed, 
the officer must apply to the Court for a variation or a revocation 
depending on the circumstances.
Comment: Regardless of the type of application made by the officer, 
the Court should be empowered to order the revocation of, or such 
variation to, the order, as it sees fit. 
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9.1 Summary of the legislation
9.1.1 Origin
The provisions set out in this Part came into force on 16 April 2003, but the powers 
were enhanced in a number of ways in 2006.235 They have been subjected to only 
minor changes and technical amendments since that time.236 
9.1.2 Purpose of the provisions
This Part provides Victoria Police with special powers for use in the event of a 
chemical, biological or radiological attack, in order to protect members of the public 
from contamination.
The powers were created recognising that in the event of such an attack, the police 
are likely to be the first agency on the scene. The provisions allow them to make urgent 
decisions to at least contain and identify the problem before the usual emergency 
procedures and protocols commence.237
Section 14 of the TCPA expresses the intention of Parliament which, in the words of 
the Premier in his second reading speech, set out the guiding principle for the powers 
contained in this Part. It states:
“In giving an authorisation or exercising powers under this Part, it is the 
intention of the Parliament that no unnecessary restrictions on personal liberty 
or privacy should be imposed.”238
Thus, persons in detention should always, unless practicably impossible, have the 
right to contact friends and relatives by telephone, for example, and the police are 
required to facilitate such contact. This was provided for in section 18(4) as originally 
enacted. However, that provision was substituted by the TCPA Further Amendment 
Act239 with section 18A, which requires the police to facilitate any reasonable request 
for communication or medical treatment. 
235 TCPA Further Amendment Act.
236 Section 3 and Schedule Item 65, Statute Law Revision Act 2007; section 32, Emergency Management Legislation 
Amendment Act 2011; section 3 and Schedule Item 15, Statute Law Revision Act 2012.
237 Part 7 of the Emergency Management Manual Victoria made under Part 3 of the Emergency Management Act 
1986, nominates agencies to be “control agencies” or “support agencies” for different types of emergencies in  
the State. 
238 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Thursday 27 February 2003) at page 165.
239 TCPA Further Amendment Act at section 9. 
9 Part 3 – Police Powers to Detain  
and Decontaminate
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9.1.3 Authorisation
If a senior police officer240 reasonably believes that a terrorist act has occurred, or may 
have occurred, and that the area or the people in it will be or may have been exposed 
to contamination by substances released as part of the act, then he or she may give 
an authorisation to another police officer to exercise the powers set out in this Part.
The authorisation given by the senior officer may be given orally or in writing, if orally, it 
must later be confirmed in writing. The authorisation must be clear that it is being given 
under this Part of the Act, and describe the act or suspected act and the geographical 
area to which it relates. The name or a description of the officer being authorised and 
the time it is given must also be recorded.
If the senior officer later believes that a terrorist act, or suspected act, has not in fact 
occurred, and that no contamination has occurred, then he or she must immediately 
inform the Chief Commissioner. At that point in time, the authorisation ceases to 
have effect. 
Alternatively, the authorisation lapses:
•	 On	the	advice	to	the	Chief	Commissioner	of	the	Control	Agency	responsible	under	
the Emergency Management Manual Victoria (the Manual), where that agency 
has assumed control under the administrative protocols (usually one of the fire 
services), that the authorisation should lapse; or
•	 In	any	event,	8	hours	after	the	authorisation	was	given.	
The Chief Commissioner, a Deputy Chief Commissioner or an Assistant Chief 
Commissioner may extend or renew the authorisation for another 8 hours if it is felt 
necessary for the protection of public health, but only with the agreement of the 
aforementioned Control Agency. Section 18(2) states that the extended period of 
authorisation must not be for more than 16 hours duration in total, whether that total 
is a continuous period or a cumulative amount of separate periods. Clarification of this 
provision was provided to the SARC by the Premier in his response to the committee’s 
comments,241 being that the total permissible duration of an authorisation would be 
16 hours, and not 24 hours (the maximum 8 hours original authorisation, plus an 
extension of 16 hours).
Where an authorisation lapses for a reason other than the effluxion of time, the 
Chief Commissioner must immediately notify the authorised officer of that fact.
9.1.4 What is authorised?
With a view to preventing or limiting the spread of any contamination caused by the 
terrorist act, or suspected terrorist act,242 the police officer authorised may take all or 
any of the following actions, or may direct another member of the police force to do so:
•	 Direct	persons	out	of,	away	from	or	into	a	given	area;
•	 Detain	a	person	or	persons;	and
240 That is, an officer of or above the rank of Inspector; section 15.
241 SARC Alert Digest No 1 of 2003.
242 TCPA at section 18(3).
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•	 Direct	a	person	to	subject	him	or	herself	to	decontamination	treatment,	 
usually provided by the fire services, such as being sprayed with water  
or a de-contaminant.243
By virtue of an amendment made by the TCPA Further Amendment Act,244 the officer 
(or another authorised member of the force) may enter a place within the suspected 
contaminated area, without the consent of the occupier, in order to carry out any of 
the above. There is a proviso, where the premises are residential, that the consent of 
the occupier must be obtained unless the authorised officer reasonably believes that 
immediate entry is necessary to ensure someone’s safety, or to prevent or limit the 
spread of any contamination.245
The authorised officer is also empowered to dispose of, destroy or seize anything 
that has been contaminated, or the source of that contamination or potential 
contamination.246 This particular power is not delegable to another police officer in the 
way that the powers above are. On the other hand, in exercising any of the powers, he 
or she may accept any assistance that he or she believes is reasonably necessary in 
the circumstances from any person.247
What is more, the authorised officer, or another member of the police force acting 
under his or her direction, is entitled to use reasonable or necessary force against 
any person who refuses or fails to comply with any direction to move out of, away 
from or into a particular area, or a direction to subject themselves to decontamination 
treatment.248 These powers are now supported by offence provisions.
Given that, a potentially important deeming provision is included at section 18(2) of the 
TCPA. If an authorised officer gives an oral direction to a group of people in a manner 
likely to have been heard by all of those people, or as many of those people as is 
reasonable in the circumstances, then the direction is deemed to have been given to 
everyone in that group.
9.1.5 Offences
The TCPA Further Amendment Act, at section 8(4), created offence provisions to 
support the use of the police powers. Thus:
•	 It	is	an	offence	for	any	person	to	refuse	or	fail	to	comply	with	any	direction	to	
move away from or into a particular area, or to refuse or fail to comply with an 
order to undergo decontamination treatment, unless that person has a reasonable 
excuse;249
•	 An	offence	may	also	be	committed	if	an	authorised	police	officer	is	hindered,	
obstructed or delayed in carrying out his or her powers.250 
243 Ibid at section 18(1).
244 Ibid at section 8(3).
245 Ibid at section 18(5).
246 Ibid at section 18(1)(ca), added by section 8(1) of the TCPA Further Amendment Act.
247 Ibid at section 18(6).
248 Ibid at section 21.
249 Ibid at section 18(7).
250 Ibid at section 18(8).
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9.2 Operation of the legislation
The powers under this Part have yet to be tested, as the occasion has yet to arise 
where they have been required.
9.3 COAG Report
These provisions were not reviewed by the COAG Committee.
9.4 Submissions 
At a meeting with Victoria Police, officers drew attention to the equivalent powers 
applicable in terrorist emergencies in Queensland, whereby the use of force is 
authorised for the purpose of rendering medical treatment as well as decontamination.
These provisions may be found in sections 29 and 30 of the Public Safety Preservation 
Act 1986 (Qld), as amended by the Chemical, Biological and Radiological Emergency 
Powers Amendment Act 2003 (Qld). There, a duly authorised ambulance officer or 
health officer is entitled to examine, undertake tests, take samples and provide any 
reasonably necessary medical treatment to someone affected by such an emergency, 
and any refusal to accept such treatment may be ignored by those officers if they are 
reasonably of the view that allowing the patient to leave their care would cause danger 
to others, ie. in terms of cross-contamination.
Victoria Police support for the adoption of such powers was reiterated in written 
submissions to the Review Committee. They pointed out that the Queensland 
provisions allowed for the continued detention of a person for an extended period of 
time where a risk of contamination remains constant.
The powers that are available under the Northern Territory terrorism provisions are less 
intrusive.251 A police officer may quarantine a person by directing him or her to remain 
in a particular place, or go to a particular place and stay there, for up to 48 hours, so 
as to undergo decontamination treatment or prevent the spread of a contaminant.
9.5 Impact of the Charter of Human Rights
Given that these powers potentially involve the detention and compulsory 
decontamination of persons, amongst other supplementary powers, five of the Charter 
rights are potentially engaged:
1. The right to liberty and security of the person under section 21 of the Charter 
(particularly through the detention powers in section 18(1)(c) of the TCPA);
2. The right to freedom of movement in section 12 of the Charter (particularly through 
the direction powers in sections 18(1)(b) and (d)); 
3. The right to property in section 20 of the Charter (particularly through the disposal, 
destruction and seizure powers in section 18(1)(ca));
4. The right to privacy under section 13(a) of the Charter (particularly through the 
powers to enter property without consent in section 18(1)(e) and to forcibly 
decontaminate a person (sections 18(1)(d) and 21).
251 Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 2003 (Qld) at sections 24 and 25.
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5. The right not to be subject to medical treatment without full free and informed 
consent under section 10(c) of the Charter. 
9.6 Discussion and conclusions
To date, the powers in this Part have not been utilised. Anticipating the type of situation 
in which the police might consider making an authorisation, the Review Committee 
regard the powers as likely to be adequate and effective. The Review Committee 
consider there is a continuing need for them.
The Review Committee considered the submission of Victoria Police regarding the 
powers available in Queensland, and considered that they were not necessary in the 
context of this Part, nor is the Northern Territory provision.
As pointed out in Section 9.1.2 of this Report, these powers are given to the police 
as likely first responders to an incident. The powers under this Part are exercisable 
for a maximum of 16 hours. However, at some point during that period, most likely 
very early during it and particularly as “response” transitions into “relief and recovery”, 
operational control of the situation will pass to the Department of Health under the 
Emergency Management Manual. Under Chapter 7 of that Manual, the Department is 
responsible for, amongst other things:
•	 Co-ordinating	all	aspects	of	the	relief	and	recovery,	including	State/Commonwealth	
departments, local government, NGOs and agencies; and
•	 Co-ordinating	the	provision	of	personal	support	at	the	incident	site.
The current provisions provide sufficient community protection in the event of the type 
of incident occurring that was envisioned.
Turning to the Charter considerations, the Review Committee are of the view that any 
limitations on a person’s rights are properly constrained by the TCPA. Most importantly, 
section 16 makes it clear that an authorised police officer may only exercise a power 
conferred by these provisions for the purpose of protecting people from chemical, 
biological or radiological contamination. Section 18(3) emphasises the limitation by 
stating that the powers under this Part may be exercised for the purpose of preventing 
or limiting the spread of contamination caused by the terrorist act or suspected act. 
Any extension to an authorisation to use these powers can only be on the grounds of 
protecting public health under section 20. 
Additionally: 
•	 The	authorisation	operates	for	a	limited	period,	and	only	for	so	long	as	the	
preconditions are met (see sections 16(2) and 19). The power to extend can only 
be exercised by the Chief Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant 
Commissioner and with the agreement of the agency responsible under the state 
emergency response plan (section 20); 
•	 The	power	to	enter	residential	premises,	in	which	there	is	a	higher	expectation	of	
privacy, is limited to the important and urgent circumstances set out in s 18(5);
•	 There	are	safeguards	for	communication	and	obtaining	medical	treatment	
(section 18A); and
•	 In	light	of	the	importance	of	the	powers	and	the	urgency	with	which	they	must	be	
exercised in order to protect the public, it would not be practicable to seek court 
authorisation of the powers.
106
The Review Committee are of the view that any limitation on the rights referred to is 
reasonable and justified in all the circumstances. 
In particular, with respect to any potential limitation of a person’s right not to be 
subject to medical treatment without full free and informed consent under section 
10 of the Charter, the Review Committee are of the view that the decontamination 
procedures would not amount to medical treatment. On a proper construction of the 
decontamination powers, including in light of the right to request medical treatment 
in section 18A, the powers would not extend to matters such as requiring a person 
to take antibiotics or other medical treatment. Further consideration would be 
necessary if the Review Committee were to recommend the type of powers available in 
Queensland, but it is the view of the Review Committee that there is no need for such 
powers. 
The Review Committee are of the view that this Part of the TCPA should continue. The 
provisions are adequate, necessary and effective. 
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10.1 Summary of the legislation 
10.1.1 Origin
As well as Part 2A, dealing with preventative detention orders, this Part of the TCPA 
was inserted by the TCPA Amendment Act,252 and came into force on 9 March 2006. 
No substantive amendments to these provisions have been made since that time.
10.1.2  Purpose of the provisions
This Part allows for the authorisation of the police to exercise special powers in limited 
circumstances. The provisions were modelled on those in the New South Wales 
Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002, which came into force in December of that year. 
An important difference, however, is that in NSW the powers are exercisable following 
the authorisation of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Police, with the 
concurrence of the Police Minister. In Victoria, in respect of a substantive authorisation, 
the police must satisfy a judge of the Supreme Court that the use of the special 
powers is necessary before that authorisation will be given. 
The circumstances that allow an authorisation to be given for the use of special police 
powers are:
1. To secure an event that is likely to be attended by a large number of people, or a 
gathering of “prominent persons”, that could be the target of a terrorist act, where 
usual police resources cannot guarantee the security of the event or the safety of 
those attending it;253
2. Where an act is occurring, or is expected to occur within the next 14 days, to 
prevent that act, reduce the threat of it or to reduce the potential impact of it;254 
3. To recover following a terrorist act, to assist in the apprehension of those 
responsible and to preserve evidence;255 or
4. To protect essential services infrastructure from a terrorist act, to mitigate the effect 
of such an act on the service or on people in the vicinity or to assist in the recovery 
of an essential service.256 
Each of these situations are discussed at Section 10.3 of this Report. In the fourth set 
of circumstances, unlike the first three, the authorisation must be given by Order of 
the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the minister responsible for the 
service, made with the approval of the Premier and in accordance with advice received 
from the Chief Commissioner. 
252 TCPA Amendment Act at section 5.
253 TCPA at section 21B.
254 Ibid at section 21C.
255 Ibid at section 21E.
256 Ibid at section 21F.
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Following the deliberations that took place between the second reading of the Bill and 
the second reading debate (see Chapter 2 of this Report), some concessions were 
made by the Government, particularly regarding the rules governing strip-searches of 
children. However, it is perhaps surprising that of the 206 amendments to the initial Bill, 
only seven substantive amendments related to this Part.
10.1.3 Use of the special police powers
In the second and third sets of circumstances described in Section 10.1.2 of  
this Report, that is where a terrorist act is occurring, is imminent or has already  
occurred, the Chief Commissioner is able to make an interim authorisation, with the 
written approval of the Premier, to use the special powers. However, that interim 
authorisation is subject to confirmation on application to the Supreme Court within 
24 hours (if the authorisation is expected to be necessary for longer than 24 hours),  
as described below.
Such an interim authorisation is not subject to legal challenge. Section 21J provides 
that the granting of an interim authorisation may not be challenged in any court 
or tribunal. No proceedings seeking relief (for example, for an order of certiorari 
or mandamus) may be commenced, with respect to the granting of the interim 
authorisation, against the Chief Commissioner or the Premier. This measure was seen 
as necessary in order to prevent the urgent exercise of the special powers being 
delayed or frustrated by court proceedings. 
The manner in which an interim authorisation is given is set out in section 21H. It may 
initially be given orally, though it must be confirmed in writing as soon as is practicable. 
It must describe the general nature of the terrorist act or threatened act, the person, 
vehicle or area which is the subject of the authorisation and the date and time of its 
commencement and expiration.
An authorisation is given with respect to a particular “target”, in the words of the 
legislation. That is, it may authorise the use of special powers as against a particular 
person, as named or described (including a description using a photograph or 
drawing), a vehicle or a particular type of vehicle or a particular geographical area. 
A substantive authorisation to use special powers (as opposed to an interim one) 
may be granted by a judge of the Supreme Court on the application of the Chief 
Commissioner, again with the approval of the Premier. The application must be 
made by the Chief Commissioner personally. It is not delegable to any other officer in 
this instance.257 A substantive authorisation (ie. not an interim one) may be of up to 
14 days duration.
In the exercise of any of the powers set out below, the use of reasonable force is 
expressly permitted by section 21V. The special powers may be exercised by any 
police officer or (with the exception of strip searches) by a person assisting the officer. 
The officer need not be issued with a copy of the authorisation.
If requested to do so, an officer exercising any of these powers must provide his or her 
name and place of duty and evidence that he or she is an officer (unless that person is 
in uniform at the time) to the person against whom the power is being exercised. This 
must be done at the time or as soon as is reasonably practicable afterwards.258
257  TCPA at section 21A(3).
258  Ibid at section 21X(1).
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In order to facilitate the exercise of any of the special police powers, the Chief 
Commissioner is expressly entitled to call upon any public entity (government 
department or agency) for assistance.259 This might be, for example, a road or rail 
transport authority.
10.2 The special police powers
For the purposes of achieving the objective of the authorisation, the powers that 
may be exercised by the police (but only if they are specifically mentioned in the 
authorisation)260 are as follows.
10.2.1  Power to obtain disclosure of identity
If a police officer believes a person to be:
•	 The	subject	of	the	authorisation;	or
•	 In	the	company	of	a	person	who	is	the	subject	of	the	authorisation;	or
•	 In	or	on	a	vehicle	which	the	officer	believes	to	be	the	subject	of	the	authorisation;	
or
•	 In	an	area	which	is	the	subject	of	an	authorisation261
then the officer may request proof of that person’s identity, and may detain the person 
for as long as is necessary for the purpose of doing so. 
It is an offence to fail or refuse to comply with a request from a police officer under this 
provision, or to give a false name or address. 
10.2.2 Power to search persons
If an officer believes that a person meets the criteria at Section 10.2.1 of this Report, 
then that officer may, without a warrant, stop and search the person and anything in 
the possession or control of that person (a bag, rucksack, etc.), and in doing so, may:
•	 Request	the	person	to	empty	the	contents	of	the	bag,	etc.,	and	search	through	
the bag or any of the contents of it; or
•	 Turn	out	his	or	her	pockets,	and	search	through	those	contents.262
For the purposes of such a search, the officer may detain the person for as long as is 
necessary to conduct it. The officer may also order a person or group of people not to 
leave an area that is the subject of the authorisation.
The power to search a person includes the power to carry out an ordinary search, 
a frisk search or, where someone is suspected to be the target, a strip search may 
be undertaken. Limits and rules on the conduct of searches, and safeguards for the 
protection of a person’s privacy and dignity during a search, are contained in the 
TCPA.263 
In particular, no strip search may be carried out on a child under the age of 10 years, 
and special rules apply to minors between the age of 10 and 18 years or persons of 
259  Ibid at section 21L.
260  Ibid at section 21N.
261  Ibid at section 21O.
262  Ibid at section 21P.
263  Ibid at Schedule 1.
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limited intellectual ability. Generally speaking, such a person may not be strip searched 
unless in the presence of a parent or guardian. 
Paragraph 6(4) of Schedule 1 to the TCPA provides that the limitation on strip searches 
of minors aged between 10 and 18 years of age, that requires a parent or guardian to 
be present, does not apply if such a person is not present, and the seriousness and 
urgency of the circumstances require the strip search to occur immediately. 
10.2.3 Power to search vehicles 
An officer may, again without a warrant, stop and search a vehicle, or anything in  
or on a vehicle, if:
•	 He	or	she	reasonably	suspects	the	vehicle	to	be	the	target	named	or	described	in	
the authorisation; or
•	 He	or	she	reasonably	suspects	that	a	person	in	or	on	the	vehicle	is	the	target;	or
•	 The	vehicle	is	in	the	area	which	is	the	subject	of	the	authorisation.264
Again, the vehicle may be detained for as long as is necessary to enable the search to 
be conducted, and the officer may order the driver or rider of the vehicle to remove it 
from, or to keep it within, the relevant area.
10.2.4 Power to move vehicles 
Where a particular geographical area is the subject of the authorisation, an officer 
may move or have moved to the nearest convenient place any vehicle parked or left 
standing in the area if, in his or her opinion, it is a danger to other persons or vehicles, 
is causing or likely to cause congestion or is hindering the exercise of the special 
powers authorised under this Part. Reasonable force may be used to enter the vehicle 
for this purpose. Any reasonable costs incurred by the police in moving the vehicle may 
be recovered from the owner.265
10.2.5 Power to enter and search premises 
If the subject or “target” of the authorisation is a person or vehicle, and a police officer 
reasonably suspects that the person or vehicle is on certain premises, then he or she 
may enter and search those premises. Further, any premises which are themselves 
in an area which is the “target” of the authorisation may similarly be searched. The 
officer may order any person or group of people to leave, or not to leave, the premises 
entered and searched. 
The provision reiterates the usual consideration that the officer must cause as little 
damage as possible in conducting the search.266
264  Ibid at section 21Q.
265  Ibid at section 21R.
266  Ibid at section 21S.
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10.2.6  Power to place a cordon around a target area 
For the purpose of conducting searches of people, vehicles or premises under powers 
set out in this Part, an officer is empowered to set up a cordon around any area which 
is the subject of the authorisation, or any part of it, including by means of a barrier or 
roadblock in or around the area. Persons or groups of people may be ordered to leave, 
or not to leave, the cordoned-off area.267
10.2.7  Power to seize and detain things 
In connection with a search carried out under this Part, a police officer may seize and 
detain (including removing a thing or guarding against its removal):
•	 Anything	that	the	officer	reasonably	suspects	may	be	used,	or	may	have	been	
used, to commit an act of terrorism; or
•	 Anything	that	the	officer	reasonably	believes	may	provide	evidence	of	the	
commission of a serious indictable offence (meaning an offence for which the 
maximum punishment is life imprisonment or for a term of five years or more), 
whether or not that offence is related to the commission of a terrorist act or not.268
Provision for the return or disposal of anything seized is made in the section.
10.3 Application for, and grant of, an authorisation
10.3.1 Authorisation to protect persons attending events
These provisions269 come into consideration where a significant event is taking place 
or is planned for Victoria, and the Chief Commissioner has reason to believe that the 
event could be the target of a terrorist act. An application may be made on the basis 
that the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that:
•	 An	event	in	Victoria	is	taking	place,	or	is	likely	to	be	taking	place	shortly,	which	
involves or is likely to involve the attendance of either a large gathering of people  
or a number of “prominent persons”; and
•	 There	are	reasonable	grounds	for	believing	that	an	act	of	terrorism	might	occur	
during that event; and
•	 The	giving	of	an	authorisation	covering	the	relevant	venue	or	any	other	area	
connected with the event is necessary for the protection of those attending 
the event.
He or she must obtain the written approval of the Premier and must make a sworn 
application in writing to the Supreme Court which:
•	 Describes	the	event;
•	 Sets	out	the	facts	and	reasons	why	it	is	considered	there	is	a	risk	of	a	terrorist	act;
•	 Explains	why	the	giving	of	the	authorisation	sought	is	considered	necessary	for	the	
protection of attendees;
267  Ibid at section 21T.
268  Ibid at section 21U.
269  Ibid at sections 21B and 21C. 
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•	 Sets	out	the	specific	special	powers	under	this	Part	of	the	TCPA	which	he	or	she	
considers reasonably necessary for that purpose; and
•	 Describes	any	area	which	is	to	be	the	subject	of	the	authorisation	sought.270
The judge hearing the application may seek such further information as he or she 
requires, and in that regard, may adjourn consideration of the application, or may 
make an interim order giving an authorisation pending the final determination of the 
application. If an interim order is granted, then a date and time must be set for the 
resumption of the hearing.271
If the judge is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the authorisation sought is 
reasonably necessary for the protection of attendees at the event, that authorisation 
may be granted. It must:
•	 State	that	it	was	granted	under	this	Part	of	the	TCPA;	and
•	 Describe	the	general	nature	of	the	event	and	any	area	targeted	by	the	
authorisation;
•	 Specify	which	of	the	powers	described	at	Section	10.2	of	this	Report,	may	be	
used; and
•	 State	its	commencement	date	and	time	and	the	date	and	time	it	ceases	to	have	
effect. 
The expiry time must be no later than 24 hours after the event’s scheduled 
completion time. Extensions may be granted on application to the Court by the Chief 
Commissioner, with the approval of the Premier, if the judge reasonably believes that 
the extension or extensions are reasonably necessary for the achievement of the 
original objective of the application and authorisation.272
If an interim order has been granted, then on the resumption of the hearing of the 
application, the judge may either confirm the authorisation as made, or may grant the 
authorisation with variations as to the area covered by it, the special powers that may 
be exercised under it or the time or date when the authorisation ceases to have effect. 
Alternatively, if he or she is not satisfied that the continuation is reasonably necessary 
for the protection of people attending the event, the order may be revoked.273
10.3.2 Authorisation to prevent, or to reduce the impact of, a terrorist act
The Chief Commissioner, with the written approval of the Premier, may make an interim 
authorisation under this provision if:274
•	 He	or	she	is	satisfied	on	reasonable	grounds	that	an	act	of	terrorism	is	occurring,	
or there is a threat of one occurring in the next 14 days; and
•	 He	or	she	is	satisfied	that	the	use	of	the	special	powers	will	substantially	assist	
in preventing the act, or reduce the impact or threat of the act on the health and 
safety of people or on property.
270  Ibid at section 21B(1) – (4).
271  Ibid at section 21B(8) and (9).
272  Ibid at section 21B(7).
273  Ibid at section 21B(10).
274  Ibid at section 21D.
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As soon as possible after that, the Chief Commissioner must make an application 
to the Court if it is expected that the authorisation would be needed for more than 
24 hours.275 Alternatively, without an interim authorisation having been given, an 
application may be made for a substantive authorisation. In either event, the application 
must again be made in writing and the evidence sworn. It must set out the facts and 
grounds relied on, and explain how the use of special powers would assist.276
The judge may, at that time, grant a substantive authorisation for the exercise of the 
special powers, thereby revoking the Chief Commissioner’s interim authorisation, if 
satisfied as to the two criteria above, or may revoke that interim authorisation if not so 
satisfied. The terms of the Court’s authorisation need not, however, be in the same 
terms as the interim one given by the Chief Commissioner.
The judge may seek further information, and again may make an interim order pending 
the determination of the substantive application, a time for the hearing of which must 
be set. At that hearing, the judge may confirm or revoke the Court’s interim order, 
depending on whether the two criteria mentioned above are established.
10.3.3 Authorisation relating to the investigation of, or recovery from, an 
act of terrorism
These provisions also allow for the making of an interim authorisation by the Chief 
Commissioner to use special powers, with the prior written approval of the Premier. 
This time, he or she must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that an act of terrorism is occurring or has occurred, and be satisfied that the exercise 
of special powers would substantially assist in:
•	 The	apprehension	of	the	terrorist;	or
•	 The	investigation	of	the	terrorist	act;	or
•	 The	recovery	process	of	people	affected	by	the	act.277
Thereafter, the provisions regarding this application for and granting of this type of 
authorisation are as set out at Section 10.3.2 of this Report. 
Where the Chief Commissioner makes an interim authorisation, pending a hearing 
before the court, of the type described under Sections 10.3.2 and 10.3.3 of this 
Report, the authorisation cannot exceed 24 hours in duration. An authorisation granted 
by the court cannot exceed 14 days.278
10.3.4  Authorisations to protect essential services
In this category of circumstance, the authorisation is given by the Governor in Council, 
by Order published in the Government Gazette.279 It is made on the recommendation 
of the responsible minister, with the approval of the Premier and on the advice of the 
Chief Commissioner, where the minister is satisfied that the authorisation is necessary 
for the protection of infrastructure assets necessary for delivering an essential service, 
or persons in the vicinity of the assets, or to aid the recovery of the service from a 
terrorist act. 
275  Ibid at section 21D(2).
276  Ibid at section 21D(4).
277  Ibid at section 21E(1).
278  Ibid at section 21I(2).
279  Ibid at section 21F.
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This type of authorisation is designed to be given in advance as part of emergency 
management planning processes, rather than in response to an emergency, hence  
the number of necessary approvals before an authorisation is given. 
The Order published in the Government Gazette must:
•	 Clearly	state	the	effect	of	the	Order;
•	 Describe	the	area	which	is	the	subject	of	the	authorisation,	and	name	or	describe	
any person or vehicle targeted;
•	 Specify	which	special	powers	are	authorised;	and
•	 Specify	the	duration	of	the	Order,	which	cannot	exceed	one	year.280
So far as the Review Committee is aware, no authorisation under section 21F has 
been given to date. 
10.4 Safeguards
10.4.1 Reporting requirements
Under section 21M of the TCPA, the Premier is required to lay before Parliament 
an annual report concerning the operation of this Part 3A during the course of 
the previous financial year. The report is broken down into authorisations given or 
granted, outlining:
•	 The	terms	of	each	authorisation	and	its	period	of	effect;
•	 A	summary	of	the	grounds	relied	upon	for	the	granting	of	the	authorisation;
•	 A	general	description	of	the	powers	exercised;	and
•	 The	results	of	the	exercise	of	those	powers.
The report is prepared by Victoria Police. Each of the reports tabled to date show 
no use of the special powers. The Review Committee has been advised by Victoria 
Police that the power has been used on one occasion. However, an annual report for 
the period 2005-2006, which would have encompassed that use of the power, was 
not tabled.
10.4.2 Other safeguards
As well as the reporting powers, which allow for a level of ministerial, parliamentary 
and public scrutiny, a number of checks and balances are built into the provisions 
to prevent misuse of the powers, most of which have been described above. They 
include:
•	 The	oversight	of	the	Supreme	Court;
•	 Only	the	Chief	Commissioner	may	apply	for	an	authorisation;
•	 The	application	has	to	be	made	in	each	instance	with	the	prior	approval	of	the	
Premier;
•	 An	interim	authorisation	made	by	the	Chief	Commissioner	in	urgent	circumstances	
must be confirmed by the Supreme Court within 24 hours;
280  Ibid at sections 21F(3) and 21I(3).
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•	 A	police	officer	conducting	a	search	must,	on	request,	provide	evidence	of	identity	
and the reasons for conducting the search;
•	 The	safeguards	contained	in	Schedule	1	assist	in	the	maintenance	of	dignity	and	
privacy during searches, particularly strip searches;
•	 If	a	person	who	has	been	searched,	or	whose	vehicle	or	premises	has	been	
searched, requests the same within 12 months, the Chief Commissioner must 
provide a written report on the reasons for the search; and281
•	 In	respect	of	anticipatory	authorisations	for	the	protection,	etc.,	of	critical	
infrastructure under section 21F, the hierarchy of approvals needed for the use  
of special powers and the requirement to Gazette the authorisation.
10.5 Operation of the legislation
The powers in this Part have been used by Victoria Police on one occasion, in 2006. 
Most of the venues for the events forming the Commonwealth Games in Melbourne in 
March of that year were the subject of special events legislation specifically formulated 
for the Games. However, a luncheon event scheduled for the Royal Exhibition Building 
was not covered. An authorisation was obtained from the Court under section 21B to 
allow for the setting up of an exclusion zone for the duration of the event.
More recently, Victoria Police gave consideration to the seeking of an authorisation to 
use special powers based on intelligence which suggested a major public event was 
under serious threat on that occasion. However, the matter was successfully dealt with 
by other means.
10.6 COAG Report
As referred to in Chapter 8 of this Report on preventative detention, the COAG 
Committee reviewed the State and Territory legislation introduced as a result of the 
2005 COAG agreement as part of its terms of reference. At paragraph 343-361 they 
commented on the provisions regarding what they called the “stop, search and seize” 
powers.
They noted that the powers across the States and Territories were broadly similar, 
though they had been rarely used. They noted however, that despite this lack of use, all 
of the jurisdictions had expressed the desire to retain the powers “on the books”, given 
the current terrorism climate. Statutory reviews in a number of States have concluded 
that the powers are necessary and warranted in the circumstances. 
The COAG Committee considered a number of criticisms of the powers: 
1. That there was a risk that the powers could be used arbitrarily;
2. That there was a lack of judicial oversight in some instances;
3. That the use of privative clauses should be abolished; and
4. That the review and oversight mechanisms should be strengthened.
281 Ibid at section 21X(2).
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As to the first point, the COAG Committee accepted that there would always be a risk, 
in the execution of the powers, that a police officer might conduct an “arbitrary” search 
of a person. However, the legislation itself was not arbitrary. Rather, each provision was 
confined to operate in appropriately circumscribed locations, and the reasons for such 
searches were clearly articulated.282
As to the other three criticisms, however, the COAG Committee recommended  
as follows:
“Recommendation 45 – The Committee recommends that the various 
jurisdictions amend their legislation to reflect a greater degree of judicial 
oversight. The legislation in each State or Territory should be based on the 
current ACT, Tasmanian or Victorian model, requiring authorisation or final 
authorisation by a judge of the State or Territory Supreme Court.” 283
Whilst recognising that seeking prior judicial approval for the use of powers was 
administratively cumbersome and time-consuming, the COAG Committee were  
of the view that authorisation by way of judicial sanction:
•	 Gives	the	community	more	confidence	in	the	process,	particularly	where	the	 
use of the powers can be invasive; but also,
•	 Provides	greater	legitimacy	and	confidence	to	the	individual	police	officers	 
charged with exercising the powers.
The COAG Committee were prepared to accept a reasonable compromise, however, 
whereby decisions were taken by senior police officers in urgent circumstances, 
provided that they were given judicial sanction shortly afterwards. The provisions in the 
Victorian and South Australian legislation in this regard were particularly approved.
The COAG Committee recommended:
“Recommendation 46 – The Committee recommends that the various privative 
clauses in the current legislation be removed.”
It was felt that privative clauses, whereby Parliament purports to restrict the 
administrative law jurisdiction of a court, were inappropriate in legislation such as 
that under consideration. Indeed, the COAG Committee felt, such clauses would be 
unnecessary should a nationally agreed system of judicial oversight, as recommended 
above, be introduced.
The COAG Committee recommended:
“Recommendation 47 – The Committee recommends that there should be a 
regular reporting function incorporated into each ‘special powers’ statute.”
The COAG Committee took as templates the provisions in the Northern Territory 
legislation284 and the equivalent Australian Capital Territory statute.285
In the former, an authorisation may be given by the Chief Commissioner or another 
authorised police officer, with the approval of the Police Minister. However, as soon 
as practicable after the authorisation ceases to have effect, the Commissioner must 
282  COAG Report at paragraph 355.
283  COAG Report at Recommendation 45. 
284  Section 13, Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 2006 (NT).
285  Section 95, Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006 (ACT).
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provide a written report to the Attorney-General and the Police Minister, describing the 
reasons for the authorisation, etc., and the results of the exercise of the powers. The 
report must then be laid before Parliament within 6 months.
In the Australian Capital Territory, authorisations may be “investigative” or 
“preventative”. Both are granted by the Supreme Court or Magistrates Court. There is 
no scope for urgent, interim executive orders in this legislation. As soon as possible 
after the authorisation ends, the Chief Police Officer must report to the Minister, 
including an analysis of the results of the exercise of the powers. The report has to be 
laid before Parliament within 6 months.
With regard to the COAG Committee’s recommendations, the position in Victoria  
is as follows:
•	 On	judicial	oversight,	the	legislative	provisions	in	Victoria	fall	within	the	range	 
of acceptable compromises;
•	 The	TCPA	contains	a	privative	clause,	at	section	21J,	in	respect	of	interim	
authorisations given by the Chief Commissioner;
•	 Section	21M	provides	for	a	report	to	Parliament	annually.	However,	there	is	no	
provision for reporting elsewhere on the exercise of special powers. This contrasts 
with section 11, whereby the details of, and the results of, the use of covert search 
warrants must be reported back to the Court that granted them within 7 days of 
their expiration.
10.7 Submissions
In their first written submission to the Review Committee, elaborated upon by officers 
at the first meeting, Victoria Police stressed their view that the provisions remain a 
relevant and vital counter-terrorism policing tool. They pointed out that Victoria is 
the only State (at the time of writing) to have used them. In terms of effectiveness, 
however, two concerns were raised:
1. Firstly, in giving an interim authorisation for the use of special powers to prevent or 
reduce the impact of a terrorist act under section 21D, or in seeking a substantive 
authorisation from the Court under that provision, the Chief Commissioner must 
be satisfied on reasonable grounds that a terrorist act is occurring, or that there is 
a threat of a terrorist act occurring in the next 14 days.286 Officers explained that 
it is sometimes difficult to determine an exact date when a terrorist act is likely 
to occur. Intelligence may suggest a preparedness to commit an act without a 
precise time, which may be dependant on variables and circumstances.
The same issue arises in respect of a PDO, and is discussed at Chapter 8 of this Report.
2. Secondly, where the Chief Commissioner is minded to grant an interim 
authorisation due to the urgency of the situation, the approval of the Premier in 
writing must first be obtained. This requirement, in the opinion of Victoria Police, 
may cause administrative delays, which could limit their ability to take quick and 
effective action to protect the community.
286  TCPA at section 21D(1)(a) and (4)(d).
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Officers stressed that it is not the fact of the Premier’s prior approval being necessary 
that concerns them, rather the potential for delays whilst he or she seeks advice and 
considers whether approval should be granted. 
The Review Committee also received submissions from members of the AFP. 
They endorsed the representations made to the COAG Committee in respect of 
the equivalent powers in Commonwealth legislation287 (which are exercisable only 
in Commonwealth places) in supporting the continued retention of the equivalent 
legislation in Victoria. Their submission to the COAG Review stated:
“The fact that the powers in Division 3A have not yet been used does not 
support any argument for their repeal. The trends of terrorism and the 
challenges for law enforcement attach greater importance to the utility of 
these tools in emergency situations. To date, because of the efforts of law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, such situations have not eventuated.” 
10.8 Impact of the Charter of Human Rights
The range of special powers available to police where an authorisation has been given 
under this Part potentially engages a number of Charter rights:
1. Requiring a person to disclose their identity (section 21O of the TCPA) engages the 
right to privacy in section 13 of the Charter;
2. Stopping and searching of persons (section 21P). This power engages the right 
to freedom of movement under section 12 (and, if the stopping occurs for long 
enough, the right to liberty in section 21) as well as the right to privacy in section 
13 of the Charter; 
3. Entering a vehicle for the purpose of moving it under section 21R, thereby 
engaging the right to privacy in section 13;
4. Entering and searching premises (section 21S) engages the right to privacy in 
section 13;
5. Cordoning off areas, and directing persons not to enter or leave such an area 
(section 21T) engages the right to freedom of movement in section 12 and, 
arguably, the right to liberty in section 21; and 
6. Seizing and detaining items (section 21U). Although this involves an interference 
with property, the right to property in the Charter is a very limited one.
Additionally, the power to stop and search vehicles (section 21Q) potentially engages 
the right to freedom of movement in section 12 of the Charter and the right to privacy 
in section 13. It should be noted that the right of police to stop a vehicle without 
suspicion of the committal of an offence is currently the subject of proceedings in the 
Victorian Supreme Court (DPP v Kaba – judgment awaited). The extent to which the 
right to freedom of movement is limited by stopping a vehicle as opposed to a person 
is, so far as the Review Committee understand, untested.
287  Division 3A of Part1AA of the Crimes Act 1914.
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10.9 Discussion and conclusions
Overall, the Review Committee are of the view that these powers are not so far 
removed from the powers available to police on other occasions as to render them 
remarkable. Having regard to the circumstances for which they were designed, the 
Review Committee consider the provisions to be necessary. In terms of the relevant 
Charter rights, the Review Committee are of the view that generally any limitations 
arising from the exercise of the special powers would be reasonable and proportionate, 
given the circumstances. The position with respect to Charter rights is discussed 
further below.
In light of the paucity of evidence available on the use of these provisions, it is difficult 
to judge their effectiveness. The Review Committee are of the view that they are 
effective and adequate, although they believe that their effectiveness, as well as their 
transparency, could be improved as a result of the recommendations set out below. 
As with the reporting requirements for the use of covert search warrants dealt with in 
Chapter 7 of this Report, the Review Committee are of the view that there is scope 
for increased accountability and transparency in this Part. At present, the statute (at 
section 21M, see Section 10.4.1 of this Report) requires an outline of the reasons 
for the authorisation, the powers that were exercised and the result of that exercise 
of powers in the report provided by the Premier to Parliament. In this regard, the 
provision is preferable to that relating to covert search warrants, where only statistics 
are necessary. However, as mentioned earlier, there was no report tabled for the 2005-
2006 period. 
The Review Committee refer to the comments and recommendation previously made 
about the possible involvement of the Victorian Inspectorate in the oversight of the 
covert search warrant powers. Those comments have application to the oversight of 
the special powers given to police. The Review Committee are of the view that the 
involvement of the Victorian Inspectorate should be considered for these powers as 
well as the covert search warrant powers and recommend accordingly. 
Of the two matters of concern raised by Victoria Police, reference is made to the 
Review Committee’s conclusions concerning the “14 day” issue in Chapter 8 of this 
Report regarding a PDO, and the Review Committee’s Recommendation 6 in that 
regard. It follows that the Review Committee are of the view that a similar amendment 
should be made to the special powers provisions and recommend accordingly. 
The second issue raised by Victoria Police concerns the need for prior approval in 
writing of the Premier when an interim (urgent) authorisation is being sought. The 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) explained to the Review Committee that 
the Premier’s involvement was included in 2006 as an additional safeguard given the 
extraordinary nature of the powers being granted by Parliament. This safeguard was 
also imposed in light of the Government’s stated principles that these new powers 
would only be exercised where their use was necessary and effective. 
120
The Review Committee understand the concern of Victoria Police and raise four 
possible alternatives:
1. The removal of the need for such consent completely; such an approval would 
then only be given by the Chief Commissioner, who is required to meet a high 
evidential threshold in any event. Moreover, if authorisation is required beyond 24 
hours, the confirmation of the Supreme Court has to be obtained. This would, 
however, remove the only existing measure of externality in the process for giving 
an interim authorisation;
2. To allow for the approval to be given orally. This however would not alleviate any 
delays caused by the necessity for the Premier to seek his or her own advice, etc.;
3. To replace the requirement for the Premier’s prior approval with that of another 
minister, such as the Minister for Police or the Attorney-General. That again, 
however, does not make allowance, for the need, for that alternative minister to 
seek advice, etc.;
4. To make allowance for the fact that the Premier might not always be immediately 
or reasonably available, so that an interim authorisation may be given by the 
Chief Commissioner alone, but that it must be reported to the Premier within 24 
hours, whilst the Premier’s approval would remain a pre-requisite for seeking a 
substantive authorisation from the Court.288
After careful consideration of the matters raised and the possible alternatives, the 
Review Committee are satisfied that the Premier should retain an involvement in this 
process. The principles upon which the TCPA and the 2006 amendments are based 
have not changed. The powers may not now be considered extraordinary (although 
this is debatable). However, the circumstances requiring an authorisation for their 
use should remain so. It should take the occurrence of, or the anticipation of, an 
extraordinary event in Victoria to trigger an authorisation or an application, and thus in 
the view of the Review Committee, the Premier should remain involved. It remains an 
important and effective safeguard. 
However, there could be more scope for practical and meaningful rehearsal of the 
application for and the use of these powers. The Review Committee were advised 
of exercises being carried out in this regard, but often in circumstances where key 
players, such as the Premier, were portrayed by other persons. Including the Premier, 
other ministers, the Chief Commissioner and other senior officers in the exercise 
would, in the view of the Review Committee, assist in the future, should an actual 
event occur. 
In order to address the concerns of Victoria Police about possible delays arising from 
the need for the Premier’s approval, DPC has informed the Review Committee that it 
would arrange workshops with Victoria Police in order to agree to a set of standard 
protocols, which could include more efficient communication through electronic 
means. The Review Committee consider this would be a worthwhile initiative and 
support it. 
288 Under section 9 of the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW), for example, an authorisation by a senior police 
officer requires the concurrence of the Police Minister. If the Minister is not able to be contacted, however, the 
authorisation may still be given. The Minister must be notified as soon as possible. If he or she is not so notified 
within 48 hours, in the case of an authorisation to prevent a terrorist attack, the authorisation lapses. There are 
similar post-notification provisions in the equivalent South Australia and Northern Territory legislation.
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With regard to the possible engagement of human rights through the exercise of the 
special powers contained in this Part, generally speaking, the detention and search 
of persons, vehicles and property is compatible with the rights to privacy, movement 
and liberty where the search is authorised by the Court or where there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect a criminal offence and it is not practicable to seek a warrant. 
Accordingly, having regard to the processes for authorisation, the Review Committee 
are of the view that the special powers in respect of particular persons named or 
described in the authorisation are compatible with the rights in the Charter. Similarly, 
the exercise of those powers with respect to a particular vehicle, and even a vehicle of 
a particular kind, are likely to be compatible with those rights.
More problematic is the ability to exercise the special powers in relation to any person, 
any vehicle and any premises in an area described in the authorisation, where that 
area is the “target”. A statement of compatibility was made to Parliament in respect 
of the Summary Offences and Control of Weapons Acts Amendment Bill 2009. This 
amounted to a statement of only partial compatibility with Charter rights in respect of 
proposed new stop, search and seize powers in designated areas, which would be 
exercisable without the prior need for a reasonable suspicion on the part of officers 
that the person is carrying a weapon. The Government proceeded with the provisions, 
notwithstanding that section 13 of the Charter (the right to privacy) would be engaged. 
The justification was public protection from increasing weapons crimes. The provisions 
came into effect as an amendment to the Control of Weapons Act 1990. 
In contrast to those provisions, however, Part 3A of the TCPA does contain a number 
of authorisation processes:
•	 The	authorisation	of	the	Supreme	Court	is	ordinarily	obtained;
•	 Interim	authorisation	can	only	be	given	by	the	Chief	Commissioner	in	
circumstances where it would not be reasonably practicable to obtain the 
authorisation of the Court (though the power is not expressly constrained in those 
terms). In any event, the Chief Commissioner is a public authority and required to 
give proper consideration to relevant human rights and exercise his or her powers 
compatibly with them;
•	 An	authorisation	is	subject	to	the	written	approval	of	the	Premier,	a	pre-condition	
which, as mentioned above, the Review Committee recommend be retained;
•	 The	circumstances	in	which	an	authorisation	can	be	sought	and	given	are	carefully	
constrained. 
The Review Committee are of the view that where the statutory test is met, and where 
it is considered appropriate to make an authorisation in relation to a specified area, it is 
reasonable and justifiable to exercise special powers in respect of any person, vehicle 
or premises in that area.
The powers have been used on just one occasion and this involved an extraordinary set 
of circumstances. The Review Committee are of the view that the statutory safeguards 
are effective in limiting the circumstances in which the powers are exercised. 
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10.10 Recommendations
Recommendation 12 
That the requirement in sections 21D(1)(a) and 21D(4)(b) that 
the Chief Commissioner needs to be satisfied of the threat of a 
terrorist act occurring in the next 14 days, and that the Supreme 
Court also needs to be so satisfied under section 21D(7)(a), 
be amended along the lines recommended by the INSLM with 
respect to the preventative detention power requirement. 
        
Recommendation 13
That consideration be given to the possible creation of an 
oversight role for the Victorian Inspectorate with respect to 
the use of the special powers under Part 3A of the Terrorism 
(Community Protection) Act 2003. 
Comment: Such a role could be in lieu of or additional to the 
obligation to report to the Parliament. The nature and scope of the 
role to be performed by the Victorian Inspectorate would need to 
be determined in consultation with the Victorian Inspectorate. The 
role may be analogous to that undertaken with regard to IBAC, 
the Auditor-General, the Chief Examiner and the Ombudsman with 
appropriate reporting requirements to Parliament. 
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11.1 Summary of the legislation
11.1.1 Origin
This Part, comprising just one section, was included in the provisions as originally 
enacted in 2003. It was substantially added to, however, by section 17 of the 
Dangerous Goods Legislation (Amendment) Act 2004, and then the breadth of the 
circumstances in which the duty applies was clarified in 2006.289
Originally, the TCPA provided for the mandatory reporting of any theft or loss of any 
prescribed chemicals and substances to the police. The provision was intended to 
assist the police with any information that could assist in preventing a terrorist act,  
by alerting them to the disappearance of chemicals such as those used in the 
October 2002 Bali bombings. The first chemical to be prescribed was ammonium 
nitrate (along with calcium ammonium nitrate and mixtures and emulsions containing 
more than 45 percent ammonium nitrate), known as “security sensitive ammonium 
nitrate”, or SSAN.290
In the meantime, however, on 25 June 2004, COAG had agreed to a national set of 
principles to regulate access to, in particular, ammonium nitrate. This chemical has a 
legitimate use in agriculture as a fertiliser. However, it is also known to have been used 
as an ingredient in explosive devices in several terrorist incidents around the world, 
most notably by the Irish Republican Army in various atrocities and in the terrorist 
attack in Oklahoma City in 1995.
The result was the enactment of the statute and the development of dangerous goods 
regulations, to be administered in Victoria by WorkSafe Victoria (WorkSafe). 
These two sets of statutory provisions and regulations still co-exist in Victoria, but since 
that time, important policy and regulatory developments with regard to chemicals and 
other substances that may be used to make explosives (explosive precursors) have 
come into effect at a national level. 
Therefore, as well as setting out the terms and purpose of section 22, in order to form 
a view as to whether the provision (and the accompanying terrorism regulations) are 
adequate, effective and necessary, consideration of developments at a national level 
needs to be undertaken.
289 TCPA Further Amendment Act at section 10(2).
290 Terrorism (Community Protection) (Chemicals and Substances) Regulations 2005, remade in 2006.
11 Part 4 – Mandatory reporting about 
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11.1.2  Purpose of the provision
Section 22 makes it mandatory for the occupier of any premises to immediately 
report any: 
•	 Theft;
•	 Attempted	theft;	or
•	 Unexplained	loss291
of regulated chemicals or substances to a member of the police force. If requested 
to do so by the police, the person must also provide a written report detailing the 
circumstances of the incident in question. As mentioned previously, the definition of 
“premises” for the purposes of the TCPA includes a vehicle, or part of a vehicle. For 
example, the disappearance of prescribed chemicals from a truck in which they were 
being transported would be reportable.292 
Where the chemicals or substances have also been listed in regulations as being “high 
consequence dangerous goods” (HCDGs), then the occupier of the building, vehicle, 
etc., must also report the incident without delay to WorkSafe., A written report detailing 
the circumstances of the incident or occurrence must be produced by the occupier 
should WorkSafe request one.
The chemicals or substances that are covered by the reporting duties to the police or 
to WorkSafe are the same, SSAN. 
Failure to report a theft, attempted theft or unexplained loss, without delay, or to 
produce a written report when requested to do so by the police or WorkSafe is 
an offence. 
11.2 The National Position 
In December 2002, in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, COAG agreed to a national 
review of the regulation, reporting and security surrounding the storage, sale and 
handling of hazardous materials, with the aim of assisting counter-terrorism efforts by 
limiting opportunities for, and enhancing the detection of, the illegal or unauthorised 
use of such materials (the COAG Review of Hazardous Material). The review was 
divided into four parts:
•	 Radiological	materials;	
•	 Harmful	biological	materials;
•	 Ammonium	nitrate;	and
•	 Chemicals	of	security	concern.
This chapter relates to the latter two parts and the subsequent action taken.
291 TCPA Further Amendment Act at section 10(1). Refined in 2006 from straightforward “loss”; the reporting duty 
now is restricted to covering any losses or discrepancies which cannot otherwise be explained by spillages, 
changes in density, evaporation or such like.
292 See Chapter 7 of this Report for meaning of the world “vehicle”.
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11.2.1  Security Sensitive Ammonium Nitrate
Ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate products are in common usage across 
Australia as an explosive in the mining industry (mixed with fuel oil) or, less so, as a 
fertilizer in the agriculture industry. It had become clear from a number of terrorist 
incidents around the world that the availability of SSAN as a terrorist tool posed a 
serious risk to national security. However, it was equally clear that an outright ban 
would not only have a detrimental effect on the farming sector but would probably 
be not feasible for the mining sector. Consideration shifted therefore to the possible 
regulation of the importation, sale, storage and transportation of these products. 
The issue was considered by COAG on 25 June 2004, and the relevant part of the 
communiqué for the meeting reads:
“COAG agreed on a national approach to ban access to ammonium nitrate 
for other than specifically authorised users. The agreement will result in 
the establishment in each jurisdiction of a licensing regime for the use, 
manufacture, storage, transport, supply, import and export of ammonium 
nitrate. The licensing regime will ensure that ammonium nitrate is only 
accessible to persons who have a demonstrated legitimate need for the 
product, are not of security concern and will store and handle the product 
safely and securely. This arrangement will balance security considerations with 
the legitimate needs of industry and farmers.
COAG agreed that the States and Territories would use their best endeavours 
to ensure the legislative arrangements for the licensing regime would be 
in place by 1 November 2004, with administrative arrangements to be 
finalised as soon as possible thereafter. COAG also noted that the Australian 
Government would continue to undertake investigations on the viability of 
completely banning ammonium nitrate fertilizers of security concern as a 
matter of priority, taking into account whether effective, non-detonable, 
alternatives can be developed, and provide information on any alternatives to 
the States and Territories.” 293
State and Territory governments were required to administer the new system because 
they have responsibility for matters concerning dangerous goods and explosives. 
However, a national set of principles for regulating ammonium nitrate was agreed and 
appended to the communiqué.
This agreement was given effect in Victoria with the enactment of the Dangerous 
Goods Legislation (Amendment) Act 2004 which amended the TCPA to provide for 
notifications about HCDGs to WorkSafe, but was particularly enacted to amend the 
Dangerous Goods Act 1985 and, to a lesser extent, the Road Transport (Dangerous 
Goods) Act 1995. The amendments, together with the accompanying Dangerous 
Goods (HCDG) Regulations 2005, ensured compliance with the national principles. 
The Dangerous Goods Act 1985 as amended established a licensing scheme, 
administered by WorkSafe, for anyone involved in the import, export, manufacture, 
storage, supply, use, handling, transfer, transportation or disposal of HCDGs. The 
details of the scheme are set out in the 2005 Regulations.
293 COAG Communiqué 25 June 2004 at pages 4-5.
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For the purposes of this Chapter, the relevant provision of these regulations is that 
licences are only granted to those who can demonstrate a legitimate need for 
ammonium nitrate and are not considered a security concern. Employees of  
persons granted such a licence need to obtain a permit if they handle the product 
unsupervised. Both licence applicants and permit applicants need to undergo national 
security and police checks. The licensing scheme came into effect on 1 October 2005. 
Most other States and Territories adopted a similar regime to Victoria, though Tasmania 
simply introduced an outright ban on the use of SSAN for agricultural purposes. 
Over time, concerns were raised about variations in the regulatory approach across 
jurisdictions, with different licensing coverage and different approaches to investigating 
the probity of applicants. Farmers groups had also complained to government that 
the regulations had unnecessarily reduced the availability of ammonium nitrate for 
legitimate use. In 2008, the Productivity Commission published a lengthy report into 
“Chemicals and Plastics Regulation”, calling for a unified national approach to the 
regulation of chemicals of security concern (the fourth of the concerns identified 
in 2002), and recommending a subsequent re-examination of the SSAN control 
framework thereafter.294
Part of the communiqué from the COAG meeting of 30 April 2009 reads:
“COAG agreed to reforms of the regulation of security-sensitive ammonium 
nitrate that will reduce the regulatory burden on legitimate users, while 
maintaining effective safeguards to prevent access for potential terrorist 
purposes. This includes the establishment of a system of recognition between 
the States for licences, permits and authorisations.” 295
11.2.2  Chemicals of security concern
In the meantime, after a lengthy consultation process, the Report on the Control of 
Chemicals of Security Concern, commissioned by COAG in 2002, was published 
in 2008. 
The report noted that some 40,000 chemicals were in use in Australia, many of which 
were already the subject of controls imposed through national or state governments 
or were self-regulated for the purposes of health, occupational safety or environmental 
risk. Of those 40,000, 96 chemicals were identified by COAG as requiring further 
attention because of their potential for misuse by terrorists, including 11 that could 
be used as explosive precursors (not including SSAN, which was by then already 
being regulated in States and Territories through the above licensing scheme). The 
96 substances listed comprise the “chemicals of security concern”.
That report was considered by COAG on 2 October 2008, which agreed to establish a:
“Chemical Security Management Framework that will reflect an agreed 
approach to minimising the potential of chemicals to harm the Australian 
community, industry and infrastructure.” 296
294 Productivity Commission Report into Chemicals and Plastics Regulation, 7 August 2008 at Chapter 10, 
Recommendation 10.4, page 293.
295 COAG Communiqué, 30 April 2009 at page 12. 
296 COAG Communiqué, 2 October 2008 at page 8.
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The parties signed an inter-governmental agreement to facilitate implementation of the 
Chemical Security Management Framework (the Framework) and the Commonwealth 
Government agreed to establish and chair a National Government Advisory Group.
At the same time, however, COAG again had to balance security concerns surrounding 
these chemicals with the need to allow relatively unhindered access to them for 
legitimate users. It had identified chemicals and plastics regulation as a “hotspot” in the 
National Reform Agenda, and had established a Ministerial Taskforce to look into the 
issue. It was also called upon to consider the Productivity Commission report referred 
to above. At Recommendation 10.3, the Commission had stated that:
“…any regulation of other [chemicals of security concern] should not be based 
on the current inefficient and cumbersome SSAN regime.” 297 
This was based on complaints received about the availability of fertilizers, the cost of 
compliance and the ability of regulatory agencies to administer any expanded licensing 
arrangements, given delays faced in some jurisdictions. It went on to say:
“State and territory governments should not add any additional security 
sensitive chemicals to the current security sensitive ammonium nitrate 
regulations.” 298 
At its next meeting, on 29 November 2008, and under the agenda item “Seamless 
National Economy”, COAG discussed the matter again, and the relevant part of the 
communiqué reads:
“Recognising the need for greater coordination and oversight in chemicals and 
plastics regulation, COAG agreed to a new governance structure for chemicals 
and plastics reform.”299
A “Memorandum of Understanding for Chemicals and Plastics Regulatory Reform” 
was signed by the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments on 7 December 
2009, “to reduce the regulatory burden on business.” 300 This established a Standing 
Committee on Chemicals as part of the new governance Framework.
The agreement “Australia’s National Arrangements for the Management of Security 
Risks Associated with Chemicals Inter-Government Agreement” (the Agreement) had 
been signed at the COAG meeting of 2 October 2008 and had the following objective:
“To establish an effective, coordinated and collaborative national approach 
to the management of chemical security that seeks to prevent the use of 
chemicals for terrorist purposes.” 301
The Agreement established the aforementioned Framework, which has as its core aims 
the education of the community, industry and government agencies to be vigilant in 
deterring or detecting the use of chemicals for terrorist purposes. It sets out the roles 
and responsibilities of each level of government, and also announces the development 
of a program of up to date risk-assessments of the chemicals considered to be a 
security risk. It states that the development of strategies will be based on the following 
guiding principles (COAG emphasis retained):
297 Productivity Commission Report into Chemicals and Plastics Regulation, 7 August 2008.
298 Ibid.
299 COAG Communiqué 29 November 2008 at page 10.
300 COAG Communiqué 7 December 2009 at page 10.
301 COAG Communiqué 2 October 2008 at page 8.
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•	 Control	measures	should	be	proportionate to the assessed risk of the use of 
chemicals for terrorist purposes;
•	 The	development	of	strategies	for	control	measures	should	be	nationally 
coordinated and agreed outcomes nationally consistent;
•	 Control	measures	should,	where	possible,	be	built on existing industry and/or 
government arrangements;
•	 Proposed	control	measures	should	be	cost effective and subject to a cost benefit 
analysis;
•	 Control	measures	should	be	developed in partnership between government and 
industry so that appropriate knowledge and needs can be effectively and efficiently 
integrated; and
•	 Australia	should	take account of arrangements applied in other countries that do 
not restrict industry competitiveness and the trade of chemicals.302
The two basic objectives of the proposed regulatory regime were to be education 
and testing. In the context of that second objective, it also agreed to jointly develop 
methodology for conducting assessments of the risk posed by the 96 individual 
chemicals as terrorist weapons, targeting first those classified as being of security 
concern.
11.2.3 The current position
11.2.3.1 Security Sensitive Ammonium Nitrate
On the issue of SSAN, and through the Framework, the National Government Advisory 
Group has published an implementation plan for the harmonisation of State and 
Territory regulations, utilising the offices of a National Industry Reference Group (also 
established under the Framework). The plan promises that:
“Proportionate and harmonised risk treatment measures will be developed 
and agreed, including having regard to the chemical security risk 
assessment for SSAN, the Productivity Commission’s recommendations and 
COAG’s responses.” 303
Work on the harmonisation was ongoing at a national level. However, in a recent 
development, the Federal Attorney-General’s Department has decided to pass the 
regulation of SSAN to Safe Work Australia, to include in a separate harmonisation 
scheme for the regulation of explosives, part of a suite of workplace health and safety 
regulations. Victoria did not adopt the wider model workplace regulations, however, 
and thus the harmonised explosives regulations will not apply in this jurisdiction. As a 
result, Victoria will need to remake the HCDG regulations, due to sunset in 2015.
302 Schedule 1 to the Agreement.
303 National Government Advisory Group on Chemicals Security – Implementation Plan for Productivity Commission 
Recommendations Chemicals and Plastics Regulatory Reform – Security Sensitive Ammonium Nitrate (SSAN) 
Reform, at page 1. 
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11.2.3.2 Chemicals of security concern
The 11 explosive precursors mentioned above have been the subject of a regulatory 
impact statement (RIS), which looked into the options for regulation. They were 
considered for inclusion in the licensing regulations, putting them on a par with SSAN, 
but there has been significant resistance from industry concerned at the regulatory 
burden that such inclusion would impose. Those chemicals are very much in common, 
legitimate use, and the compliance cost of such regulation was judged to far outweigh 
the benefits that would be derived.
Instead, a voluntary National Code of Practice was developed, following the publication 
of and consultation on the RIS, aimed at encouraging cooperation between businesses 
and law enforcement agencies, and asking businesses to train staff to be vigilant to 
suspicious behaviours. It is aimed at producers and importers of chemicals, as well as 
retailers and members of the general public. The Code can be found on the dedicated 
website www.chemicalsecurity.gov.au, created in 2009 as part of a larger public 
awareness campaign. The existence of that website was publicised in May 2013, with 
the Federal Attorney-General launching a “Chemicals of Security Concern” campaign, 
listing the 96 chemicals of concern, where those chemicals may be found in domestic 
products and calling on the public to recognise and report suspicious behaviour to the 
National Security Hotline. 
In the meantime, risk assessments of the 96 chemicals of security concern have been 
completed, where they were tested against such criteria as availability, useability and 
practicality of threat. A RIS will be produced in the near future as to the options for their 
future regulation .
11.3 Operation of the legislation
A significant number of reports have been made and investigated since 2003 involving 
thefts from motor vehicles, shop thefts and burglaries where SSAN of such quantities 
as to raise concerns has been stolen. The provision is regarded as a useful intelligence 
tool by both Victoria Police and WorkSafe, whose relationship has developed well in 
terms of information sharing and investigations.
Under the parallel dangerous goods provisions, WorkSafe has issued (at the time of 
writing), 305 “Licences to Access High Consequence Dangerous Goods”, which are 
renewable every five years. Four applications have been refused. In the same period, 
821 “Permits for Unsupervised Access” have been granted, with 24 refusals. 
Turning to the arrangements for the other 96 chemicals, WorkSafe continue to monitor 
the usefulness of the Code of Practice. Its voluntary nature might be re-considered. 
There would appear to be a general feeling that the “message’ has yet to get  
through to smaller businesses in particular. However, the option of adding any of  
the 96 chemicals to the licensing regulations remains open.
A review of the efficacy, amongst other things, of the National Security Hotline was 
carried out in 2010 by the Commonwealth Auditor-General (ANAO).304 The Review 
reported that agencies including ASIO, the AFP and the State and Territory police 
forces placed “significant value” on the information they received through the hotline. 
Since its inception in December 2002 until the end of 2009, some 140,000 calls had 
been received. The ANAO was satisfied: 
304 Audit Report No 4 2010-11.
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“…that both Australian Government and State/Territory stakeholder agencies 
have in place effective liaison arrangements to co-ordinate necessary 
response to [National Security Hotline] calls.” 305
The ANAO analysis was supported by a classified ASIO / AFP joint paper of 2009, 
quoted in the report, stating that approximately 30 per cent of calls received are 
assessed as containing sufficient indicators to warrant further investigation and that, of 
those, around 4 per cent were considered to be “significant leads” containing specific 
and apparently credible threats or strong indicators of potential security related activity.
Of course, not all of these calls relate to chemicals of security concern. However, the 
ANAO report provides some reassurance that the system of public education and 
provision for reporting suspicious behaviour is working.
11.4 Submissions
In their first written submission to the review, Victoria Police supported the retention 
of section 22, and of the continued inclusion of SSAN in the regulations. The Review 
Committee’s attention was drawn however to a number of perceived limitations:
1. The requirement that the substance is stolen or lost from “premises” may exclude 
loss of chemicals being transported by road or rail; 
2. It is unclear who bears the reporting onus where the theft or loss has occurred 
from a place with multiple occupants. It is suggested that this ambiguity could be 
cleared up with the inclusion of the words “or any person in possession or control,” 
after the words “An occupier of any premises” in section 22(1); 
3. The provision does not extend to the acquisition of prescribed substances through 
wholly lawful means. As mentioned, most chemicals that have been found to have 
been used in the manufacture of explosives by terrorists in the past are available 
for purchase from many legitimate retail and wholesale businesses with limited or 
no restrictions. The substances used in the London transport bombings of 2005 
and the Oslo bombings carried out by Anders Breivik in 2011, for example, were 
obtained through seemingly legitimate commercial transactions.306 
Victoria Police drew the Review Committee’s attention to recent regulations made by 
the European Union relating to the sale and use of so called “explosive precursors.” 307 
305 Ibid at paragraph 3.47.
306 Breivik’s device was made from ammonium nitrate fuel oil (or ANFO) – the ammonium nitrate was obtained 
through the renting of a farm and the setting up of a fake agricultural business, and it was mixed with fuel. 
Unbeknownst to Breivik, he need not have gone to so much trouble – Norway had not yet adopted a 2009 
EU regulation on the sale of explosive precursors (whilst not an EU member, Norway is bound to adopt such 
measures as a member of the European Economic Area, which has an agreement with the EU on such matters), 
and would not do so until 2011, after the Oslo bombing and subsequent events. Thus, the company that supplied 
the fertilizer would have carried out no checks on Breivik personally in any event because he was buying standard 
products that were entirely unregulated and that were lawfully available to anyone.
307 Regulation (EU) No. 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors.
131
11.5 Impact of the Charter of Human Rights
The Review Committee have not identified any Charter issues with regard to Part 4 of 
the TCPA.
11.6 Discussion and conclusions
The Review Committee are of the view that section 22 is a necessary provision in the 
context of the counter-terrorism provisions as a whole and is effective and adequate 
for that purpose.
With respect to the submissions made by Victoria Police: 
1. As mentioned in Chapter 7 of this Report, the definition of “premises” for the 
purposes of the TCPA includes a vehicle or part of a vehicle.308
Whilst “vehicle” is not currently defined for the purposes of the TCPA as a whole, 
most common dictionary based definitions include land-based forms of transport. 
The Review Committee are of the view that chemicals stolen or lost whilst being 
transported by road or rail would be covered by this duty. If Recommendation 3 is 
accepted, theft or loss during transportation by air or water would also be specifically 
included.
2. The Review Committee is satisfied that the wording of section 22(1) would  
cover any occupier of premises who becomes aware of the theft, etc., of the 
substance. The onus is on all such occupiers, not just one who owns or controls 
the substances.
3. The lack of provision for dealing in explosive precursors is discussed below. 
The European Union Regulation referred to above by Victoria Police was adopted 
on 15 January 2013, but will not come into effect across member countries until 
2 September 2014. It was formulated to give a legislative framework to the EU Action 
Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, created in 2008 and reviewed in 2012, 
to harmonise divergent laws and administrative procedures across EU member states 
to provide a high level of protection for the public whilst removing possible free trade 
distortions. Moreover, it:
“…establishes a tighter regulatory regime for high-risk chemical  
explosives precursors to reduce their accessibility to the general public  
(private individuals)”.309
The Regulation lists seven “restricted explosive precursors” which shall not be made 
available to members of the public above a certain concentration limit except, at the 
discretion of each member state, where they are subject to a licensing or (in the case 
of three of the chemicals) a registration scheme. It then lists a further eight substances 
which, together with the first seven, must be subject to national reporting systems 
for suspicious transactions or attempted transactions, where the sales outlet has 
concerns, having regard to all of the circumstances. Draft guidance produced under 
Article 9(5) gives some indicators of suspicious behaviour, much like the above-
mentioned National Code of Practice in Australia.
308 TCPA at section 3. 
309 European Commission website ec.europa.eu – Home Affairs – “What We Do”.
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The Regulation includes a so-called “safeguard clause”, at Article 13. Where a member 
state has reasonable concerns that a substance not listed may be used to create 
explosives, or a listed substance in different quantities or solutions to those listed may 
be so used, that state may legislate further on its own account, and must immediately 
inform the European Commission and all other member states that it is doing so, and 
the reasons why. 
Like Australia, the EU has clearly wrestled with the difficulty of balancing the threat 
posed by the availability of these chemicals with the desire not to unfairly fetter lawful 
businesses that use them. There is of course, in that context, the need not to restrict 
trade as across member states.
The Review Committee consider that there are two issues within the overall regime 
relating to explosive precursors in Victoria that warrant further consideration.
Firstly, the fact that the reporting duty in this Part of the TCPA does not apply to 
legitimate, or seemingly legitimate, transactions. 
The Review Committee consider that the existence of the licensing regime for SSAN 
is of assistance. It requires police and ASIO checks for persons seeking licences or 
permits to sell, purchase or otherwise deal in SSAN, and requires such dealings to be 
recorded by the vendor, with the objective that all SSAN products be accounted for.  
It is intended that the licensing provisions be regularised soon across Australia. 
However, the purpose of this regularisation appears not to be concerned with 
increasing the security of access to SSAN, but rather the harmonisation of provisions 
to decrease the “red tape” for those requiring licences to deal with SSAN across 
jurisdictions. This in itself is of no assistance to the investigation agencies as an alert 
mechanism where large or otherwise unusual trades in SSAN take place.
The Review Committee share the overall concerns of Victoria Police with regard to 
dealing in SSAN. The purchase or sale of SSAN in circumstances where a person may 
have a licence, but there are circumstances surrounding the transaction that cause a 
concern on the part of the vendor, should be reported to the police, not just recorded 
for future reference.
However, the Review Committee found difficulty in resolving how such a duty on 
retailers, etc., to report might be enforced by way of amendment to Part 4 of the 
TCPA. The difficulty with this option is defining the circumstances in which a failure 
to report a transaction might make it a criminal offence. The mere description of a 
transaction, behaviour or question as “suspicious” is too subjective a test in the view 
of the Review Committee. This same definitional problem would also apply to the 
imposition of stronger licensing conditions on legitimate dealers that could result in the 
loss of the license. 
The Review Committee are of the view that the current position should continue. 
However, the Review Committee request the Commonwealth and State authorities not 
to lose sight of the primary purpose of this regulatory regime, namely the safety of the 
public, rather than the facilitation of transactions in a potentially fatal substance.
The second issue, relates to the fact that the current reporting duty under the terrorism 
provisions applies only to ammonium nitrate. All debates regarding other chemicals of 
security concern have concentrated on whether they should be added to the HCDG 
licensing scheme – the answer has generally been in the negative due to cost or 
compliance difficulties.
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The Review Committee appreciate the difficult balancing exercise that has been 
performed, and will need to continue to be performed, with regard to each of the 
96 chemicals identified. By way of example, hydrogen peroxide is an efficient rocket 
propellant. It is also very commonly used in hairdressing. The compliance cost of 
requiring all hairdressers in Victoria to hold a license under the dangerous goods 
regulations would be considerable.
The National Code of Practice, allied to the National Security Hotline, appears to be an 
efficient compromise. However, compliance is voluntary. Both the terrorism provisions 
and the HCDG regulations are designed to allow for further chemicals to be added 
without difficulty. They would then join SSAN in being reportable under the terrorism 
laws, or at least subject to the licensing regime under the latter provisions. The Review 
Committee note the importance of the need for the components of this regulatory 
regime to be kept under review to ensure their continued effectiveness. 
It follows that the Review Committee consider that these provisions should continue 
and there is no need for them to be amended. 
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12.1 Summary of the legislation
12.1.1 Origin
These provisions formed part of the original TCPA and came into force on 16 April 
2003. They have been the subject of only technical or consequential amendments 
since then.310
12.1.2  Purpose of the provisions
This Part of the TCPA, comprising sections 23 and 24, contains measures to protect 
the confidentiality of sensitive police investigative methods where appropriate. 
The provisions allow for the exemption from disclosure in legal proceedings of 
“counter-terrorism information”. This is defined in section 3 of the TCPA as information 
that relates to the covert methods of investigation used in relation to a terrorist act, or  
a suspected act.
During the second reading debate on the Bill, the shadow Attorney-General said:
“It is a pretty dramatic step to prevent a court from examining any sort of issue, 
or limiting that right, but again I think in the interests of national security and the 
fight against terrorism, it is an appropriate step. It is a balancing act between 
two different evils but in this circumstance it is an appropriate step.” 311
The Leader of the National Party, added:
“…the times dictate that we have to have this sort of material before us.” 312
As the shadow Attorney-General pointed out, the TCPA does not provide a blanket 
protection from disclosure of such information. A case by case decision must be made 
by the Court, balancing the competing public interests of protecting the information 
relating to the covert methods of investigating the terrorist act or suspected act against 
providing an accused person with all the evidence available. The balancing exercise 
required of the Court is comparable to that required under the law relating to public 
interest immunity.
310 Section 54 and Schedule Item 52, Statute Law Amendment (Evidence Consequential Provisions) Act 2009; 
section 97 and Schedule Item 119, Criminal Procedure Amendment (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) 
Act 2009.
311 Victorian Parliament Hansard (Wednesday 19 March 2003) 337.
312 Ibid at page 381.
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In short, if in any legal proceedings313 an issue arises relating to such information, a 
person may be excused from disclosing that evidence if the Court is satisfied that:
•	 The	disclosure	of	it	would	prejudice	the	prevention,	investigation	or	prosecution	of	
an act of terrorism or suspected act; and
•	 The	public	interest	in	preserving	the	confidentiality	of	the	information	outweighs	the	
public interest in its disclosure.314
Section 23(2) sets out some guidelines that the Court must consider in balancing these 
two competing interests, including:
•	 In	a	criminal	proceeding	at	first	instance	or	on	appeal,	which	of	the	parties	is	
seeking disclosure; 
•	 The	nature	of	the	proceedings	and	the	importance	of	the	information	to	the	case;
•	 The	likely	effect	that	disclosure	would	have.
However, the Court is not restricted to those considerations, and may inform itself as it 
sees fit in reaching a decision.
The Court is entitled to inspect any documentary evidence before ruling on it.315
12.2 Operation of the legislation
The Review Committee has not been referred to any instance whereby a court has 
been invited to make a ruling under this provision.
12.3 Submissions
No submissions were received in respect of this Part of the Act.
12.4 Impact of the Charter of Human Rights
One of the basic tenets of the right to a fair trial is that the accused is entitled to know 
the case against him or her. On the other hand, this has to be balanced against the 
need to keep some information from the accused or from the public. This balancing 
exercise is often carried out by the courts in situations where they have to decide 
whether to admit evidence which may be subject to public interest immunity.
In the view of the Review Committee, the right to a fair hearing under section 25 of the 
Charter is engaged. However, taking into account:
•	 The	matters	discussed	at	Section	8.7.5.4	of	this	Report,	and	the	fact	that	the	
Supreme Court may conduct its proceedings as it sees fit, including the manner in 
which it evaluates the evidence once submitted, or the manner in which it affords 
procedural fairness after the application is made; and
313 Defined as including any civil, criminal or mixed proceedings and any inquiry in which evidence is or may be given 
before any court or person acting judicially – section 3, Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958; in other 
words, as stated in the Note to section 23, a civil or criminal proceeding before a court, a coronial inquest or a 
Royal Commission. 
314 TCPA at section 23(1).
315 Ibid at section 24.
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•	 The	fact	that	the	Court	is	given	guidance	at	section	23(2)	on	matters	to	be	taken	
into account in ensuring fairness whilst carrying out the important balancing 
exercise referred to above; and
•	 The	further	fact	that	section	23(3)	makes	it	clear	that	the	Court	may	inform	itself	in	
any way it sees fit, and in doing so, may inspect any document for the purpose of 
deciding whether disclosure should be ordered (section 24),
the Review Committee are of the view that any limitation on an accused person’s right 
to a fair trial resulting from these provisions is reasonable, proportionate and justified.
12.5 Discussion and conclusion
After careful consideration the Review Committee consider that these provisions 
are necessary. Further, the Review Committee consider that they are effective and 
adequate and do not recommend any amendment to them. In the view of the Review 
Committee, the provisions should continue. 
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The Review Committee have covered, to the best of their ability, the matters raised 
by the terms of reference. In particular, the Review Committee have expressed their 
views and stated their conclusions on the adequacy, effectiveness and continuing 
need for the various provisions contained in the TCPA. There is no need to repeat 
them. In assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of the TCPA the Review Committee 
have done so in the context of their assessment of the joint operations conducted 
by Victoria Police with Commonwealth or interstate agencies. The consultations with 
and briefings by agencies have been of great assistance to the Review Committee in 
making this assessment. 
The Review Committee have also considered the effect of the Charter on these 
provisions and expressed their views and conclusions on that effect. Again, there is no 
need to repeat them. 
The Review Committee have also considered the need for amendment to the TCPA 
and have set out their views and conclusions and recommended the amendments that 
they consider should be made. 
The terms of reference require the Review Committee to assess the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the TCPA in the context of joint operations conducted by Victoria Police 
with Commonwealth agencies or agencies from interstate. Having consulted with and 
received comprehensive briefings from Victoria Police, AFP and ASIO, the Review 
Committee are satisfied that adequate measures are in place for inter-jurisdictional 
co-operation and action in relation to terrorism investigations. The Review Committee 
have been provided with examples of that co-operation. It is the view of the Review 
Committee that the agencies are working well in their joint endeavours to combat 
terrorism, and that those endeavours, which are assisted by the TCPA, are effective. 
The Review Committee consider that the effectiveness of joint operations is well 
summed up by the following assessment of His Honour Judge Maidment in his 
submission to this Review:
“Throughout that period I had the pleasure of working closely with officers of 
the Victoria Police, the Australian Federal Police, New South Wales Police and 
ASIO. In my opinion, without the high level of co-operation between those 
organisations, the successful outcomes would not have been achieved.”
“Whilst in the early stages all participants had to familiarise themselves with 
the legislative frameworks in which they were required to operate, it was my 
observation that they did so quickly and effectively.”
His Honour, before being appointed a judge of the County Court, had been involved 
in the prosecution of the Benbrika and Elomar terrorism cases which are referred to in 
Chapter 7 of this Report. 
13 In conclusion
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The Review Committee did not identify any additional power that might be added by 
the Victorian Parliament to the existing powers contained in the TCPA. Victoria Police 
raised the possibility of a control order power being included in the legislation. The 
Review Committee consider that the current position, whereby this necessary power 
is provided by Commonwealth legislation, is adequate and appropriate and there is no 
additional need for such a power to be included in the TCPA. A control order power is 
not contained in any State or Territory legislation.
July 2014
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Terms of Reference
1 Background
Terrorist incidents around the world, including attacks on the World Trade Centre and 
Pentagon in the United States in 2001 and the Bali bombings in 2002, led Australian 
governments to review counter-terrorism measures.
The Commonwealth was referred legislative powers to provide constitutional support 
for terrorism offences that apply uniformly throughout Australia. Victoria enacted the 
Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 (the Act) to cover those areas where 
Victoria continued to have legislative responsibility.
The Act was amended in 2006, pursuant to a Council Of Australian Governments 
agreement to further strengthen Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation, to insert  
Parts 2A (preventative detention orders) and 3A (special police powers). 
2 Purpose
This Review is for the purposes of section 38(1) of the Act, which requires the Minister 
to undertake a review of the operation of this Act and bring a report of the Review 
before each House of the Parliament, no later than 31 December 2014. 
The Act is administered by the Attorney-General, with the exception of Part 4 (Mandatory 
Reporting about Prescribed Chemicals and other Substances – administered by the 
Minister for Police and Emergency Services) and Part 6 (Essential Services Infrastructure 
Risk Management – administered by the Premier). 
The Department of Justice is responsible for overseeing the Review. 
3 Scope
The Review will:
•	 assess the adequacy, effectiveness and continuing need for the Act
•	 identify whether there is a need for amendments to the Act or additional  
powers to mitigate and prevent the risk of terrorist acts
•	 assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the Act in the context of joint  
operations conducted by Victoria Police with Commonwealth agencies  
or agencies from interstate.
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In conducting the Review, the Committee must consider the operation of the Act  
and must draw upon and take into account:
•	 the findings and observations of the 2012 Council Of Australian Governments 
(COAG) Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation conducted by Justice Anthony 
Whealy, Richard Bingham, David Jones, Commander Justine Saunders, Assistant 
Commissioner Mike Condon and Graeme Davidson. The review was tabled in the 
Commonwealth Parliament on 14 May 2013 by the Attorney-General
•	 the agreement of COAG leaders at the Special Meeting on Counter-Terrorism 
on 27 September 2005 that any strengthened counter-terrorism laws must be 
necessary, effective against terrorism and contain appropriate safeguards against 
abuse, and be exercised in a way that is evidence-based, intelligence-led and 
proportionate.
The scope of this Review does not extend to the operation of Part 6 of the Act.  
A separate review of Part 6 has been conducted by the Department of Premier  
and Cabinet and tabled in Parliament.
In conducting the Review, the Review Committee may seek public submissions.
4 The Review Committee
The Review will be conducted by a Review Committee consisting of three members 
with expertise and experience in the areas of policing, intelligence and the law.
The Review Committee members are: 
•	 The Hon David Jones AM, former Judge of the County Court (Chair of the Review 
Committee)
•	 Lieutenant General Mark Evans AO DSC (Retd) 
•	 Kieran Walshe APM, former Deputy Commissioner of Police
Secretariat support will be provided by the Department of Justice. 
5 Reporting
The Review Committee will provide a copy of the final report to the Attorney-General 
for the report to be tabled as per section 38(2).
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e	
re
lia
bi
lit
y	
of
	th
e	
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
its
 
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 s
ou
rc
e;
•	
w
he
th
er
	th
er
e	
is
	a
	
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 a
nd
 
th
e 
ki
nd
s 
of
 th
in
g 
it 
is
 
pr
op
os
ed
 to
 s
ea
rc
h 
fo
r, 
se
iz
e,
 p
ho
to
gr
ap
h,
 e
tc
.;
•	
th
e	
na
tu
re
	a
nd
	g
ra
vi
ty
	o
f	
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
;
•	
th
e	
be
ne
fit
s	
de
riv
ed
	
fro
m
 a
ny
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
co
ve
rt
 
w
ar
ra
nt
s,
 s
ea
rc
h
Th
e 
ju
dg
e 
m
us
t b
e 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 g
ro
un
ds
 fo
r 
be
lie
vi
ng
 th
at
 th
er
e 
is
 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f t
er
ro
ris
m
 a
t 
th
e 
pl
ac
e,
 o
r 
it 
is
 li
ke
ly
 to
 
be
 ta
ke
n 
to
 th
e 
pl
ac
e 
in
 
th
e 
ne
xt
 7
2 
ho
ur
s.
 
Th
e 
ju
dg
e 
m
us
t a
ls
o 
be
 
m
in
df
ul
 o
f t
he
 o
bt
ru
si
ve
 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 c
ov
er
t 
w
ar
ra
nt
, a
nd
 m
us
t i
n 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 c
on
si
de
r:
•	
th
e 	
na
tu
r e
	a
nd
	
se
rio
us
ne
ss
 o
f t
he
 a
ct
 o
f 
te
rr
or
is
m
;
•	
th
e	
ex
te
nt
	to
	w
hi
ch
	
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 w
ou
ld
 
he
lp
 p
re
ve
nt
, d
et
ec
t o
r 
pr
ov
id
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 
ac
t o
f t
er
ro
ris
m
;
Th
e 
ju
dg
e 
m
us
t b
e 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
:
•	
th
er
e	
ar
e	
re
as
on
ab
le
	
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t’ s
 s
us
pi
ci
on
s;
•	
co
ns
id
er
in
g	
th
e	
na
tu
re
	
an
d 
se
rio
us
ne
ss
 o
f 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
, a
nd
 
w
he
th
er
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
fin
di
ng
 th
e 
th
in
g 
or
 c
la
ss
 
of
 th
in
gs
 s
ou
gh
t, 
th
e 
is
su
e 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 is
 
ju
st
ifi
ed
; a
nd
•	
(if
 a
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
w
ar
ra
nt
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
m
ad
e 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 
3 
m
on
th
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
pl
ac
e)
 th
at
 th
e 
ne
w
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
co
nt
ai
ns
 
ne
w
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
hi
ch
, 
to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 th
e
Th
e 
ju
dg
e 
m
us
t b
e 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 g
ro
un
ds
 fo
r 
is
su
in
g.
In
 d
oi
ng
 s
o,
 th
e 
ju
dg
e 
m
us
t c
on
si
de
r:
•	
th
e	
re
lia
bi
lit
y	
of
	th
e	
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f i
ts
 s
ou
r c
e;
•	
w
he
th
er
	th
er
e	
is
	a
	
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 a
nd
 
th
e 
ki
nd
s 
of
 th
in
g 
it 
is
 
pr
op
os
ed
 to
 s
ea
rc
h 
fo
r, 
se
iz
e,
 p
ho
to
gr
ap
h,
 e
tc
.;
•	
th
e	
na
tu
re
	a
nd
	g
ra
vi
ty
	o
f	
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
;
•	
th
e 	
ex
te
nt
	to
	w
hi
ch
	th
e	
ex
ec
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 
w
ou
ld
 a
ss
is
t i
n 
th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
, o
r
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C
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91
4
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
2
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
an
d
 
R
es
p
o
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
A
ct
 2
00
0
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
 
so
ug
ht
 m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
on
 th
e 
pr
iv
ac
y 
of
 th
e 
oc
cu
pi
er
(s
) o
f t
he
 
re
le
va
nt
 p
re
m
is
es
;
•	
an
y	
co
nd
iti
on
s	
(o
r	
re
st
ric
tio
ns
) t
ha
t m
ig
ht
 
be
 p
la
ce
d 
on
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 if
 g
ra
nt
ed
; a
nd
•	
an
y 	
su
bm
is
si
on
s	
m
ad
e	
by
 th
e 
P
IM
.
•	
th
e	
ex
te
nt
	to
	w
hi
ch
	
th
e 
ex
ec
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 w
ou
ld
 a
ss
is
t i
n 
th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
, o
r 
th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
, t
he
 a
ct
;
•	
an
y	
al
te
rn
at
iv
e	
m
ea
ns
	o
f	
ob
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
so
ug
ht
;
•	
th
e 	
ex
te
nt
	to
	w
hi
ch
	th
e	
pr
iv
ac
y 
of
 s
om
eo
ne
 n
ot
 
kn
ow
in
gl
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 
th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 
ac
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
af
fe
ct
ed
;
•	
if 	
au
th
or
is
at
io
n	
is
	s
ou
gh
t	
to
 e
nt
er
 a
n 
ad
jo
in
in
g 
pl
ac
e,
 w
he
th
er
 it
 is
 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 e
na
bl
e 
ac
ce
ss
 o
r 
to
 
av
oi
d 
co
m
pr
om
is
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n;
 a
nd
•	
w
he
th
er
	a
ny
	o
th
er
	
co
nd
iti
on
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pl
ac
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
.
•	
th
e 
be
ne
fit
s 
de
riv
ed
 
fro
m
 a
ny
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
co
ve
rt
 w
ar
ra
nt
s,
 s
ea
rc
h 
w
ar
ra
nt
s 
or
 s
ur
ve
illa
nc
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
s 
is
su
ed
 in
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 o
r 
pl
ac
e;
•	
th
e 	
ex
te
nt
	to
	w
hi
ch
	th
e	
po
lic
e 
ha
ve
 u
se
d,
 o
r 
ca
n 
us
e,
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
l 
po
lic
in
g 
m
et
ho
ds
, a
nd
 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
l 
m
et
ho
ds
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 h
el
p 
in
 th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
or
 p
re
ju
di
ce
 
it;
 a
nd
•	
an
y 	
su
bm
is
si
on
s	
of
	th
e	
P
IM
.
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n,
 
ju
st
ifi
es
 is
su
in
g 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
.
Ju
dg
e 
m
us
t a
ls
o 
be
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 is
 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 fo
r:
•	
fa
ci
lit
at
in
g 	
th
e	
en
try
	o
r	
se
ar
ch
;
•	
pr
ev
en
tin
g	
th
e	
se
ar
ch
	
be
in
g 
fru
st
ra
te
d 
or
 
je
op
ar
di
se
d;
 o
r
•	
fo
r	a
ny
	o
th
er
	g
oo
d	
re
as
on
.
 
re
sp
on
se
 to
, t
he
 a
ct
;
•	
al
te
rn
at
iv
e	
m
ea
ns
	o
f	
ob
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
so
ug
ht
;
•	
th
e	
ex
te
nt
	to
	w
hi
ch
	th
e	
pr
iv
ac
y 
of
 s
om
eo
ne
 n
ot
 
kn
ow
in
gl
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 
th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 
ac
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
af
fe
ct
ed
;
•	
if	
au
th
or
is
at
io
n	
is
	s
ou
gh
t	
to
 e
nt
er
 a
n 
ad
jo
in
in
g 
pl
ac
e,
 w
he
th
er
 it
 is
 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 e
na
bl
e 
ac
ce
ss
 o
r 
to
 
av
oi
d 
co
m
pr
om
is
in
g 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n;
•	
w
he
th
er
	a
ny
	c
on
di
tio
ns
	
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pl
ac
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
.
D
ur
at
io
n 
o
f 
w
ar
ra
nt
N
/A
A
s 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, 
bu
t n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
.
A
s 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, 
bu
t n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
.
A
s 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, 
bu
t n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
.
A
s 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, 
bu
t n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
.
A
s 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, 
bu
t n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 3
0 
da
ys
.
E
xt
en
si
o
n 
o
f 
w
ar
ra
nt
N
/A
N
o,
 b
ut
 a
 fu
rt
he
r 
w
ar
ra
nt
 
m
ay
 b
e 
is
su
ed
 o
ve
r 
sa
m
e 
pr
em
is
es
.
N
o 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
Ye
s,
 m
ay
 b
e 
ex
te
nd
ed
 
fro
m
 ti
m
e 
to
 ti
m
e.
N
o,
 b
ut
 a
 fu
rt
he
r 
w
ar
ra
nt
 
m
ay
 b
e 
is
su
ed
 o
ve
r 
sa
m
e 
pr
em
is
es
.
N
o
C
o
nt
en
ts
 o
f 
w
ar
ra
nt
N
/A
M
us
t c
on
ta
in
:
•	
th
e	
ad
dr
es
s	
or
	lo
ca
tio
n	
of
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
re
m
is
es
;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	th
e	
ap
pl
ic
an
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
na
m
es
 (o
r 
a 
de
sc
rip
tio
n)
 
of
 a
ny
on
e 
el
se
 w
ho
 w
ill 
ta
ke
 p
ar
t i
n 
en
fo
rc
in
g 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
th
e	
da
te
	o
f	i
ss
ue
	o
f	t
he
	
w
ar
ra
nt
, a
nd
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 it
 w
ill 
re
m
ai
n 
in
 
fo
rc
e;
M
us
t c
on
ta
in
:
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	th
e	
ap
pl
ic
an
t;
•	
th
e	
ad
dr
es
s	
or
	o
th
er
	
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t p
re
m
is
es
;
•	
th
e 	
na
m
e	
of
	a
ny
	p
er
so
n	
be
lie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
kn
ow
in
gl
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 a
ct
, 
or
 if
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
er
so
n 
oc
cu
pi
es
 th
e 
pl
ac
e,
 a
ny
 
kn
ow
n 
oc
cu
pi
er
;
M
us
t c
on
ta
in
:
•	
co
nfi
rm
at
io
n	
th
at
	a
n	
of
fic
er
 m
ay
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
co
ve
rt
 s
ea
r c
h 
po
w
er
s 
un
de
r 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
de
ta
ils
	o
f	t
he
	te
rro
ris
m
	
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 
w
as
 is
su
ed
;
•	
an
y	
ev
id
en
ce
	th
at
	m
ay
	
be
 s
ei
ze
d;
•	
co
nfi
rm
at
io
n	
th
at
	
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 m
ay
 b
e 
ex
er
ci
se
d 
at
 a
ny
 ti
m
e 
of
 
da
y 
or
 n
ig
ht
;
M
us
t c
on
ta
in
:
•	
th
e	
na
m
e,
	ra
nk
	a
nd
	
nu
m
be
r 
of
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t;
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	th
e	
ta
rg
et
 p
la
ce
;
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	th
e	
th
in
g	
or
 c
la
ss
 o
f t
hi
ng
 th
at
 
m
ay
 b
e 
se
ar
ch
ed
 fo
r 
an
d 
se
iz
ed
;
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	a
ny
	
pl
ac
e,
 a
dj
oi
ni
ng
 th
e 
ta
rg
et
 p
la
ce
, e
nt
ry
 to
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
ut
ho
ris
ed
;
M
us
t c
on
ta
in
:
•	
th
e	
na
m
e,
	ra
nk
	a
nd
	
nu
m
be
r 
of
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t;
•	
th
e	
ad
dr
es
s	
or
	o
th
er
	
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t p
la
ce
;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	a
ny
	p
er
so
n	
be
lie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
kn
ow
in
gl
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 a
ct
, 
or
 if
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
er
so
n 
oc
cu
pi
es
 th
e 
pl
ac
e,
 a
ny
 
kn
ow
n 
oc
cu
pi
er
;
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ta
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C
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 A
ct
 1
91
4
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
2
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
an
d
 
R
es
p
o
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
A
ct
 2
00
0
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
•	
th
e	
na
m
e(
s)
	o
f	t
he
	
oc
cu
pi
er
(s
) o
f t
he
 
re
le
va
nt
 p
re
m
is
es
, i
f 
kn
ow
n;
•	
w
he
th
er
	th
e	
w
ar
ra
nt
	
au
th
or
is
es
 m
or
e 
th
an
 
on
e 
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 e
nt
ry
;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
,	o
r	a
	
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
, t
he
 s
or
t 
of
 th
in
g 
th
at
 is
 b
ei
ng
 
se
ar
ch
ed
 fo
r , 
or
 s
ei
ze
d,
 
or
 p
ho
to
gr
ap
he
d,
 e
tc
.; 
an
d
•	
an
y 	
co
nd
iti
on
s	
pl
ac
ed
	
on
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
.
•	
a 	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	th
e	
ki
nd
	
of
 th
in
g 
th
at
 m
ay
 b
e 
se
ar
ch
ed
 fo
r, 
se
iz
ed
, 
co
pi
ed
, r
ep
la
ce
d,
 e
tc
.;
•	
th
e	
da
te
	o
f	i
ss
ue
;
•	
th
e	
ex
pi
ry
	d
at
e;
•	
an
y	
co
nd
iti
on
s	
im
po
se
d	
on
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
; a
nd
•	
an
y	
ot
he
r	m
at
te
r	
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
(n
o 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 fo
un
d)
.
•	
co
nfi
rm
at
io
n 	
th
at
,	i
f	
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
, t
he
 s
ea
rc
h 
m
us
t b
e 
vi
de
ot
ap
ed
;
•	
th
e	
st
ar
t	a
nd
	e
nd
	ti
m
e	
an
d 
da
te
.
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	a
ny
th
in
g	
au
th
or
is
ed
 to
 b
e 
re
m
ov
ed
 a
nd
 re
pl
ac
ed
;
•	
if 	
re
-e
nt
ry
	is
	a
ut
ho
ris
ed
	
to
 re
tu
rn
 a
 th
in
g 
re
m
ov
ed
 o
r 
to
 re
tr
ie
ve
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 s
ub
st
itu
te
d,
 a
 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
th
in
g;
•	
an
y 	
ot
he
r	t
er
m
s	
an
d	
co
nd
iti
on
s 
pl
ac
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
th
e	
ex
pi
ry
	d
at
e;
•	
th
e	
da
te
	a
nd
	ti
m
e	
of
	
is
su
e.
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	th
e	
ki
nd
	
of
 th
in
g 
th
at
 m
ay
 b
e 
se
ar
ch
ed
 fo
r, 
se
iz
ed
, 
co
pi
ed
, r
ep
la
ce
d,
 e
tc
.;
•	
if	
re
-e
nt
ry
	is
	a
ut
ho
ris
ed
	
to
 re
tu
rn
 a
 th
in
g 
re
m
ov
ed
 o
r 
to
 re
tr
ie
ve
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 s
ub
st
itu
te
d,
 a
 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
th
in
g;
•	
th
e 	
da
te
	a
nd
	ti
m
e	
of
	
is
su
e;
•	
th
e	
ex
pi
ry
	d
at
e;
•	
an
y	
co
nd
iti
on
s	
im
po
se
d	
on
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
; a
nd
•	
an
y	
ot
he
r	m
at
te
r	
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 r e
gu
la
tio
ns
 
(n
o 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 fo
un
d)
.
P
o
w
er
s 
th
at
 m
ay
 b
e 
ex
er
ci
se
d
Th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
ay
:
•	
se
ar
ch
	fo
r	t
he
	th
in
g;
	a
nd
•	
se
iz
e	
th
e	
th
in
g.
If 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 fi
nd
s 
a 
di
ffe
re
nt
 th
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 h
e 
or
 
sh
e 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 s
us
pe
ct
s 
to
 b
e 
re
le
va
nt
 to
 a
no
th
er
 
of
fe
nc
e,
 th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
ay
 
se
cu
re
 th
e 
pr
em
is
es
 
pe
nd
in
g 
an
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
a 
se
ar
ch
 w
ar
ra
nt
.
Th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
ay
 a
ls
o 
se
iz
e 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
th
in
g,
 o
r 
do
 a
ny
th
in
g 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
pr
em
is
es
 s
af
e,
 if
 h
e 
or
 s
he
 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 s
us
pe
ct
s 
th
at
 it
 
is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
:
•	
to
	p
r o
te
ct
	a
	p
er
so
n’
s	
lif
e,
	
he
al
th
 o
r 
sa
fe
ty
; a
nd
•	
th
e	
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s	
ar
e	
se
rio
us
 a
nd
 u
rg
en
t.
A
ut
ho
ris
es
 th
e 
of
fic
er
, 
pl
us
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 p
er
so
n 
na
m
ed
 o
r 
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, a
nd
 w
ith
 a
ny
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
to
 e
nt
er
 th
e 
pr
em
is
es
, 
an
y 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 a
dj
oi
ni
ng
 
pr
em
is
es
 o
r 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
pr
em
is
es
 w
hi
ch
 p
ro
vi
de
 
an
 a
cc
es
s 
ro
ut
e 
to
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t o
f 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
.
E
nt
ry
 b
y 
fo
rc
e,
 o
r 
by
 im
pe
rs
on
at
io
n 
is
 
pe
rm
itt
ed
.
Th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
ay
 th
en
:
•	
se
ar
ch
	fo
r	i
te
m
s	
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
se
iz
e	
th
os
e	
ite
m
s;
•	
re
pl
ac
e	
an
y	
ite
m
	s
o	
se
iz
ed
;
•	
co
py
,	p
ho
to
gr
ap
h	
or
	
de
sc
rib
e 
in
 w
rit
in
g 
or
 
sk
et
ch
es
 th
e 
th
in
g 
na
m
ed
 o
r 
de
sc
rib
ed
;
A
ut
ho
ris
es
 th
e 
of
fic
er
 to
:
•	
en
te
r	c
ov
er
tly
;
•	
im
pe
rs
on
at
e;
•	
us
e	
su
ch
	fo
rc
e	
as
	is
	
re
as
on
ab
ly
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 
en
te
r 
an
d 
se
ar
ch
;
•	
se
ar
ch
	fo
r	t
he
	k
in
d	
of
 th
in
g 
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
br
ea
k	
op
en
	a
ny
	
re
ce
pt
ac
le
; a
nd
•	
do
	a
ny
th
in
g	
th
at
	is
	
re
as
on
ab
le
 to
 c
on
ce
al
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 d
on
e 
fr o
m
 th
e 
oc
cu
pi
er
.
If 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 s
pe
ci
fic
al
ly
 
au
th
or
is
es
 it
, t
he
 o
ffi
ce
r 
m
ay
:
•	
en
te
r	a
	s
pe
ci
fie
d	
ad
jo
in
in
g 
pl
ac
e 
(w
ith
 
fo
rc
e 
if 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y)
 fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f e
nt
er
in
g 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t p
la
ce
;
A
ut
ho
ris
es
 th
e 
of
fic
er
 to
:
•	
en
te
r	c
ov
er
tly
	o
r	t
hr
ou
gh
	
su
bt
er
fu
ge
, a
s 
of
te
n 
as
 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
an
d 
to
 s
ta
y 
fo
r 
as
 
lo
ng
 a
s 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y;
•	
pa
ss
	o
ve
r ,	
th
r o
ug
h,
	
al
on
g 
or
 u
nd
er
 a
no
th
er
 
pl
ac
e 
to
 e
nt
er
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
la
ce
;
•	
se
ar
ch
	fo
r	a
ny
th
in
g	
so
ug
ht
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
op
en
	a
ny
th
in
g	
th
at
	is
	
lo
ck
ed
;
•	
se
iz
e 	
an
yt
hi
ng
	fo
un
d	
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
of
fic
er
 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 b
el
ie
ve
s 
is
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
te
rr
or
is
m
;
•	
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
	a
ny
th
in
g	
fo
un
d 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
of
fic
er
 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 b
el
ie
ve
s 
m
ay
 
pr
ov
id
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
te
rr
or
is
m
;
A
ut
ho
ris
es
 a
ny
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 to
 e
xe
cu
te
 p
rim
ar
y 
po
w
er
s,
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 to
:
•	
en
te
r 
co
ve
rt
ly
;
•	
im
pe
rs
on
at
e;
•	
se
ar
ch
	fo
r	a
nd
	s
ei
ze
	th
e	
th
in
g 
or
 c
la
ss
 o
f t
hi
ng
 
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
se
iz
e	
an
yt
hi
ng
	fo
un
d	
no
t c
on
ne
ct
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 b
ut
 w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 r e
as
on
ab
ly
 
su
sp
ec
ts
 to
 b
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 
re
le
va
nt
 to
 a
 s
er
io
us
 
in
di
ct
ab
le
 o
ffe
nc
e;
•	
do
	a
	b
as
ic
	o
r	s
tri
p	
se
ar
ch
 o
f a
ny
on
e 
in
 
th
e 
pl
ac
e 
at
 th
e 
tim
e 
of
 e
xe
cu
tio
n 
fo
r 
an
y 
th
in
g 
or
 c
la
ss
 o
f t
hi
ng
 
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
.
If 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 e
xp
re
ss
ly
 
au
th
or
is
es
 it
, t
he
 o
ffi
ce
r 
m
ay
:
P
ow
er
s 
au
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
 
co
nf
er
re
d 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
en
te
r	c
ov
er
tly
;
•	
im
pe
rs
on
at
e;
•	
us
e	
su
ch
	fo
r c
e	
as
	is
	
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 e
nt
er
 a
nd
 
se
ar
ch
;
•	
se
ar
ch
	fo
r	a
ny
	k
in
d	
of
 th
in
g 
or
 c
la
ss
 o
f 
th
in
g 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
br
ea
k	
op
en
	a
ny
	
re
ce
pt
ac
le
;
•	
se
iz
e	
an
d	
de
ta
in
	a
ny
	
ot
he
r 
th
in
g 
fo
un
d 
th
at
 
is
 c
on
ne
ct
ed
 w
ith
 
a 
se
rio
us
 in
di
ct
ab
le
 
of
fe
nc
e.
A
dd
iti
on
al
 p
ow
er
s,
 if
 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 e
xp
r e
ss
ly
 
au
th
or
is
es
, a
re
 to
:
•	
en
te
r	a
	s
pe
ci
fie
d	
ad
jo
in
in
g 
pl
ac
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f e
nt
er
in
g 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t p
la
ce
;
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P
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R
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p
o
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
A
ct
 2
00
0
Te
rr
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P
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w
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 A
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Te
rr
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sm
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m
er
g
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P
o
w
er
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 A
ct
 2
00
3
Th
e 
of
fic
er
 a
nd
 a
ny
 
as
si
st
in
g 
of
fic
er
 m
ay
 
us
e 
su
ch
 fo
rc
e 
ag
ai
ns
t 
pe
rs
on
s 
or
 th
in
gs
 a
s 
is
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
an
d 
re
as
on
ab
le
. 
A
ny
 p
er
so
n 
as
si
st
in
g 
w
ho
 
is
 n
ot
 a
n 
of
fic
er
 m
ay
 u
se
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 fo
rc
e 
ag
ai
ns
t 
th
in
gs
.
•	
us
e 	
an
y	
el
ec
tro
ni
c	
eq
ui
pm
en
t f
or
 th
e 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f s
uc
h 
co
py
in
g,
 e
tc
.; 
an
d
•	
te
st
	o
r	k
ee
p	
a	
sa
m
pl
e	
of
 a
ny
th
in
g 
fo
un
d 
as
 
na
m
ed
 o
r 
de
sc
rib
ed
.
•	
se
iz
e	
an
d	
de
ta
in
	a
	th
in
g	
of
 a
 k
in
d 
de
sc
rib
ed
 
or
 a
no
th
er
 re
le
va
nt
 
th
in
g,
 to
 re
pl
ac
e 
a 
th
in
g 
se
iz
ed
, o
r 
to
 s
ei
ze
 a
nd
 
de
ta
in
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 th
in
g 
fo
un
d 
co
nn
ec
te
d 
w
ith
 
a 
se
rio
us
 in
di
ct
ab
le
 
of
fe
nc
e;
•	
co
py
, 	p
ho
to
gr
ap
h	
or
	
re
co
rd
 a
 th
in
g 
of
 a
 k
in
d 
de
sc
rib
ed
 o
r 
an
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 th
in
g;
•	
op
er
at
e 	
an
y	
el
ec
tr o
ni
c	
eq
ui
pm
en
t f
ou
nd
 
on
 th
e 
pr
em
is
es
, 
an
d 
to
 p
rin
t, 
co
py
 o
r 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
r e
co
rd
 fr
om
 
th
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
 th
in
g 
of
 a
 k
in
d 
de
sc
rib
ed
 o
r 
an
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 th
in
g;
•	
te
st
	a
	th
in
g	
of
	a
	k
in
d	
de
sc
rib
ed
 o
r 
an
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 th
in
g.
Th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 m
ay
 e
xp
re
ss
ly
 
au
th
or
is
e 
re
-e
nt
ry
 fo
r 
re
tu
rn
in
g 
a 
th
in
g 
re
m
ov
ed
 
or
 re
tr
ie
vi
ng
 a
 th
in
g 
su
bs
tit
ut
ed
, w
ith
in
 7
 d
ay
s 
of
 fi
rs
t e
nt
ry
 o
r 
su
ch
 lo
ng
er
 
pe
rio
d 
as
 th
e 
ju
dg
e 
al
lo
w
s.
•	
in
sp
ec
t 	o
r	t
es
t	a
ny
th
in
g	
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
pl
ac
e.
A
dd
iti
on
al
 p
ow
er
s 
if 
ex
pr
es
sl
y 
au
th
or
is
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 a
r e
 to
:
•	
ta
ke
	a
	th
in
g	
se
iz
ed
	to
	
an
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 p
la
ce
 fo
r 
te
st
in
g 
fo
r 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
te
rr
or
is
m
;
•	
in
	re
sp
ec
t	o
f	a
ny
	v
eh
ic
le
	
en
te
re
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, i
f t
he
 o
ffi
ce
r 
r e
as
on
ab
ly
 s
us
pe
ct
s 
it 
ha
s 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 
te
rr
or
is
m
 in
 o
r 
on
 it
, 
- 
se
iz
e 
th
e 
ve
hi
cl
e;
- 
ta
ke
 it
 to
 a
 p
la
ce
 w
ith
 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
fo
r 
se
ar
ch
in
g 
it;
- 
re
m
ov
e 
pa
rt
s 
of
 
th
e 
ve
hi
cl
e 
(p
an
el
s,
 
lin
in
gs
, e
tc
.) 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 s
ea
r c
hi
ng
 
it;
 a
nd
- 
se
ar
ch
 it
 fo
r 
ev
id
en
ce
 
of
 te
rr
or
is
m
.
•	
en
te
r	b
ut
	n
ot
	s
ea
rc
h	
an
	
ad
jo
in
in
g 
pl
ac
e 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
re
m
ov
e 	
a	
th
in
g	
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 
fro
m
 th
e 
ta
rg
et
 p
la
ce
 
an
d 
r e
pl
ac
e 
it;
•	
re
-e
nt
er
	to
	re
tu
rn
	a
	th
in
g	
re
m
ov
ed
 o
r 
to
 re
tr
ie
ve
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 s
ub
st
itu
te
d,
 
w
ith
in
 7
 d
ay
s 
of
 fi
rs
t 
en
tr
y 
(o
r 
lo
ng
er
 if
 
au
th
or
is
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
ju
dg
e)
.
If 
an
 a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 re
-e
nt
ry
 
oc
cu
rs
 a
s 
ab
ov
e,
 a
ll 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
of
fic
er
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
re
-e
nt
ry
.
Th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 a
ls
o 
au
th
or
is
es
 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 to
 e
xe
cu
te
 
an
ci
lla
ry
 p
ow
er
s 
to
:
•	
ta
ke
	a
nd
	u
se
	a
ny
	
eq
ui
pm
en
t o
r 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s;
•	
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
	o
r	o
th
er
w
is
e	
m
ak
e 
a 
re
co
rd
 o
f 
an
yt
hi
ng
 in
 th
e 
ta
rg
et
 
pl
ac
e;
•	
co
nd
uc
t 	a
	fo
re
ns
ic
	te
st
	
in
 th
e 
ta
rg
et
 p
la
ce
;
•	
m
ak
e	
re
as
on
ab
le
	u
se
	o
f	
an
y 
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
or
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
in
 th
e 
pl
ac
e 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 e
xe
r c
is
e 
an
y 
po
w
er
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 –
 m
ay
 a
ls
o 
or
de
r 
an
yo
ne
 in
 th
e 
pl
ac
e 
to
 
do
 a
ny
th
in
g 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
to
 fa
ci
lit
at
e 
th
at
 u
se
 o
r 
to
 
op
er
at
e 
th
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
or
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s;
•	
se
iz
e 	
an
d	
de
ta
in
	a
	th
in
g	
of
 a
 k
in
d 
de
sc
rib
ed
 
in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 o
r 
an
y 
re
le
va
nt
 th
in
g;
•	
re
pl
ac
e	
so
m
et
hi
ng
	
se
iz
ed
;
•	
co
py
,	p
ho
to
gr
ap
h,
	e
tc
.	a
	
th
in
g 
of
 a
 k
in
d 
de
sc
rib
ed
 
in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 o
r 
an
y 
re
le
va
nt
 th
in
g;
•	
op
er
at
e 	
an
y	
el
ec
tro
ni
c 	
eq
ui
pm
en
t f
ou
nd
 o
n 
th
e 
pr
em
is
es
;
•	
pr
in
t,	
co
py
	o
r	o
th
er
w
is
e	
re
co
rd
 fr
om
 th
e 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
 th
in
g 
of
 a
 
ki
nd
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 o
r 
an
y 
re
le
va
nt
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n;
 o
r
•	
te
st
	a
	th
in
g	
of
	a
	k
in
d	
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 
or
 a
ny
 re
le
va
nt
 th
in
g.
Th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 m
ay
 e
xp
r e
ss
ly
 
au
th
or
is
e 
re
-e
nt
ry
 fo
r 
re
tu
rn
in
g 
a 
th
in
g 
re
m
ov
ed
 
or
 re
tr
ie
vi
ng
 a
 th
in
g 
su
bs
tit
ut
ed
, w
ith
in
 7
 d
ay
s 
of
 fi
rs
t e
nt
ry
 o
r 
su
ch
 lo
ng
er
 
pe
rio
d 
as
 ju
dg
e 
al
lo
w
s.
 A
ll 
po
w
er
s 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
as
 a
bo
ve
 
on
 a
 re
-e
nt
ry
.
If 
an
 o
ffi
ce
r 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 
be
lie
ve
s 
it 
is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 d
o 
so
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 a
ny
 
pe
rs
on
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
of
fic
er
, i
n 
re
sp
ec
t o
f 
an
yo
ne
 in
 o
r 
ne
ar
 th
e 
pl
ac
e 
du
rin
g 
its
 e
xe
cu
tio
n,
 
to
:
•	
de
ta
in
	a
ny
on
e	
in
	th
e	
pl
ac
e;
•	
do
	a
	b
as
ic
	o
r	s
tri
p	
se
ar
ch
 o
f t
ha
t p
er
so
n;
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ro
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Te
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P
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 A
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P
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R
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ra
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ar
y 
P
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w
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Te
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sm
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P
o
w
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 A
ct
 2
00
3
•	
op
er
at
e	
an
y	
de
vi
ce
	o
r	
eq
ui
pm
en
t i
n 
th
e 
pl
ac
e 
to
 g
ai
n 
ac
ce
ss
 to
, 
re
co
ve
r 
or
 re
pr
od
uc
e 
an
y 
re
co
rd
, o
r 
or
de
r 
an
y 
oc
cu
pi
er
 to
 d
o 
so
.
If 
an
 o
ffi
ce
r 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 
su
sp
ec
ts
 it
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 d
o 
so
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 a
ny
 
pe
rs
on
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
of
fic
er
, w
hi
ls
t t
he
 w
ar
ra
nt
 is
 
be
in
g 
ex
ec
ut
ed
, t
o:
•	
de
ta
in
	a
ny
on
e	
in
	th
e	
pl
ac
e;
•	
do
	a
	b
as
ic
	o
r	s
tri
p	
se
ar
ch
 o
f t
ha
t p
er
so
n;
•	
or
de
r	t
he
	p
er
so
n	
to
	
le
av
e,
 o
r 
no
t t
o 
en
te
r, 
th
e 
pl
ac
e 
or
 it
s 
vi
ci
ni
ty
; 
an
d
•	
se
iz
e	
an
d	
re
ta
in
	a
ny
	
w
ea
po
n 
or
 d
an
ge
ro
us
 
th
in
g 
in
 th
e 
pl
ac
e.
•	
or
de
r	t
he
	p
er
so
n	
to
	
le
av
e,
 o
r 
no
t t
o 
en
te
r, 
th
e 
pl
ac
e 
or
 it
s 
vi
ci
ni
ty
; 
an
d
•	
se
iz
e	
an
d	
re
ta
in
	a
ny
	
w
ea
po
n 
or
 d
an
ge
ro
us
 
th
in
g 
in
 th
e 
pl
ac
e.
R
ep
o
rt
in
g
 t
o
 
th
e 
C
o
ur
t
N
/A
Th
e 
pe
rs
on
 e
xe
cu
tin
g 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 m
us
t r
ep
or
t b
ac
k 
to
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 w
ith
in
 7
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f t
he
 w
ar
ra
nt
 
on
: 
•	
w
hi
ch
	p
ow
er
s	
w
er
e	
ex
er
ci
se
d;
•	
w
hi
ch
	c
on
di
tio
ns
	o
n	
th
e	
w
ar
ra
nt
 w
er
e 
co
m
pl
ie
d 
w
ith
, a
nd
 h
ow
;
•	
th
e	
pe
rio
d	
du
rin
g	
w
hi
ch
	
th
e 
en
tr
y 
an
d 
se
ar
ch
 
w
er
e 
co
nd
uc
te
d;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
,	o
r	a
	
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
, a
ny
 
pe
rs
on
 w
ho
 e
nt
er
ed
 th
e 
pr
em
is
es
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
Th
e 
pe
rs
on
 e
xe
cu
tin
g 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 m
us
t r
ep
or
t b
ac
k 
to
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 w
ith
in
 1
0 
da
ys
 o
f t
he
 e
xe
cu
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 o
n:
 
•	
th
e	
da
te
	o
f	e
xe
cu
tio
n;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	th
e	
pe
rs
on
	
w
ho
 e
xe
cu
te
d 
an
d 
an
yo
ne
 a
ss
is
tin
g;
•	
th
e 	
na
m
e	
of
	a
ny
	p
er
so
n	
be
lie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
kn
ow
in
gl
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 a
ct
, 
or
 if
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
er
so
n 
oc
cu
pi
es
 th
e 
pl
ac
e,
 a
ny
 
kn
ow
n 
oc
cu
pi
er
;
•	
th
e	
po
w
er
s	
ex
er
ci
se
d;
•	
th
e	
re
su
lt	
of
	th
e	
ex
ec
ut
io
n;
Th
e 
of
fic
er
 is
su
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 o
r 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 w
ho
 
pr
im
ar
ily
 e
xe
cu
te
d 
it 
m
us
t 
re
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 o
r 
th
e 
P
IM
 (w
ho
 m
ay
 th
en
 r e
fe
r 
it 
to
 th
e 
ju
dg
e)
, a
s 
st
at
ed
 in
 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, w
ith
in
 7
 d
ay
s 
of
 e
xe
cu
tio
n.
M
us
t t
ak
e 
al
on
g 
an
yt
hi
ng
 
se
iz
ed
 o
r 
an
y 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
 
ta
ke
n.
 T
he
 ju
dg
e 
m
ay
 
or
de
r 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 w
ha
t t
o 
do
 w
ith
 th
e 
th
in
g 
se
iz
ed
 o
r 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
 ta
ke
n.
Th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t m
us
t r
ep
or
t 
ba
ck
 to
 th
e 
is
su
in
g 
ju
dg
e 
or
 C
hi
ef
 J
us
tic
e 
w
ith
in
 7
 
da
ys
 o
f e
xe
cu
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 o
n:
•	
th
e 	
da
te
	a
nd
	ti
m
e	
of
	
ex
ec
ut
io
n;
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	e
ac
h	
pl
ac
e 
en
te
re
d;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e(
s)
	o
f	a
ny
	
oc
cu
pi
er
(s
) p
re
se
nt
, i
f 
kn
ow
n;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	th
e	
pe
rs
on
	
ex
ec
ut
in
g 
an
d 
of
 a
ny
on
e 
w
ho
 a
ss
is
te
d 
in
 th
e 
ex
ec
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
w
hi
ch
	p
ow
er
s	
w
er
e	
ex
er
ci
se
d;
Th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t m
us
t r
ep
or
t 
ba
ck
 to
 th
e 
ju
dg
e 
w
ith
in
 
10
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
ex
ec
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 o
n,
 o
r 
if 
no
t 
ex
ec
ut
ed
, w
ith
in
 1
0 
da
ys
 
of
 th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 d
at
e 
on
:
•	
th
e 	
ad
dr
es
s 	
or
	o
th
er
	
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pl
ac
e;
•	
w
he
th
er
	o
r	n
ot
	th
e	
w
ar
ra
nt
 w
as
 e
xe
cu
te
d;
 
an
d
•	
an
y	
ot
he
r	p
ar
tic
ul
ar
s	
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
(n
o 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 fo
un
d)
.
If 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 w
as
 
ex
ec
ut
ed
, t
he
 re
po
rt
 m
us
t 
in
cl
ud
e:
•	
th
e	
da
te
	o
f	e
xe
cu
tio
n;
151
C
o
m
m
o
nw
ea
lth
V
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ri
a
N
S
W
Q
ue
en
sl
an
d
W
es
te
rn
 A
us
tr
al
ia
N
o
rt
he
rn
 T
er
ri
to
ry
S
ta
tu
te
C
ri
m
es
 A
ct
 1
91
4
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
2
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
an
d
 
R
es
p
o
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
A
ct
 2
00
0
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
•	
th
e	
na
m
e(
s)
	o
f	t
he
	
oc
cu
pi
er
(s
) o
f t
he
 
pr
em
is
es
 e
nt
er
ed
, i
f 
kn
ow
n;
 
•	
de
ta
ils
	o
f	a
ny
	a
ct
iv
ity
	
un
de
rt
ak
en
 in
 th
e 
ex
ec
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 
(s
uc
h 
as
 a
ny
 s
ei
zu
re
, 
ite
m
 re
pl
ac
em
en
t, 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
in
g,
 e
tc
.);
 
an
d
•	
an
	a
na
ly
si
s	
of
	a
ny
	
be
ne
fit
 th
at
 w
as
 d
er
iv
ed
 
fro
m
 th
e 
is
su
e 
an
d 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
 w
ar
ra
nt
, 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 a
ny
 a
ct
 
or
 s
us
pe
ct
ed
 a
ct
 o
f 
te
rr
or
is
m
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 o
r 
in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
.
•	
if 	
an
yt
hi
ng
	w
as
	c
op
ie
d,
	
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
ed
, 
op
er
at
ed
, e
tc
., 
th
at
 w
as
 
no
t a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, t
he
 g
ro
un
ds
 
on
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
th
in
g 
w
as
 b
el
ie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
r e
le
va
nt
 o
r 
co
nn
ec
te
d 
to
 a
 s
er
io
us
 in
di
ct
ab
le
 
of
fe
nc
e;
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	a
ny
th
in
g	
te
st
ed
 o
r 
ta
ke
n 
fo
r 
te
st
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
ty
pe
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
 
fro
m
 it
;
•	
an
	a
na
ly
si
s	
of
	w
he
th
er
	o
r	
no
t t
he
 w
ar
ra
nt
 a
ss
is
te
d 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 o
r 
th
e 
r e
sp
on
se
 to
 th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
, a
nd
 h
ow
; 
an
d
•	
an
	a
na
ly
si
s	
of
	w
he
th
er
	o
r	
no
t t
he
 w
ar
ra
nt
 a
ss
is
te
d 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 o
r 
th
e 
r e
sp
on
se
 to
 a
ny
 
ot
he
r 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 o
r 
an
y 
se
rio
us
 in
di
ct
ab
le
 
of
fe
nc
e,
 a
nd
 h
ow
.
If 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 w
as
 n
ot
 
ex
ec
ut
ed
, t
he
 re
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
ju
dg
e 
m
us
t b
e 
w
ith
in
 1
0 
da
ys
 o
f e
xp
iry
 a
nd
 m
us
t 
ex
pl
ai
n 
w
hy
.
If 
th
e 
pl
ac
e 
is
 re
-e
nt
er
ed
, 
an
ot
he
r 
re
po
rt
 m
us
t b
e 
gi
ve
n 
to
 th
e 
ju
dg
e 
w
ith
in
 
10
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
-e
nt
ry
 
st
at
in
g:
•	
th
e 	
ad
dr
es
s	
or
	o
th
er
	
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pl
ac
e;
•	
th
e	
da
te
	o
f	r
e-
en
try
;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	a
ny
	p
er
so
n	
w
ho
 re
-e
nt
er
ed
;
•	
a 	
br
ie
f	d
es
cr
ip
tio
n	
of
	
an
yt
hi
ng
 s
ei
ze
d 
(w
ith
 
a 
co
py
 o
f a
ny
 re
co
rd
), 
or
 a
ny
th
in
g 
re
m
ov
ed
 
an
d 
re
pl
ac
ed
, a
nd
 th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
su
sp
ec
tin
g 
th
at
 th
e 
th
in
g 
is
 
co
nn
ec
te
d 
to
 a
 te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t o
r 
is
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
re
le
va
nt
 to
 a
 s
er
io
us
 
in
di
ct
ab
le
 o
ffe
nc
e;
•	
a 	
br
ie
f	d
es
cr
ip
tio
n	
of
	
an
y 
ph
ot
o 
or
 o
th
er
 
ev
id
en
tia
ry
 m
at
er
ia
l 
ob
ta
in
ed
; 
•	
an
	a
na
ly
si
s	
of
	w
he
th
er
	
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 a
ss
is
te
d 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
or
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
of
 th
is
 o
r 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 
an
d,
 if
 s
o,
 h
ow
; a
nd
•	
an
yt
hi
ng
 e
ls
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
by
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 (n
o 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 fo
un
d)
.
If 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 w
as
 n
ot
 
ex
ec
ut
ed
, t
he
 re
po
rt
 to
 
th
e 
ju
dg
e 
m
us
t b
e 
w
ith
in
 
7 
da
ys
 o
f e
xp
iry
 a
nd
 m
us
t 
ex
pl
ai
n 
w
hy
, a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 e
ls
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
by
 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 (n
o 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
fo
un
d)
.
If 
th
e 
pl
ac
e 
w
as
 re
-e
nt
er
ed
 
as
 a
bo
ve
, t
he
 re
po
rt
 m
us
t:
•	
st
at
e 	
w
he
n	
re
-e
nt
ry
	to
ok
	
pl
ac
e;
•	
de
sc
rib
e	
an
y	
ot
he
r	p
la
ce
	
en
te
re
d 
in
 o
r d
er
 to
 e
ffe
ct
 
th
e 
re
-e
nt
ry
;
•	
na
m
e	
ea
ch
	p
er
so
n	
in
vo
lv
ed
;
•	
de
sc
rib
e	
th
e	
th
in
g	
re
tu
rn
ed
 o
r 
re
tr
ie
ve
d;
 
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	th
e	
of
fic
er
	
w
ho
 e
xe
cu
te
d 
it;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	a
ny
on
e	
w
ho
	
as
si
st
ed
, a
nd
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 
of
 th
e 
as
si
st
an
ce
;
•	
th
e 	
na
m
e	
of
	a
ny
	p
er
so
n	
be
lie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
kn
ow
in
gl
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 a
ct
, 
or
 if
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
er
so
n 
oc
cu
pi
es
 th
e 
pl
ac
e,
 a
ny
 
kn
ow
n 
oc
cu
pi
er
;
•	
th
e	
po
w
er
s	
ex
er
ci
se
d	
un
de
r 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
th
e	
re
su
lt	
of
	th
e	
ex
ec
ut
io
n,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
a 
br
ie
f d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 a
ny
th
in
g 
se
iz
ed
, 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
ed
, e
tc
.;
•	
if	
an
yt
hi
ng
	w
as
	c
op
ie
d,
	
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
ed
, 
op
er
at
ed
, e
tc
., 
th
at
 w
as
 
no
t a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
, t
he
 g
ro
un
ds
 
on
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
th
in
g 
w
as
 b
el
ie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
r e
le
va
nt
 o
r 
co
nn
ec
te
d 
to
 a
 s
er
io
us
 in
di
ct
ab
le
 
of
fe
nc
e;
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	a
ny
th
in
g	
te
st
ed
 o
r 
ta
ke
n 
fo
r 
te
st
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
ty
pe
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
 
fro
m
 it
;
•	
an
	a
na
ly
si
s	
of
	w
he
th
er
	o
r	
no
t t
he
 w
ar
ra
nt
 a
ss
is
te
d 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 o
r 
th
e 
r e
sp
on
se
 to
 th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
, a
nd
 h
ow
; 
an
d
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W
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N
o
rt
he
rn
 T
er
ri
to
ry
S
ta
tu
te
C
ri
m
es
 A
ct
 1
91
4
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
2
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
an
d
 
R
es
p
o
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
A
ct
 2
00
0
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
•	
a	
br
ie
f	d
es
cr
ip
tio
n	
of
	
th
e 
th
in
g 
re
tu
rn
ed
 o
r 
re
tr
ie
ve
d;
•	
if	
th
e	
th
in
g	
w
as
	n
ot
	
re
tu
rn
ed
 o
r 
re
tr
ie
ve
d,
 
w
hy
; a
nd
•	
an
y 	
ot
he
r	t
hi
ng
	
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
(n
o 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 m
ad
e)
.
•	
if 	
th
e	
th
in
g	
w
as
	n
ot
	
re
tu
rn
ed
 o
r 
re
tr
ie
ve
d,
 
ex
pl
ai
n 
w
hy
 n
ot
; a
nd
•	
an
yt
hi
ng
	e
ls
e	
re
qu
ire
d	
by
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 (n
o 
r e
gu
la
tio
ns
 fo
un
d)
.
•	
an
	a
na
ly
si
s	
of
	w
he
th
er
	o
r	
no
t t
he
 w
ar
ra
nt
 a
ss
is
te
d 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 o
r 
th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 a
ny
 
ot
he
r 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 o
r 
an
y 
se
rio
us
 in
di
ct
ab
le
 
of
fe
nc
e,
 a
nd
 h
ow
.
If 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 w
as
 n
ot
 
ex
ec
ut
ed
, t
he
 re
po
rt
 m
us
t 
ex
pl
ai
n 
w
hy
.
If 
th
e 
pl
ac
e 
is
 re
-e
nt
er
ed
, 
an
ot
he
r 
re
po
rt
 m
us
t b
e 
gi
ve
n 
to
 th
e 
ju
dg
e 
w
ith
in
 
10
 d
ay
s 
of
 th
e 
re
-e
nt
ry
 
st
at
in
g:
•	
th
e 	
ad
dr
es
s	
or
	o
th
er
	
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pl
ac
e;
•	
th
e	
da
te
	o
f	r
e-
en
try
;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	a
ny
	p
er
so
n	
w
ho
 re
-e
nt
er
ed
;
•	
a	
br
ie
f	d
es
cr
ip
tio
n	
of
	
th
e 
th
in
g 
re
tu
rn
ed
 o
r 
re
tr
ie
ve
d;
•	
if	
th
e	
th
in
g	
w
as
	n
ot
	
re
tu
r n
ed
 o
r 
re
tr
ie
ve
d,
 
w
hy
; a
nd
•	
an
y	
ot
he
r	t
hi
ng
	
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
(n
o 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 fo
un
d)
.
O
th
er
 
re
p
o
rt
in
g
N
o
Th
e 
C
hi
ef
 C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
an
nu
al
 
re
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 o
f 
P
ol
ic
e 
an
d 
th
e 
C
rim
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 m
us
t r
ep
or
t 
an
nu
al
ly
 to
 th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
an
d 
th
e 
A
-G
.
Th
e 
O
m
bu
ds
m
an
 a
ls
o 
ha
s 
a 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
du
ty
 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
es
e 
po
w
er
s,
 
an
d 
m
us
t r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
an
d 
th
e 
A
-G
 e
ve
ry
 3
 y
ea
rs
.
Th
e 
P
IM
 m
on
ito
rs
 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 re
po
rt
s 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 a
s 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
.
Th
e 
P
IM
 re
po
rt
s 
an
nu
al
ly
 
to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r. 
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 m
us
t 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
 a
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 m
us
t 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
 a
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
153
C
o
m
m
o
nw
ea
lth
V
ic
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ri
a
N
S
W
Q
ue
en
sl
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d
W
es
te
rn
 A
us
tr
al
ia
N
o
rt
he
rn
 T
er
ri
to
ry
S
ta
tu
te
C
ri
m
es
 A
ct
 1
91
4
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
2
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
an
d
 
R
es
p
o
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
A
ct
 2
00
0
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
D
el
ay
ed
 
N
o
tic
e 
P
ro
vi
si
o
n?
Th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
us
t n
ot
ify
 
th
e 
oc
cu
pi
er
 o
f p
re
m
is
es
 
se
ar
ch
ed
 th
at
 e
nt
ry
 h
as
 
ta
ke
n 
pl
ac
e 
w
ith
in
 2
4 
ho
ur
s 
or
, i
f n
ot
 p
ra
ct
ic
ab
le
 
to
 d
o 
so
, l
ea
ve
 a
 w
rit
te
n 
no
tic
e 
of
 e
nt
ry
 a
t t
he
 
pr
em
is
es
.
N
o
W
ith
in
 6
 m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
ex
ec
ut
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 (m
ay
 b
e 
po
st
po
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
ju
dg
e 
if 
re
as
on
ab
le
 g
ro
un
ds
 
ex
is
t –
 a
ny
 p
os
tp
on
em
en
t 
be
yo
nd
 1
8 
m
on
th
s 
re
qu
ire
s 
ex
ce
pt
io
na
l 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s)
, t
he
 p
er
so
n 
w
ho
 e
xe
cu
te
d 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
 
m
us
t c
au
se
 a
n 
“o
cc
up
ie
r’s
 
no
tic
e”
 to
 b
e 
pr
ep
ar
ed
 a
nd
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 to
 th
e 
is
su
in
g 
ju
dg
e 
fo
r 
ap
pr
ov
al
. I
t m
us
t 
co
nt
ai
n:
•	
th
e 	
na
m
e	
of
	th
e	
ap
pl
ic
an
t;
•	
th
e	
na
m
e	
of
	th
e	
is
su
in
g	
ju
dg
e;
•	
th
e	
da
te
	o
f	i
ss
ue
	o
f	t
he
	
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
th
e	
da
te
	o
f	e
xe
cu
tio
n;
•	
th
e	
ad
dr
es
s	
or
	o
th
er
	
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t p
re
m
is
es
;
•	
th
e	
nu
m
be
r	o
f	p
er
so
ns
	
w
ho
 e
nt
er
ed
 to
 e
xe
cu
te
 
or
 a
ss
is
t i
n 
ex
ec
ut
in
g 
th
e 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
a	
su
m
m
ar
y	
of
	th
e	
na
tu
r e
	
of
 th
e 
co
ve
rt
 s
ea
rc
h 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	a
ny
th
in
g	
se
iz
ed
 o
r 
re
pl
ac
ed
;
•	
a	
de
sc
rip
tio
n	
of
	a
ny
th
in
g	
re
tu
rn
ed
 o
r 
re
tr
ie
ve
d 
on
 
a 
re
-e
nt
ry
;
•	
if	
th
e	
oc
cu
pi
er
	w
as
	
no
t b
el
ie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
kn
ow
in
gl
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 
th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
, t
he
 n
ot
ic
e 
m
us
t s
ay
 s
o;
 a
nd
N
o
N
o
N
o
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C
o
m
m
o
nw
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V
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N
S
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Q
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d
W
es
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rn
 A
us
tr
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N
o
rt
he
rn
 T
er
ri
to
ry
S
ta
tu
te
C
ri
m
es
 A
ct
 1
91
4
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
2
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
an
d
 
R
es
p
o
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
A
ct
 2
00
0
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 (E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 2
00
3
•	
an
y	
ot
he
r	m
at
te
r	
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
(n
o 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 fo
un
d)
.
A
s 
so
on
 a
s 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 
af
te
r t
he
 ju
dg
e’
s 
ap
pr
ov
al
, 
th
e 
no
tic
e 
m
us
t b
e 
gi
ve
n 
to
 a
ny
 o
cc
up
ie
r b
el
ie
ve
d 
at
 
th
e 
tim
e 
of
 e
xe
cu
tio
n 
to
 b
e 
kn
ow
in
gl
y 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 a
ct
, o
r i
f 
th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
er
so
n 
oc
cu
py
in
g 
th
e 
pl
ac
e 
at
 
th
e 
tim
e 
of
 e
xe
cu
tio
n,
 a
ny
 
kn
ow
n 
oc
cu
pi
er
 a
bo
ve
 th
e 
ag
e 
of
 1
8.
If 
no
 s
uc
h 
pe
rs
on
 is
 
kn
ow
n,
 o
r h
is
/h
er
 
w
he
re
ab
ou
ts
 a
re
 u
nk
no
w
n,
 
th
e 
ju
dg
e 
m
ay
 th
en
 g
iv
e 
fu
rt
he
r d
ire
ct
io
ns
.
If 
ad
jo
in
in
g 
pr
em
is
es
 
w
er
e 
en
te
re
d 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
ex
ec
ut
io
n,
 th
en
 a
n 
“o
cc
up
ie
r’s
 n
ot
ic
e”
 m
us
t 
be
 p
re
pa
re
d 
an
d 
gi
ve
n 
to
 th
e 
oc
cu
pi
er
 o
f t
ho
se
 
pr
em
is
es
 a
s 
ab
ov
e.
R
ep
o
rt
 t
o
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
t
N
o
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
us
t l
ay
 th
e 
re
po
rt
 b
ef
or
e 
bo
th
 H
ou
se
s 
of
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t w
ith
in
 1
2 
si
tt
in
g 
da
ys
 o
f i
ts
 re
ce
ip
t.
Th
e 
A
-G
 m
us
t 
ta
bl
e 
re
po
rt
s 
of
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 o
f P
ol
ic
e,
 
th
e 
C
rim
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
an
d 
th
e 
O
m
bu
ds
m
an
 in
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
t a
s 
so
on
 a
s 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
re
ce
ip
t.
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
us
t t
ab
le
 
th
e 
P
IM
’s
 re
po
rt
 in
 th
e 
A
ss
em
bl
y 
w
ith
in
 1
4 
da
ys
 
of
 re
ce
ip
t.
Th
e 
re
po
rt
 m
ay
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
re
po
rt
 to
 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
un
de
r 
th
e 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l M
an
ag
em
en
t 
A
ct
 2
00
6 
or
, i
f n
ot
, b
e 
la
id
 
be
fo
re
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t w
ith
in
 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 re
ce
ip
t.
Th
e 
re
po
rt
 m
ay
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
an
nu
al
 
re
po
rt
 o
f t
he
 P
ol
ic
e 
Fo
rc
e 
or
, i
f n
ot
, b
e 
ta
bl
ed
 in
 th
e 
A
ss
em
bl
y 
w
ith
in
 7
 d
ay
s 
of
 
re
ce
ip
t.
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
th
e 
A
ct
N
o
Ye
s.
 B
y 
31
 D
ec
em
be
r 
20
14
 (e
xt
en
de
d 
by
 
am
en
di
ng
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n)
.
E
ve
ry
 3
 y
ea
rs
, a
s 
so
on
 a
s 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 
af
te
r 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 
O
m
bu
ds
m
an
 re
po
rt
s.
N
o
Ye
s.
 O
n 
th
e 
1s
t  a
nn
iv
er
sa
ry
 
of
 it
s 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t a
nd
 
ev
er
y 
3 
ye
ar
s 
th
er
ea
fte
r.
Ye
s.
 W
ith
in
 5
 y
ea
rs
 o
f i
ts
 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t.
S
un
se
t 
cl
au
se
10
 y
ea
rs
 fr
om
 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t (
be
in
g 
15
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
15
).
1 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
16
.
N
o
N
o
10
th
 a
nn
iv
er
sa
ry
 o
f 
R
oy
al
 A
ss
en
t (
be
in
g 
19
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
15
).
N
o
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P
re
ve
nt
at
iv
e 
D
et
en
tio
n 
O
rd
er
s 
– 
C
o
m
p
ar
is
o
ns
1.
 
Th
e 
C
om
m
on
w
ea
lth
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
pe
rm
its
 d
et
en
tio
n 
un
de
r 
a 
P
D
O
 fo
r 
a 
m
ax
im
um
 o
f 4
8 
ho
ur
s.
 S
ta
te
 a
nd
 T
er
rit
or
y 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
pr
ov
id
es
 fo
r 
up
 to
 1
4 
da
ys
 d
et
en
tio
n,
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
th
e 
C
O
A
G
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t o
f 2
7 
S
ep
te
m
be
r 
20
05
.
2.
 
Th
e 
A
C
T 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
st
re
ss
es
 th
at
 P
D
O
 p
ow
er
s 
ar
e 
“a
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f l
as
t r
es
or
t”
. T
he
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
te
st
 a
ls
o 
re
qu
ire
s 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
th
at
 d
et
en
tio
n 
is
 th
e 
le
as
t r
es
tr
ic
tiv
e 
w
ay
 o
f p
re
ve
nt
in
g 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
, o
r 
th
at
 it
 is
 th
e 
on
ly
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
w
ay
 o
f 
pr
es
er
vi
ng
 e
vi
de
nc
e.
 T
he
 a
pp
lic
an
t m
us
t a
tt
es
t t
ha
t n
on
e 
of
 th
e 
fa
ct
s 
or
 g
ro
un
ds
 re
lie
d 
up
on
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
, d
ire
ct
ly
 o
r 
in
di
re
ct
ly,
 fr
om
 to
rt
ur
e.
 N
o 
P
D
O
 m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
in
 re
sp
ec
t o
f a
 p
er
so
n 
le
ss
 th
an
 1
8 
ye
ar
s 
of
 a
ge
. 
If 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
as
 im
pa
ire
d 
de
ci
si
on
-m
ak
in
g 
ab
ilit
y,
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 m
us
t e
xp
re
ss
ly
 c
on
si
de
r 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 e
xt
en
t o
f t
he
 
im
pa
irm
en
t a
nd
 w
he
th
er
 th
er
e 
is
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 w
ay
 o
f d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 u
nd
er
 A
C
T 
la
w
.
3.
 
Th
e 
C
om
m
on
w
ea
lth
 a
nd
 a
 n
um
be
r 
of
 S
ta
te
s 
pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r 
in
te
rim
 P
D
O
s 
to
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
by
 s
en
io
r 
po
lic
e 
of
fic
er
s 
fo
r 
up
 to
 
24
 h
ou
rs
. T
he
 V
ic
to
ria
n 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
ba
nd
on
ed
 th
is
 o
pt
io
n 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 re
ad
in
g 
de
ba
te
 o
n 
th
e 
B
ill 
in
 2
00
6.
 
In
st
ea
d,
 in
te
rim
 o
rd
er
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
by
 th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 a
llo
w
in
g 
fo
r 
48
 h
ou
rs
 (o
r 
lo
ng
er
 in
 c
er
ta
in
 c
irc
um
st
an
ce
s)
 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
an
 e
x 
pa
rt
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
 A
 s
im
ila
r 
m
od
el
 a
pp
lie
s 
in
 N
ew
 S
ou
th
 W
al
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
A
C
T.
4.
 
In
 S
ou
th
 A
us
tr
al
ia
, W
es
te
rn
 A
us
tr
al
ia
 a
nd
 th
e 
N
or
th
er
n 
Te
rr
ito
rie
s,
 th
re
e 
of
 th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
ns
 w
he
re
 th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 is
 
no
t t
he
 is
su
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 fo
r 
fin
al
 o
r 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
P
D
O
s,
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 is
 m
ad
e 
fo
r 
a 
re
vi
ew
 o
f t
he
 o
rd
er
 b
y 
th
e 
C
ou
rt
 a
s 
so
on
 
as
 p
ra
ct
ic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t o
f t
he
 o
rd
er
 is
 fi
rs
t t
ak
en
 in
to
 d
et
en
tio
n.
5.
 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
co
nt
ac
t w
ith
 a
 la
w
ye
r 
– 
th
e 
de
fa
ul
t p
os
iti
on
 in
 th
e 
A
C
T 
is
 th
at
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 a
 la
w
ye
r 
ar
e 
no
t t
o 
be
 
m
on
ito
re
d,
 u
nl
es
s 
a 
se
ni
or
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 o
rd
er
s 
th
at
 th
ey
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
. I
n 
V
ic
to
ria
, t
he
 S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 m
ay
 o
rd
er
 th
at
 th
ey
 
no
t b
e 
m
on
ito
re
d.
 A
ll 
ot
he
r 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
ns
 s
im
pl
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r 
co
m
pu
ls
or
y 
m
on
ito
rin
g,
 th
ou
gh
 e
xc
ep
tio
ns
 m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
in
 
Q
ue
en
sl
an
d 
an
d 
W
A
 if
 th
e 
la
w
ye
r 
ha
s 
be
en
 s
ec
ur
ity
 c
le
ar
ed
 to
 a
n 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 le
ve
l b
y 
th
e 
C
om
m
on
w
ea
lth
 A
-G
’s
 O
ffi
ce
.
6.
 
Th
e 
N
ew
 S
ou
th
 W
al
es
 A
ct
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
le
as
e 
of
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 a
s 
so
on
 a
s 
is
 p
ra
ct
ic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
de
ta
in
in
g 
of
fic
er
 
be
co
m
es
 s
at
is
fie
d 
th
at
 th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
on
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
or
de
r 
w
as
 s
ou
gh
t o
r 
gr
an
te
d 
no
 lo
ng
er
 e
xi
st
. O
th
er
 ju
ris
di
ct
io
ns
 s
im
pl
y 
pr
ov
id
e 
th
at
 th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
us
t a
pp
ly
 fo
r 
re
vo
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
or
de
r, 
an
d 
th
e 
is
su
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 o
r 
co
ur
t m
us
t r
ev
ok
e 
th
e 
or
de
r.
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m
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w
ea
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V
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ri
a
N
S
W
Q
ue
en
sl
an
d
S
A
Ta
sm
an
ia
W
A
A
C
T
N
T
S
ta
tu
te
C
ri
m
in
al
 C
o
d
e 
A
ct
 1
99
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 
20
03
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 
A
ct
 2
00
2
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
re
ve
nt
at
iv
e 
D
et
en
tio
n)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
re
ve
nt
at
iv
e 
D
et
en
tio
n)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
re
ve
nt
at
iv
e 
D
et
en
tio
n)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
re
ve
nt
at
iv
e 
D
et
en
tio
n)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
Te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
03
W
ho
 m
ay
 a
p
p
ly
A
n 
A
FP
 m
em
be
r 
(a
 m
em
be
r 
or
 a
 
sp
ec
ia
l m
em
be
r 
of
 th
e 
A
FP
).
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 
au
th
or
is
ed
 
by
 th
e 
C
hi
ef
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
.
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
, w
ith
 th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f t
he
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e,
 
th
e 
D
ep
ut
y 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
or
 a
n 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
co
un
te
r-
te
rro
ris
m
 
op
er
at
io
ns
.
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
.
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
.
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e.
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 
au
th
or
is
ed
 
by
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
.
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 
of
 o
r 
ab
ov
e 
th
e 
ra
nk
 o
f 
S
up
er
in
te
nd
en
t, 
w
ith
 th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f t
he
 
C
hi
ef
 P
ol
ic
e 
O
ffi
ce
r.
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 
of
 o
r 
ab
ov
e 
th
e 
ra
nk
 o
f 
S
up
er
in
te
nd
en
t, 
au
th
or
is
ed
 b
y 
an
 o
ffi
ce
r 
of
 o
r 
ab
ov
e 
th
e 
ra
nk
 
of
 A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
.
G
ro
un
d
s 
fo
r 
ap
p
lic
at
io
n
Th
e 
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: 
(i)
 it
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 d
et
ai
n 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
to
 p
re
se
rv
e 
ev
id
en
ce
, a
nd
(ii
) d
et
ai
ni
ng
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
is
 th
e 
le
as
t 
re
st
ric
tiv
e 
w
ay
 o
f 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
th
e 
ac
t, 
an
d
(ii
i) 
de
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
fo
r t
he
 p
er
io
d 
in
 q
ue
st
io
n 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
ac
t.
Th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t m
us
t b
e 
im
m
in
en
t o
r, 
in
 
an
y 
ev
en
t, 
be
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
 
oc
cu
r i
n 
th
e 
ne
xt
 
14
 d
ay
s.
 
O
R
Th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t 
m
us
t b
e 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
tta
ck
 
ha
s 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 in
 
th
e 
la
st
 2
8 
da
ys
 
an
d:
(i)
 it
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 d
et
ai
n 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
to
 p
re
se
rv
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 in
 
th
e 
A
C
T 
or
 
el
se
w
he
re
, a
nd
(ii
) d
et
ai
ni
ng
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
fo
r 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
in
 q
ue
st
io
n 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
ac
t.
Th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t m
us
t b
e 
im
m
in
en
t o
r, 
in
 
an
y 
ev
en
t, 
be
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
 
oc
cu
r 
in
 th
e 
ne
xt
 
14
 d
ay
s.
 
O
R
Th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t 
m
us
t b
e 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
tt
ac
k 
ha
s 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 in
 
th
e 
la
st
 2
8 
da
ys
 
an
d:
(i)
 it
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 d
et
ai
n 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
to
 p
re
se
rv
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 in
 
th
e 
Te
rr
ito
ry
 o
r 
el
se
w
he
re
, a
nd
(ii
) d
et
ai
ni
ng
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
fo
r 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
in
 q
ue
st
io
n 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
of
 th
at
 e
vi
de
nc
e.
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ro
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D
et
en
tio
n)
 A
ct
 
20
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D
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tio
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o
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o
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Te
m
p
o
ra
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P
o
w
er
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 A
ct
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Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
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 A
ct
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(ii
) d
et
ai
ni
ng
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
fo
r 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
in
 q
ue
st
io
n 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
of
 th
at
 e
vi
de
nc
e.
(ii
) d
et
ai
ni
ng
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
is
 th
e 
on
ly
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
w
ay
 o
f 
pr
es
er
vi
ng
 th
e 
ev
id
en
ce
, a
nd
(ii
i) 
de
ta
in
in
g 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
fo
r t
he
 p
er
io
d 
in
 q
ue
st
io
n 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
es
er
va
tio
n 
of
 th
at
 e
vi
de
nc
e.
R
em
o
te
 
ap
p
lic
at
io
n
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
Is
su
in
g
 
A
ut
ho
ri
ty
C
er
ta
in
 ju
dg
es
, 
ex
-ju
dg
es
 o
r 
A
AT
 m
em
be
rs
 
as
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
Th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
.
Th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
.
A
 ju
dg
e 
or
 
re
tir
ed
 ju
dg
e 
as
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
A
 ju
dg
e 
or
 
re
tir
ed
 ju
dg
e 
of
 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 o
r 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
ou
rt
 a
s 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
Th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
.
A
 ju
dg
e 
or
 
re
tir
ed
 ju
dg
e 
as
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 
th
e 
G
ov
er
no
r.
Th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
.
A
 ju
dg
e 
de
cl
ar
ed
 to
 
be
 a
n 
el
ig
ib
le
 
ju
dg
e 
by
 th
e 
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
or
.
P
IM
 in
vo
lv
ed
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
U
rg
en
t 
in
te
ri
m
 p
o
w
er
 
av
ai
la
b
le
Ye
s,
 a
n 
or
de
r 
m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
by
 
an
 A
FP
 m
em
be
r 
of
 o
r 
ab
ov
e 
th
e 
ra
nk
 o
f 
S
up
er
in
te
nd
en
t, 
fo
r 
up
 to
 
24
 h
ou
rs
 
de
te
nt
io
n 
fr o
m
 
th
e 
tim
e 
of
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 b
ei
ng
 
ta
ke
n 
in
to
 
cu
st
od
y.
If 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
 m
ad
e 
ex
 
pa
rt
e,
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 
m
ay
 c
ho
os
e 
to
 
m
ak
e 
an
 in
te
rim
 
or
de
r 
pe
rm
itt
in
g 
de
te
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
48
 h
ou
rs
, 
or
 u
nt
il 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
is
 fi
na
lly
 
de
te
rm
in
ed
, 
w
hi
ch
ev
er
 is
 th
e 
la
te
r.
If 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
 m
ad
e 
ex
 
pa
rt
e,
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 
m
ay
 c
ho
os
e 
to
 
m
ak
e 
an
 in
te
rim
 
or
de
r 
pe
rm
itt
in
g 
de
te
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
48
 h
ou
rs
. 
Ye
s,
 a
n 
or
de
r 
m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
by
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
, 
th
e 
D
ep
ut
y 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
or
 a
n 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
pe
rm
itt
in
g 
de
te
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
24
 h
ou
rs
. 
Ye
s,
 a
n 
or
de
r 
m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
by
 a
n 
of
fic
er
 o
f 
or
 a
bo
ve
 th
e 
ra
nk
 o
f A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
pe
rm
itt
in
g 
de
te
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
24
 h
ou
rs
. 
Ye
s,
 a
n 
or
de
r 
m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
by
 a
n 
of
fic
er
 o
f 
or
 a
bo
ve
 th
e 
ra
nk
 o
f A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
pe
rm
itt
in
g 
de
te
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
24
 h
ou
rs
 
 
O
R
N
o,
 b
ut
 a
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
m
ay
 
be
 m
ad
e 
ex
 
pa
rt
e 
an
d 
th
e 
or
de
r 
m
us
t b
e 
re
vi
ew
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 a
s 
so
on
 
as
 p
ra
ct
ic
ab
le
 
af
te
r 
de
te
nt
io
n 
of
 p
er
so
n 
(s
ee
 
be
lo
w
).
If 
an
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
is
 m
ad
e 
ex
 
pa
rt
e,
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 
m
ay
 c
ho
os
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
 
in
te
rim
 o
rd
er
 
fo
r 
24
 h
ou
rs
 
fro
m
 th
e 
tim
e 
of
 
de
te
nt
io
n.
N
o,
 b
ut
 a
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
m
ay
 
be
 m
ad
e 
ex
 
pa
rt
e 
an
d 
th
e 
or
de
r 
m
us
t b
e 
re
vi
ew
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 
as
 s
oo
n 
as
 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
de
te
nt
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 (s
ee
 
be
lo
w
).
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o
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If 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
is
 m
ad
e 
ex
 
pa
rt
e,
 th
e 
C
ou
rt
 
m
ay
 c
ho
os
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
an
 
in
te
rim
 o
rd
er
 fo
r 
48
 h
ou
rs
 fr
om
 
th
e 
tim
e 
of
 th
e 
or
de
r, 
or
 u
nt
il 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
is
 fi
na
lly
 
de
te
rm
in
ed
, 
w
hi
ch
ev
er
 is
 th
e 
la
te
r.
G
ro
un
d
s 
fo
r 
Is
su
in
g
Th
e 
is
su
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
C
ou
rt
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
C
ou
rt
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
is
su
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
is
su
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
C
ou
rt
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
is
su
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
C
ou
rt
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
is
su
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n.
M
ax
im
um
 
p
er
m
itt
ed
 
d
et
en
tio
n 
un
d
er
 fi
na
l 
P
D
O
48
 h
ou
rs
 
14
 d
ay
s
14
 d
ay
s
14
 d
ay
s
14
 d
ay
s
14
 d
ay
s
14
 d
ay
s
14
 d
ay
s 
14
 d
ay
s
S
up
re
m
e 
C
o
ur
t 
re
vi
ew
 o
f 
a 
P
D
O
N
o
N
o
N
o
A
 d
et
ai
ne
e 
m
ay
 
se
ek
 a
 re
vi
ew
 b
y 
th
e 
C
ou
rt
 a
t a
ny
 
tim
e.
Th
e 
de
ta
in
in
g 
of
fic
er
 m
us
t 
br
in
g 
th
e 
de
ta
in
ee
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
C
ou
rt
 fo
r 
a 
re
vi
ew
 o
f 
th
e 
P
D
O
 if
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 is
 s
til
l i
n 
cu
st
od
y 
af
te
r 
7  
da
ys
.
Ye
s 
– 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 
m
us
t b
rin
g 
th
e 
de
ta
in
ee
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 fo
r 
a 
re
vi
ew
 o
f t
he
 
P
D
O
 (i
ni
tia
l o
r 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e)
 
as
 s
oo
n 
as
 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 is
 
fir
st
 ta
ke
n 
in
to
 
cu
st
od
y.
N
o
Ye
s 
– 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 
m
us
t b
rin
g 
th
e 
de
ta
in
ee
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 fo
r 
a 
re
vi
ew
 o
f t
he
 
P
D
O
 a
s 
so
on
 
as
 p
ra
ct
ic
ab
le
 
af
te
r 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
is
 fi
rs
t t
ak
en
 in
to
 
cu
st
od
y.
N
o
Ye
s 
– 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 
m
us
t b
rin
g 
th
e 
de
ta
in
ee
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 fo
r 
a 
re
vi
ew
 o
f t
he
 
P
D
O
 a
s 
so
on
 
as
 p
ra
ct
ic
ab
le
 
af
te
r 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 
is
 fi
rs
t t
ak
en
 in
to
 
cu
st
od
y.
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M
ul
tip
le
 P
D
O
s
A
 fu
rt
he
r 
P
D
O
 
fo
r 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
a 
di
ffe
re
nt
 te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t w
ith
in
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
co
ve
re
d 
by
 th
e 
fir
st
 
P
D
O
 c
an
 o
nl
y 
be
 m
ad
e 
if 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 
w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 b
as
ed
 
ca
m
e 
to
 li
gh
t 
af
te
r 
th
e 
fir
st
 
P
D
O
 w
as
 m
ad
e.
A
 fu
rt
he
r 
P
D
O
 
fo
r 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
a 
di
ffe
re
nt
 te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t w
ith
in
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
co
ve
re
d 
by
 th
e 
fir
st
 
P
D
O
 c
an
 o
nl
y 
be
 m
ad
e 
if 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 
w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 b
as
ed
 
ca
m
e 
to
 li
gh
t 
af
te
r 
th
e 
fir
st
 
P
D
O
 w
as
 m
ad
e.
Ye
s,
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
th
e 
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
du
ra
tio
n 
do
es
 
no
t e
xc
ee
d 
14
 d
ay
s.
If 
a 
pe
rs
on
 is
 
de
ta
in
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 in
 a
 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 p
er
io
d,
 
no
 fu
rt
he
r 
or
de
r 
is
 p
er
m
itt
ed
 fo
r 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ac
t i
n 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
pe
rio
d.
If 
a 
pe
rs
on
 is
 
de
ta
in
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 in
 a
 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 p
er
io
d,
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 m
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g 
ou
t o
f t
he
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
of
 th
e 
po
w
er
s.
4.
 
U
nd
er
 th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
A
C
T,
 o
ffi
ce
rs
 e
xe
rc
is
in
g 
sp
ec
ia
l p
ow
er
s 
un
de
r 
an
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
m
us
t h
av
e 
un
de
rg
on
e 
hu
m
an
 
rig
ht
s 
tr
ai
ni
ng
. T
he
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
al
so
 e
xp
lic
itl
y 
st
at
es
 th
at
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
re
su
lt 
of
 to
rt
ur
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 b
e 
ad
m
is
si
bl
e.
5.
 
S
om
e 
S
ta
te
s’
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
(N
ew
 S
ou
th
 W
al
es
, S
ou
th
 A
us
tr
al
ia
 a
nd
 W
es
te
rn
 A
us
tr
al
ia
) e
xp
re
ss
ly
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t o
f i
nt
er
st
at
e 
po
lic
e 
of
fic
er
s 
to
 a
ss
is
t i
n 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
po
w
er
s.
6.
 
Q
ue
en
sl
an
d 
an
d 
th
e 
A
C
T 
ha
ve
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
po
lic
in
g 
of
 m
as
s 
ga
th
er
in
gs
 /
 s
pe
ci
al
 e
ve
nt
s.
 T
he
se
 a
re
 n
ot
 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
te
rr
or
is
m
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s,
 a
nd
 a
re
 th
us
 e
xc
lu
de
d 
fro
m
 th
is
 ta
bl
e.
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P
ro
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P
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at
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P
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w
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P
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A
ct
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5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
Te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
03
W
ho
 m
ay
 a
p
p
ly
A
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 
(b
ei
ng
 a
n 
A
FP
 
m
em
be
r, 
a 
sp
ec
ia
l m
em
be
r 
or
 a
 m
em
be
r 
of
 a
 S
ta
te
 o
r 
Te
rr
ito
ry
 p
ol
ic
e 
fo
rc
e)
 m
ay
 
ap
pl
y 
fo
r 
a 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n 
of
 a
 
C
om
m
on
w
ea
lth
 
pl
ac
e 
as
 a
 
“p
re
sc
rib
ed
 
se
cu
rit
y 
zo
ne
”.
In
 re
sp
ec
t o
f 
G
ro
un
ds
 (i
) t
o 
(ii
i),
 th
e 
C
hi
ef
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
w
ith
 th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f t
he
 
P
re
m
ie
r.
In
 re
sp
ec
t o
f 
G
ro
un
d 
(iv
), 
th
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
m
in
is
te
r 
w
ith
 
th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 
of
 th
e 
P
re
m
ie
r, 
on
 th
e 
ad
vi
ce
 
of
 th
e 
C
hi
ef
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
.
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
In
 re
sp
ec
t o
f 
G
ro
un
ds
 (i
) a
nd
 
(ii
) –
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 
pr
om
in
en
t 
pe
rs
on
s 
or
 a
 
la
rg
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 p
er
so
ns
 
at
te
nd
in
g 
an
 
ev
en
t, 
or
 to
 
pr
ot
ec
t a
 s
pe
ci
al
 
si
te
, w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 
tr
an
sp
or
t h
ub
, 
an
 a
re
a 
of
 m
as
s 
ga
th
er
in
gs
 o
r t
he
 
lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
n 
es
se
nt
ia
l s
er
vi
ce
– 
no
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
is
 n
ee
de
d 
fo
r t
he
 
us
e 
of
 s
pe
ci
al
 
po
w
er
s.
 T
he
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e 
w
ith
 
th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f 
th
e 
P
re
m
ie
r m
ay
 
ap
pl
y 
fo
r t
he
 
us
e 
of
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
po
w
er
s.
In
 re
sp
ec
t o
f 
G
ro
un
ds
 (i
ii)
 a
nd
 
(iv
) –
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 
or
 to
 re
du
ce
 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
of
 a
 te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t, 
or
 fo
r t
he
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
of
 
or
 re
co
ve
ry
 fr
om
 
an
 a
ct
– 
th
e 
C
om
m
is
s-
io
ne
r o
f P
ol
ic
e 
m
us
t a
pp
ly,
 w
ith
 
th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f 
th
e 
P
re
m
ie
r, 
fo
r 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
to
 
us
e 
bo
th
 s
pe
ci
al
 
an
d 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
po
w
er
s.
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
Th
e 
C
hi
ef
 P
ol
ic
e 
O
ffi
ce
r 
w
ith
 th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f t
he
 
C
hi
ef
 M
in
is
te
r.
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
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C
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ct
 
19
14
Te
rr
o
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(C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 
20
03
Te
rr
o
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sm
 
(P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 
A
ct
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00
2
P
ub
lic
 S
af
et
y 
P
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
A
ct
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98
6
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 
A
ct
 2
00
5
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
(P
ub
lic
 S
af
et
y)
 
A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
Te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
03
G
ro
un
d
s 
fo
r 
ap
p
lic
at
io
n
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
ay
 d
ec
la
re
 
a 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 
se
cu
rit
y 
zo
ne
 
if 
he
 o
r 
sh
e 
co
ns
id
er
s 
a 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n 
w
ou
ld
 a
ss
is
t 
in
 p
re
ve
nt
in
g 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
tt
ac
k 
or
 in
 re
sp
on
di
ng
 
to
 a
 te
rr
or
is
t 
at
ta
ck
 th
at
 h
ad
 
al
re
ad
y 
oc
cu
re
d.
Th
e 
C
hi
ef
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t b
e 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
 a
n 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
to
 u
se
 s
pe
ci
al
 
po
w
er
s:
(G
ro
un
d 
(i)
) i
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 
pr
ot
ec
t p
er
so
ns
 
at
te
nd
in
g 
sp
ec
ia
l e
ve
nt
s 
th
at
 h
e/
sh
e 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
m
ay
 b
e 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t t
ar
ge
t; 
or (G
ro
un
d 
(ii
)) 
w
ou
ld
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
 
pr
ev
en
tin
g,
 o
r 
re
du
ci
ng
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f, 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 
th
at
 h
e/
sh
e 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
is
 
oc
cu
rr
in
g 
or
 
m
ay
 o
cc
ur
 in
 th
e 
ne
xt
 1
4 
da
ys
; o
r
(G
ro
un
d 
(ii
i))
 w
ou
ld
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
 th
e 
ap
pr
eh
en
si
on
 
of
 th
os
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
or
 in
 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
of
 o
r 
re
co
ve
ry
 
fro
m
 a
 te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t t
ha
t h
e/
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
ds
 
(i)
 a
nd
 (i
i),
 fo
r 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
po
w
er
s,
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e 
m
us
t 
be
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
 a
n 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 
th
os
e 
po
w
er
s 
is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
fe
ty
 o
f 
th
os
e 
at
te
nd
in
g 
th
e 
ev
en
t, 
to
 
pr
ot
ec
t t
he
 
sp
ec
ia
l s
ite
 a
nd
 
th
os
e 
in
 it
 fr
om
 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
, 
to
 m
iti
ga
te
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 a
n 
ac
t o
r 
to
 a
ss
is
t 
in
 th
e 
re
co
ve
ry
 
fro
m
 a
n 
ac
t.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
d 
(ii
i),
 fo
r 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
to
 u
se
 s
pe
ci
al
 
or
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
po
w
er
s,
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e 
m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
th
at
 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 th
e 
sp
ec
ia
l a
nd
/
or
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
po
w
er
s 
w
ill 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
or
 
re
du
ci
ng
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
.
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
Fo
r 
a 
“P
re
ve
nt
at
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n”
, 
th
e 
C
hi
ef
 P
ol
ic
e 
O
ffi
ce
r 
m
us
t 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 
be
lie
ve
 th
at
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 is
 
ha
pp
en
in
g 
or
 
w
ill 
ha
pp
en
 
in
 th
e 
ne
xt
 
14
 d
ay
s,
 a
nd
 
be
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
 a
n 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
w
ou
ld
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
th
e 
ac
t, 
re
du
ci
ng
 it
s 
im
pa
ct
 o
r 
bo
th
.
Fo
r 
an
 
“I
nv
es
tig
at
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n”
, 
th
e 
C
hi
ef
 P
ol
ic
e 
O
ffi
ce
r 
m
us
t 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 
be
lie
ve
 th
at
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 h
as
 
ha
pp
en
ed
 in
 la
st
 
28
 d
ay
s,
 o
r 
is
 
ha
pp
en
in
g,
 a
nd
 
be
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
 a
n 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
w
ou
ld
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
 
ap
pr
eh
en
di
ng
 
a 
pe
rs
on
 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e,
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
in
g
N
o 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
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Te
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P
ro
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03
Te
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o
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lic
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P
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 S
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P
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at
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P
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w
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o
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ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
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y 
Te
m
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ra
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P
o
w
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s)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
03
sh
e 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 
be
lie
ve
s 
ha
s 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 o
r 
is
 
oc
cu
rr
in
g;
 o
r
(G
ro
un
d 
(iv
)) 
(th
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
m
in
is
te
r 
m
us
t 
be
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
th
at
) 
it 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 
pr
ot
ec
t e
ss
en
tia
l 
se
rv
ic
es
 fr
om
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
tt
ac
k,
 
to
 m
iti
ga
te
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 a
n 
at
ta
ck
 o
r 
to
 
as
si
st
 in
 th
e 
re
co
ve
ry
 o
f t
he
 
se
rv
ic
e 
fro
m
 a
n 
at
ta
ck
.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
d 
(iv
), 
fo
r 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
to
 u
se
 s
pe
ci
al
 
or
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
po
w
er
s,
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e 
m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
th
at
 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 th
e 
sp
ec
ia
l a
nd
/
or
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
po
w
er
s 
w
ill 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
 
ap
pr
eh
en
di
ng
 
th
os
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t, 
in
 th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
ac
t o
r 
in
 th
e 
re
co
ve
ry
 fr
om
 it
.
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 
or
 re
du
ci
ng
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f i
t.
Is
su
in
g
 
A
ut
ho
ri
ty
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
G
ro
un
ds
 (i
) t
o 
(ii
i) 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
.
G
ro
un
d 
(iv
) t
he
 
G
ov
er
no
r 
in
 
C
ou
nc
il.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
or
 D
ep
ut
y 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
(w
ith
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 
fo
r 
ab
se
nc
e)
, 
w
ith
 th
e 
co
nc
ur
re
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
(if
 
av
ai
la
bl
e)
.
Fi
rs
t, 
th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
or
 D
ep
ut
y 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
ap
po
in
ts
 
a 
Te
rr
or
is
t 
E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
C
om
m
an
de
r.
Th
en
, o
ne
 o
f 
th
es
e 
ap
po
in
ts
 
a 
Te
rr
or
is
t 
E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
Fo
rw
ar
d 
C
om
m
an
de
r 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 te
rr
or
is
t 
at
ta
ck
 s
ite
.
Th
en
, t
he
 la
tt
er
 
de
cl
ar
es
 a
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
si
tu
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
si
te
.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e 
(w
ith
 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
fo
r 
ab
se
nc
e)
, w
ith
 
co
nfi
rm
at
io
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
an
d 
a 
ju
dg
e 
of
 th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 
or
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
th
at
 th
e 
of
fic
er
 
ha
s 
pr
op
er
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
is
su
in
g 
th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
ds
 
(i)
 a
nd
 (i
i),
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e 
w
ith
 
th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 
of
 th
e 
P
re
m
ie
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 
sp
ec
ia
l p
ow
er
s,
 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 fo
r 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
po
w
er
s.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
ds
 
(ii
i) 
an
d 
(iv
), 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 
fo
r 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
to
 
us
e 
al
l p
ow
er
s.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
, 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
io
r 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f a
 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 
ju
dg
e 
(th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
is
 k
no
w
n 
as
 a
 
“C
om
m
is
si
on
er
’s
 
w
ar
ra
nt
”)
.
Th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 o
r 
th
e 
M
ag
is
tr
at
es
 
C
ou
rt
.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
or
 a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 
of
fic
er
 (w
ith
 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
fo
r 
ab
se
nc
e)
 w
ith
 
th
e 
co
nc
ur
re
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
ay
 d
ec
la
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 d
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ra
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 o
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C
ou
rt
 o
r 
th
e 
G
ov
er
no
r 
in
 
C
ou
nc
il 
m
us
t 
be
 s
at
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; o
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S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 o
r 
th
e 
G
ov
er
no
r 
in
 
C
ou
nc
il 
m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
as
 
to
 th
e 
m
at
te
rs
 
lis
te
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ab
ov
e.
Th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
on
 re
as
on
ab
le
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
th
at
 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 
is
 a
bo
ut
 to
 b
e 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 
or
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 
an
d 
th
at
 th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f 
sp
ec
ia
l p
ow
er
s 
w
ill 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 o
r 
in
 a
pp
re
he
nd
in
g 
th
os
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e.
Th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
th
at
 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
he
 
po
w
er
s 
to
 b
e 
au
th
or
is
ed
 a
re
 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 to
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
or
 D
ep
ut
y 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t b
e 
sa
tis
fie
d 
on
 re
as
on
ab
le
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
th
at
 
an
 e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
si
tu
at
io
n 
ha
s 
ar
is
en
 o
r i
s 
lik
el
y 
to
 a
ris
e,
 th
at
 
re
su
lts
 o
r m
ay
 
re
su
lt 
fro
m
 o
r 
m
ay
 le
ad
 to
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 a
t 
on
e 
or
 m
or
e 
pl
ac
es
.
Th
e 
Te
rr
or
is
t 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
Fo
rw
ar
d 
C
om
m
an
de
r 
m
ay
 d
ec
la
re
 a
n 
th
at
 a
 te
rr
or
is
t 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
ex
is
ts
 fo
r a
 g
iv
en
 
ar
ea
 if
Fo
r 
a 
“p
re
ve
nt
at
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n”
, 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
us
t 
ha
ve
 re
as
on
ab
le
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
to
 
be
lie
ve
 th
at
 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 
is
 im
m
in
en
t, 
w
he
th
er
 in
 S
A
 
or
 o
ut
si
de
 th
e 
S
ta
te
, a
nd
 th
at
 
an
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
to
 u
se
 s
pe
ci
al
 
po
w
er
s 
w
ill 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
.
Fo
r 
an
 
“in
ve
st
ig
at
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n”
, 
th
e 
of
fic
er
 m
us
t 
ha
ve
 re
as
on
ab
le
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
to
 
be
lie
ve
 th
at
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
ds
 
(i)
 a
nd
 (i
i),
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e 
(s
pe
ci
al
 
po
w
er
s)
 o
r 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 
(a
dd
iti
on
al
 
po
w
er
s)
 m
us
t 
be
 s
at
is
fie
d 
on
 re
as
on
ab
le
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
th
at
 a
n 
ar
ea
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
at
 
ris
k 
of
 a
 te
rr
or
is
t 
at
ta
ck
 a
nd
 th
at
 
th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n:
•	
is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
sa
fe
ty
 
of
 p
er
so
ns
 
at
te
nd
in
g 
an
 
ev
en
t, 
or
•	
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 a
 
sp
ec
ia
l s
ite
 o
r 
th
os
e 
in
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t h
av
e 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
to
 
be
lie
ve
 th
at
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 h
as
 
be
en
, i
s 
be
in
g 
or
 is
 a
bo
ut
 to
 
be
 c
om
m
itt
ed
, 
w
he
th
er
 in
 o
r 
ou
ts
id
e 
S
A
, 
an
d 
th
at
 th
e 
is
su
e 
of
 a
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
’s
 
w
ar
ra
nt
 to
 u
se
 
sp
ec
ia
l p
ow
er
s 
w
ill 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
:
•	
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
;
•	
m
in
im
is
in
g 
th
e 
ris
k 
to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 fr
om
 
th
e 
ac
t;
Fo
r 
ei
th
er
 a
 
pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
or
 
an
 in
ve
st
ig
at
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n,
 
th
e 
C
ou
rt
 m
us
t 
be
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
sa
tis
fie
d 
in
 li
ne
 
w
ith
 th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
ab
ov
e 
an
d,
 if
 th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
is
 
fo
r 
or
 in
cl
ud
es
 
a 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
ar
ea
, t
ha
t i
t 
is
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 g
iv
e 
th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
at
 a
re
a.
Th
e 
is
su
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 m
us
t 
ha
ve
 re
as
on
ab
le
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
to
 
be
lie
ve
 th
at
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 h
as
 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 o
r 
is
 
lik
el
y 
to
 o
cc
ur
 
in
 th
e 
ne
ar
 
fu
tu
re
, a
nd
 th
at
 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f 
th
e 
po
w
er
s 
w
ill 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 
as
si
st
 in
:
•	
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
th
e 
ac
t o
r 
m
in
im
is
in
g 
th
e 
ris
k 
to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 fr
om
 it
; 
•	
fin
di
ng
, 
re
m
ov
in
g 
or
 
pr
es
er
vi
ng
 
ev
id
en
ce
; o
r 
•	
ap
pr
eh
en
di
ng
 
a 
pe
rs
on
 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
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A
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T
N
T
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ta
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C
ri
m
es
 A
ct
 
19
14
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 
20
03
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 
A
ct
 2
00
2
P
ub
lic
 S
af
et
y 
P
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
A
ct
 1
98
6
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 
A
ct
 2
00
5
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
(P
ub
lic
 S
af
et
y)
 
A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
Te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
03
M
ax
im
um
 
d
ur
at
io
n 
o
f 
au
th
o
ri
sa
tio
n
A
 d
ec
la
ra
tio
n 
of
 a
 p
la
ce
 a
s 
a 
“p
re
sc
rib
ed
 
se
cu
rit
y 
zo
ne
” 
m
ay
 la
st
 fo
r 
up
 
to
 2
8 
da
ys
.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
d 
(i)
, 2
4 
ho
ur
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
sc
he
du
le
d 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
ev
en
t.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
ds
 
(ii
) a
nd
 (i
ii)
, 2
4 
ho
ur
s 
fo
r 
in
te
rim
 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
, 
14
 d
ay
s 
fo
r 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
d 
(iv
), 
on
e 
ye
ar
.
7 
da
ys
 w
he
re
 
th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
is
 fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 a
 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
.
24
 h
ou
rs
 w
he
re
 
th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
is
 fo
r 
ap
pr
eh
en
di
ng
 
th
os
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e.
7 
da
ys
.
In
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f 
a 
pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n,
 7
 
da
ys
.
In
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f 
an
 in
ve
st
ig
at
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n,
 2
4 
ho
ur
s.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
d 
(i)
, 2
4 
ho
ur
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
sc
he
du
le
d 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
ev
en
t.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
d 
(ii
) 
on
e 
ye
ar
.
U
nd
er
 G
ro
un
ds
 
(ii
i) 
an
d 
(iv
), 
72
 h
ou
rs
 fo
r 
an
 in
te
rim
 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n,
 
14
 d
ay
s 
fo
r a
 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n.
7 
da
ys
.
In
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f 
a 
pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n,
 7
 
da
ys
.
In
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f 
an
 in
ve
st
ig
at
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n,
 2
4 
ho
ur
s.
7 
da
ys
 fo
r 
a 
sp
ec
ia
l p
ow
er
s 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n.
28
 d
ay
s 
fo
r 
a 
sp
ec
ia
l a
re
a 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n.
E
xt
en
si
o
n 
o
f 
au
th
o
ri
sa
tio
n
N
o
Ye
s 
– 
by
 th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 
fo
r 
G
ro
un
d 
(i)
.
N
o 
ex
te
ns
io
ns
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 fo
r 
in
 re
sp
ec
t o
f 
G
ro
un
ds
 (i
i) 
– 
(iv
), 
bu
t n
ew
 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
 
m
ay
 b
e 
gi
ve
n.
Ye
s 
– 
bo
th
 m
ay
 
be
 d
ou
bl
ed
 w
ith
 
co
nc
ur
re
nc
e 
of
 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
Ye
s 
– 
th
e 
P
re
m
ie
r 
an
d 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
ay
 a
pp
ro
ve
 a
 
fu
rt
he
r 
7 
da
ys
.
N
o,
 b
ut
 fu
rt
he
r 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
 
m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
in
 
re
sp
ec
t o
f s
am
e 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 
w
ith
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
of
 d
ou
bl
in
g 
th
e 
tim
e 
lim
its
.
Ye
s 
– 
th
e 
S
up
re
m
e 
C
ou
rt
 
ca
n 
ex
te
nd
 a
ll 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
 it
 
is
 e
m
po
w
er
ed
 to
 
gi
ve
.
N
o,
 b
ut
 a
 fu
rt
he
r 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
m
ay
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
in
 
re
sp
ec
t o
f t
he
 
sa
m
e 
te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t.
N
o,
 b
ut
 a
 fu
rt
he
r 
pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
or
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
iv
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
in
 
re
sp
ec
t o
f t
he
 
sa
m
e 
te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t.
A
n 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
m
ay
 b
e 
ex
te
nd
ed
 b
y 
7 
da
ys
 b
y 
th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
or
 a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 
of
fic
er
, w
ith
 
th
e 
ag
re
em
en
t 
of
 th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r, 
an
d 
th
en
 b
y 
a 
fu
rt
he
r 
14
 d
ay
s 
by
 th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
A
 s
pe
ci
al
 a
re
a 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n 
m
ay
 
be
 e
xt
en
de
d 
by
 
7 
da
ys
.
P
o
w
er
s 
th
at
 m
ay
 b
e 
ex
er
ci
se
d
Th
e 
po
w
er
s 
m
ay
 
be
 e
xe
rc
is
ed
:
(i)
 if
 a
 p
er
so
n 
is
 
in
 a
 p
re
sc
rib
ed
 
se
cu
rit
y 
zo
ne
, o
r
(ii
) i
f a
 p
er
so
n 
is
 in
 a
 
C
om
m
on
w
ea
lth
 
pl
ac
e 
(th
at
 is
 n
ot
 
a 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 
Th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pe
rs
on
s;
Th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pe
rs
on
s;
Th
e 
po
w
er
s 
m
ay
 
be
 e
xe
rc
is
ed
 
by
 a
 te
rr
or
is
t 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
of
fic
er
, b
ei
ng
 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
fo
rw
ar
d 
co
m
m
an
de
r 
or
 a
 
po
lic
e 
of
fic
er
 
Th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pe
rs
on
s;
 
Th
e 
sp
ec
ia
l 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pe
rs
on
s;
Th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
re
gu
la
te
	th
e	
m
ov
em
en
t 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
or
 
ve
hi
cl
es
 in
 
or
 o
ut
 o
f a
 
“t
ar
ge
t a
re
a”
;
Th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pe
rs
on
s;
Th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pe
rs
on
s;
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ta
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te
C
ri
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es
 A
ct
 
19
14
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(C
o
m
m
un
ity
 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n)
 A
ct
 
20
03
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 
A
ct
 2
00
2
P
ub
lic
 S
af
et
y 
P
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
A
ct
 1
98
6
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 
A
ct
 2
00
5
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
(P
ub
lic
 S
af
et
y)
 
A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
Te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
03
se
cu
rit
y 
zo
ne
) 
an
d 
an
 o
ffi
ce
r 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 
su
sp
ec
ts
 th
at
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
as
 
co
m
m
itt
ed
, i
s 
co
m
m
itt
in
g 
or
 is
 
ab
ou
t t
o 
co
m
m
it 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
.
Th
e 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y 
an
d 
r e
as
on
s 
fo
r 
be
in
g 
in
 th
e 
pl
ac
e;
•	
se
ar
ch
	
pe
rs
on
s 
an
d 
ve
hi
cl
es
, 
an
d 
se
iz
e 
an
d 
de
ta
in
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
te
rr
or
is
m
 o
r 
to
 a
no
th
er
 
se
rio
us
 
of
fe
nc
e.
Th
e 
po
lic
e 
ha
ve
 p
ow
er
 
to
 e
nt
er
 a
nd
 
se
ar
ch
 p
re
m
is
es
 
w
ith
ou
t a
 
w
ar
ra
nt
 in
 a
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y,
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 n
ot
 
co
nfi
ne
d 
to
 
th
e 
ab
ov
e 
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
al
 
ar
ea
s 
(s
ee
 th
e 
C
ov
er
t S
ea
rc
h 
W
ar
ra
nt
 ta
bl
e)
.
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
m
ov
e	
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
en
te
r	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pr
em
is
es
 
w
ith
ou
t a
 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
se
t 	u
p	
a	
co
rd
on
;
•	
se
iz
e	
an
d	
de
ta
in
 th
in
gs
.
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
en
te
r 	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pr
em
is
es
 
w
ith
ou
t a
 
w
ar
ra
nt
;
•	
se
t 	u
p	
a	
co
rd
on
;
•	
se
iz
e	
an
d	
de
ta
in
 th
in
gs
.
ac
tin
g 
on
 h
is
 o
r 
he
r 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
.
Th
e 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
re
gu
la
te
	th
e	
m
ov
em
en
t 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
or
 v
eh
ic
le
s 
in
 o
r 
ou
t o
f 
a 
“d
ec
la
re
d 
ar
ea
”;
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pe
rs
on
s.
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
en
te
r	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pr
em
is
es
;
•	
se
t	u
p	
a	
co
rd
on
;
•	
se
iz
e 
an
d 
de
ta
in
 
an
yt
hi
ng
 
r e
la
te
d 
to
 
te
rr
or
is
m
 o
r 
to
 a
no
th
er
 
se
rio
us
 
of
fe
nc
e.
If 
a 
“s
pe
ci
al
 
ar
ea
” 
is
 
de
cl
ar
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
of
 P
ol
ic
e 
(a
 
tr
an
sp
or
t h
ub
, 
th
e 
si
te
 o
f a
 
sp
ec
ia
l e
ve
nt
 o
r 
an
 a
re
a 
w
he
re
 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
ga
th
er
 in
 la
rg
e 
nu
m
be
rs
), 
of
fic
er
s 
m
ay
 
se
ar
ch
 b
ag
ga
ge
.
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
m
ov
e	
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
se
t	u
p	
a	
co
rd
on
;
•	
se
iz
e 
an
d 
de
ta
in
 th
in
gs
.
Th
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
po
w
er
s 
ar
e 
to
:
•	
st
rip
	s
ea
rc
h;
•	
en
te
r	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pr
em
is
es
 
w
ith
ou
t a
 
w
ar
ra
nt
.
•	
ob
ta
in
	
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
id
en
tit
y;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pe
rs
on
s;
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
en
te
r	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pr
em
is
es
;
•	
se
iz
e 	
an
d	
de
ta
in
 th
in
gs
;
•	
se
t	u
p	
a	
co
rd
on
 
ar
ou
nd
 a
n 
ar
ea
.
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
m
ov
e	
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
en
te
r	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pr
em
is
es
;
•	
se
t	u
p	
a	
co
rd
on
;
•	
se
iz
e	
an
d	
de
ta
in
 th
in
gs
.
•	
st
op
	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
en
te
r	a
nd
	
se
ar
ch
 
pr
em
is
es
;
•	
en
te
r	p
r e
m
is
es
	
fo
r t
he
 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
or
 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 a
 
pe
rs
on
.
U
nd
er
 a
 s
pe
ci
al
 
ar
ea
 d
ec
la
ra
tio
n,
 
of
fic
er
s 
m
ay
 
do
 a
ll 
of
 th
e 
ab
ov
e,
 b
ut
 m
ay
 
al
so
 s
ei
ze
 a
ny
 
te
rr
or
is
m
 o
r 
ot
he
r s
er
io
us
 
of
fe
nc
e 
re
la
te
d 
ite
m
s 
fo
un
d 
du
rin
g 
a 
se
ar
ch
.
O
th
er
 p
ow
er
s 
ar
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
on
 
pu
bl
ic
 h
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
sa
fe
ty
 g
ro
un
ds
 
un
de
r t
he
 A
ct
, 
w
ith
 n
o 
ne
ed
 fo
r 
an
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
or
 a
 d
ec
la
ra
tio
n,
 
if 
a 
te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
 
ha
s 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 o
r 
is
 im
m
in
en
t:
•	
m
ov
e 	
ve
hi
cl
es
;
•	
se
t	u
p	
a	
co
rd
on
;
•	
re
gu
la
te
	th
e	
m
ov
em
en
t 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
or
 
ve
hi
cl
es
 in
 o
r 
ou
t o
f a
n 
ar
ea
;
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ro
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o
lic
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o
w
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A
ct
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00
2
P
ub
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 S
af
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P
re
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at
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A
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98
6
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s)
 
A
ct
 2
00
5
P
o
lic
e 
P
o
w
er
s 
(P
ub
lic
 S
af
et
y)
 
A
ct
 2
00
5
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
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o
rd
in
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y 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
05
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
xt
ra
o
rd
in
ar
y 
Te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
03
•	
di
re
ct
 a
 
pe
rs
on
 to
 
re
m
ai
n 
in
 
or
 g
o 
to
 a
 
pl
ac
e 
fo
r 
de
co
nt
am
in
a-
tio
n 
or
 
qu
ar
an
tin
e 
fo
r 
up
 to
 4
8 
ho
ur
s 
(C
hi
ef
 M
ed
ic
al
 
O
ffi
ce
r h
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
po
w
er
s)
;
•	
en
te
r 	a
nd
	
m
ak
e 
sa
fe
 
co
nt
am
in
at
ed
 
pr
em
is
es
 
or
 p
re
m
is
es
 
da
m
ag
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
te
rr
or
is
t 
ac
t;
•	
de
st
ro
y 	
or
	
de
co
nt
am
in
-
at
e 
a 
th
in
g 
fo
un
d 
w
hi
ch
 is
 
a 
ris
k 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
.
P
ri
va
tiv
e 
cl
au
se
N
o
Ye
s,
 in
 re
sp
ec
t 
of
 in
te
rim
 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
.
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s,
 in
 re
sp
ec
t 
of
 s
pe
ci
al
 
po
w
er
s 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
or
 s
pe
ci
al
 a
re
a 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n.
Ye
s,
 in
 re
sp
ec
t 
of
 in
te
rim
 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
.
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s,
 in
 re
sp
ec
t 
of
 b
ot
h 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
 
an
d 
sp
ec
ia
l a
re
a 
de
cl
ar
at
io
ns
.
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ra
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Te
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P
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20
03
O
th
er
 r
el
ev
an
t 
p
ro
vi
si
o
ns
M
ay
 u
se
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
fo
rc
e.
M
ay
 a
cc
ep
t 
ou
ts
id
e 
as
si
st
an
ce
 
in
 s
ea
rc
hi
ng
 
pr
em
is
es
.
M
ay
 u
se
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
fo
rc
e.
M
ay
 g
iv
e 
di
re
ct
io
ns
 
to
 o
th
er
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
po
w
er
s 
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
M
ay
 u
se
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
fo
rc
e.
M
ay
 g
iv
e 
di
re
ct
io
ns
 
to
 o
th
er
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
po
w
er
s 
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
M
ay
 a
pp
oi
nt
 
A
FP
 o
r 
in
te
rs
ta
te
 
po
lic
e 
as
 la
w
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
of
fic
er
s 
fo
r 
th
is
 
P
ar
t, 
w
ho
 h
av
e 
al
l o
f t
he
 a
bo
ve
 
po
w
er
s.
M
ay
 g
iv
e 
di
re
ct
io
ns
 
to
 o
th
er
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
po
w
er
s 
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
A
ct
 a
ls
o 
co
nt
ai
ns
 
sp
ec
ia
l p
ow
er
s 
fo
r 
ch
em
ic
al
, 
bi
ol
og
ic
al
 o
r 
ra
di
ol
og
ic
al
 
em
er
ge
nc
ie
s.
M
ay
 u
se
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
fo
rc
e,
 b
ut
 
m
us
t n
ot
 in
fli
ct
 
un
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ha
rm
, 
hu
m
ilia
tio
n 
or
 
em
ba
rr
as
sm
en
t 
an
d 
m
us
t 
av
oi
d 
of
fe
nd
in
g 
ge
nu
in
el
y 
he
ld
 
cu
ltu
ra
l v
al
ue
s 
or
 
re
lig
io
us
 b
el
ie
fs
.
M
ay
 u
se
 s
uc
h 
as
si
st
an
ce
 a
s 
is
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y.
M
ay
 a
pp
oi
nt
 
A
FP
 o
r 
in
te
rs
ta
te
 
po
lic
e 
as
 la
w
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t 
of
fic
er
s 
fo
r 
th
is
 
P
ar
t.
M
ay
 u
se
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
fo
rc
e.
M
ay
 g
iv
e 
di
re
ct
io
ns
 
to
 o
th
er
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
po
w
er
s 
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
O
ffi
ce
r 
m
ay
 
au
th
or
is
e 
ot
he
r 
pe
rs
on
s 
to
 
as
si
st
 (m
ay
 n
ot
 
co
nd
uc
t s
tr
ip
 
se
ar
ch
).
M
ay
 u
se
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
fo
rc
e.
M
ay
 u
se
 s
uc
h 
as
si
st
an
ce
 a
s 
is
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y.
M
ay
 g
iv
e 
di
re
ct
io
ns
 
to
 o
th
er
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
po
w
er
s 
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
M
ay
 a
pp
oi
nt
 
A
FP
 o
r 
in
te
rs
ta
te
 
po
lic
e 
as
 s
pe
ci
al
 
of
fic
er
s 
fo
r 
th
is
 
P
ar
t .
M
ay
 u
se
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
fo
rc
e.
M
ay
 g
iv
e 
di
re
ct
io
ns
 
to
 o
th
er
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
po
w
er
s 
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
A
ll 
of
fic
er
s 
ex
er
ci
si
ng
 
po
w
er
s 
m
us
t 
ha
ve
 u
nd
er
ta
ke
n 
hu
m
an
 r
ig
ht
s 
tr
ai
ni
ng
.
E
vi
de
nc
e 
ob
ta
in
ed
 
th
ro
ug
h 
to
rt
ur
e 
is
 in
ad
m
is
si
bl
e.
M
ay
 g
iv
e 
di
re
ct
io
ns
 
to
 o
th
er
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
po
w
er
s 
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
R
ep
o
rt
in
g
N
o 
pr
ov
is
io
n.
Th
e 
P
re
m
ie
r 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
an
nu
al
 re
po
rt
 to
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
t.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 
a 
re
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
an
d 
th
e 
A
-G
 
as
 s
oo
n 
as
 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n 
ce
as
es
.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 
a 
re
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
w
ith
in
 
6 
m
on
th
s 
of
 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n.
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
us
t t
ab
le
 
th
e 
re
po
rt
 in
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
t 
w
ith
in
 6
 m
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 
a 
re
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
P
ol
ic
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
an
d 
th
e 
A
-G
 
as
 s
oo
n 
as
 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
an
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
ce
as
es
.
Th
e 
A
-G
 m
us
t 
ta
bl
e 
th
e 
re
po
rt
 
in
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t 
w
ith
in
 1
2 
si
tt
in
g 
da
ys
 o
f r
ec
ei
pt
.
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
an
nu
al
 re
po
rt
 to
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
t.
A
s 
so
on
 a
s 
is
 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
is
su
e 
of
 th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n,
 
th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t g
iv
e 
a 
w
rit
te
n 
re
po
rt
 to
 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 
a 
re
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
an
d 
th
e 
A
-G
 w
ith
in
 
30
 d
ay
s 
of
 
ce
ss
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n.
A
s 
so
on
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
ex
pi
ry
 o
f t
he
 
au
th
or
is
at
io
n,
 
th
e 
C
hi
ef
 P
ol
ic
e 
O
ffi
ce
r m
us
t g
iv
e 
a 
w
rit
te
n 
re
po
rt
 
to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r.
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
us
t p
re
se
nt
 
th
e 
re
po
rt
 to
 
th
e 
A
ss
em
bl
y 
no
 la
te
r 
th
an
 6
 
si
tt
in
g 
da
ys
 a
fte
r 
re
ce
ip
t.
Th
e 
an
nu
al
 
re
po
rt
 o
f t
he
Fo
r 
bo
th
 
sp
ec
ia
l p
ow
er
s 
au
th
or
is
at
io
ns
 
an
d 
sp
ec
ia
l a
re
a 
de
cl
ar
at
io
ns
, t
he
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 
a 
re
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
an
d 
th
e 
A
-G
 a
s 
so
on
 a
s 
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 a
fte
r 
th
ei
r 
ex
pi
ra
tio
n.
 
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
us
t r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
A
ss
em
bl
y 
w
ith
in
 6
 m
on
th
s 
of
 re
ce
ip
t 
(7
 d
ay
s 
in
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o
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P
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Te
rr
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sm
 
(E
xt
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Te
m
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ra
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P
o
w
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s)
 A
ct
 
20
06
Te
rr
o
ri
sm
 
(E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
P
o
w
er
s)
 A
ct
 
20
03
Th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
m
us
t t
ab
le
 
th
e 
re
po
rt
 in
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
t 
w
ith
in
 6
0 
da
ys
 
of
 re
ce
ip
t.
D
ire
ct
or
-G
en
er
al
 
un
de
r 
th
e 
A
nn
ua
l R
ep
or
ts
 
(G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
A
ge
nc
ie
s)
 A
ct
 
20
04
 m
us
t 
in
cl
ud
e 
an
 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
of
 th
e 
us
e 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 
th
is
 A
ct
.
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f a
 
sp
ec
ia
l a
re
a 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n)
.
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
A
ct
 
o
r 
P
ar
t
N
o 
(th
ou
gh
 w
as
 
re
vi
ew
ed
 in
 
20
13
).
B
y 
31
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
14
.
E
ve
ry
 3
 
ye
ar
s,
 a
fte
r 
O
m
bu
ds
m
an
 
ha
s 
re
po
rt
ed
 
on
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 
co
ve
rt
 s
ea
rc
h 
w
ar
ra
nt
 p
ow
er
s 
an
d 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 P
D
O
s 
(N
b:
 
O
m
bu
ds
m
an
 
ha
s 
no
 s
ta
nd
in
g 
in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 s
pe
ci
al
 
po
lic
e 
po
w
er
s)
.
5 
ye
ar
s 
af
te
r 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t.
2n
d  
an
d 
5t
h  
an
ni
ve
rs
ar
ie
s.
N
o
1s
t  a
nn
iv
er
sa
ry
 
th
en
 e
ve
ry
 3
 
ye
ar
s.
8 
ye
ar
s 
af
te
r 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t.
5 
ye
ar
s 
af
te
r 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t.
S
un
se
t 
cl
au
se
10
 y
ea
rs
 fr
om
 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t, 
be
in
g 
15
 
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5.
1 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
16
N
o
N
o
10
th
 
an
ni
ve
rs
ar
y 
of
 
co
m
m
en
ce
m
en
t, 
be
in
g 
8 
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5.
10
th
 
an
ni
ve
rs
ar
y 
of
 
co
m
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